Instability on Horizon
as Arab Regimes Remain Indecisive

Summary

Driven by a burgeoning youth population, stagnant economies and
the regionally unpopular U.S. war on terrorism, domestic
challenges in many Arab states are nearing critical mass. Arab
governments are moving to counter this trend and have taken a
number of unusual or unprecedented steps in recent months. But
the measures so far are half-hearted at best and will not resolve
the underlying pressures nor halt a surge in popular unrest in
the coming year.

Analysis

U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney arrived in Jordan March 12 on the
first leg of an 11-nation tour that includes nine Arab states,
Israel and Turkey. The vice president will be talking with
government leaders about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and
likely hoping to build support for a U.S. campaign against Iraq.

But bringing Arab governments on board will be difficult.
Mounting social and economic pressures, combined with the U.S.
hunt for al Qaeda, has made maintaining the status quo in the
Arab world impossible. The added pressure of a U.S. war against
Iraq could seriously destabilize several regimes in the region.
Several Arab leaderships are now taking extraordinary steps to
maintain calm, but their efforts are limited and may not stave
off an explosion in popular unrest within the next year.

Washington's hunt for al Qaeda is heating up in the Middle East,
with U.S. troops deploying into Yemen and Somalia and now
possibly preparing for an assault on Iraq. But the U.S. campaign
is widely unpopular in the Middle East. According to a Gallup
poll released in February that surveyed Middle East opinion after
Sept. 11, 61 percent of those surveyed did not believe the
attacks on the United States were carried out by Arabs, 77
percent said the U.S. war in Afghanistan was unjustified and 53
percent held an unfavorable opinion of the United States overall.

A U.S. military campaign against Iraq will only exacerbate these
resentments. Many Arab governments such as Egypt, Jordan and
Saudi Arabia may not support the war. But given their own
intimate relationships with the U.S. government, they aren't
likely to oppose it with anything more than rhetoric either. This
will stoke tension between frustrated and angry Arab citizens and
their governments.

Moreover, the tensions surrounding Iraq complicate an already
explosive situation. There are several reasons why Arab
governments are already feeling threatened, the most important
being that the Arab world as a whole has missed out on the
economic boom brought about by globalization. Indeed, although
the last decade has allowed for some economic development, many
Arab economies remain sluggish and tied to extractive industries.
Only Egypt and Jordan fall within the list of top 50 countries on
the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Index.

At the same time, a population bulge combined with high
unemployment is creating a pressure-cooker scenario across the
board. More than 50 percent of the population in Egypt, Jordan,
Saudi Arabia and Syria is under 25.

To counter the looming social problems and deflect the tension
created both by the U.S. war against al Qaeda and the cooperation
of Arab governments with Washington, many regimes are now taking
wide-ranging and unusually proactive measures.

The most telling example is the recent proposal by Saudi Crown
Prince Abdullah offering Arab recognition of Israel in exchange
for a return of all lands claimed by the Palestinians. The
initiative is highly unusual because Riyadh has never directly
involved itself in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is also
the first time any Arab government has promised the hand of all
Arab states in recognizing Israel. Saudi Arabia is hoping that by
becoming a key peacemaker in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it
can deflect U.S. pressure for internal reforms and avoid
participating in U.S. military operations in the region and
especially against Iraq.

The Saudi example is only one of many. In Syria, President Bashar
Assad is weakening the stranglehold his own ethnic group, the
Alawites, has on the government and the military in order to open
up jobs for a younger generation and strengthen his support among
that age group. In Bahrain, the Sunni Muslim king recently
transformed the emirate into a constitutional monarchy to pacify
the majority Shiite population. Jordan's King Abdullah has gone
the way of Egypt by actively supporting Washington's campaign
against al Qaeda. Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Salih is openly
allowing U.S. forces to hunt the terrorist group in his country,
and Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri is dismantling dynastic
monopolies on imports and implementing unprecedented value-added
taxes.

These reforms, measures and initiatives are meant to diffuse
popular resentment. But most are little more than cosmetic. For
example, the Saudi peace proposal does not have the full support
of all the Arab states and isn't likely to get it, despite
Riyadh's claims to the contrary. In Bahrain, the king will
establish a dual parliament, one elected and one appointed, which
limits the legislative power of the Shiite majority.

Since the steps taken are not decisive, they will not resolve
underlying pressures in many countries. For instance, Bahrain's
Shiite majority is willing to accept the concessions made by the
Sunni ruling elite, but only for the moment. Once it becomes
obvious that these measures are insufficient, the frustration and
dissent that prompted the changes will only resurface.

Arab governments are hoping that buying time will be all that's
needed to keep things from boiling over. But they may be
miscalculating the level of frustration that millions of
unemployed youths feel. Though military coups are the most common
source of regime changes in the region, they often ride a wave of
widespread social unrest. In the Arab world, such waves of
protest are now on the horizon. Who takes advantage of them is
the next question.