Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri dramatically rearranged the country's balance of political forces and altered its alignment between the Arab world and the West when he admitted that he had wrongly accused Syria of involvement in the 2005 assassination of his father. Hariri not only said he had made a mistake but also that the accusation against Syria had been politically motivated.

His admission will have far reaching consequences for Lebanon, the region, and external powers interfering in Lebanese and regional affairs.

While he attempted to explain his accusation against Syria by saying he had been misled by false testimony, he assumed responsibility for leveling the charge. He must be given credit for taking this stand. Politicians rarely admit they are wrong.

His admission has stunned former right-wing Maronite Christian partners and finished off the anti-Syrian March 14 Sunni-Maronite alliance formed after Rafiq Hariri and 22 others were slain by a massive bomb on February 14th, 2005. This grouping, always a co- alition of convenience, had already begun to fragment. One of its stalwarts, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt deserted March 14th some months ago and made peace with Damascus.

Saad Hariri has visited Damascus five times since he formed a government following last year's parliamentary election. Hariri's admission is the culmination of his effort to fully restore relations with Damascus. Charged with involvement in the killing of the ex-prime minister, Syria came under strong Lebanese, Arab and Western pressure to withdraw 29,000 troops and intelligence officers from Lebanon.

The troops had been deployed in June 1976 as peacekeepers at the request of Lebanese President Suleiman Frangie who wanted to prevent nationalist forces, led by Kamal Jumblatt, father of Walid, from defeating Phalange and Lebanese Forces militias seeking to maintain the leading Maronite political role in the country.

Syria was, however, restrained by the US, France, and Arab powers from intervening decisively to halt the conflict until October 1990 when Damascus was authorised to use force. Syrian forces stayed on in Lebanon until April 2005.

Syria's withdrawal, long over-due, was welcomed by a majority of Lebanese. However, the Shia Hizbollah and Amal movements tried to retain Syria as friend and ally while, encouraged by the US and France, Maronite right-wingers and Sunnis loyal to the Hariris continued to accuse and humiliate Damascus. Syria bided its time, certain that, eventually, Lebanon would seek reconciliation and rapprochement. This is precisely what happened.

Ever since France carved Lebanon out of Syria in 1920, the two countries have had a complicated and sometimes confrontational sibling relationship. Nevertheless, following their emergence as independent states, Syria has often mediated between fractious Lebanese politicians and stabilised volatile situations while Lebanon has been a commercial outlet for Syria and provided employment for millions of Syrian labourers. Lebanon cannot do without Syria while Syria feels bereft if it does not have good relations with Lebanon.

By distancing his Future party, which draws support from the Sunni community, from the rightist Maronites, Hariri has put the Sunnis back in the centre of the Lebanese political spectrum. They are now in a position to mediate between Maronites led by the rightist Phalange and Lebanese forces and Shias, Lebanon's largest community, represented by the Hizbollah and Amal movements.

Hariri's declaration is timely and, once again, politically motivated. Sunnis must act as a stabilising force when indictments are issued by the special tribunal established to try those accused of being responsible for the killing of the elder Hariri.

Sources in the tribunal have leaked to the younger Hariri information that may implicate figures belonging to Hizbollah, which has angrily denied any involvement. Hariri has said, however, that Hizbollah as a whole will not be charged. This has mollified the movement's leadership, which does not want another street clash with armed elements loyal to Hariri. Lebanese of all communities, still traumatised by civil conflict, were shocked and terrified when militiamen from Hizbollah and the Syrian Social National Party clashed with pro-Hariri elements in 2008.

Syria is certain to support the Hariri government and do its utmost to ensure that there is no repeat of this episode whatever the tribunal decides to do. Syria's ally, Iran, will follow Damascus lead. A renewal of violence in Lebanon does not suit either Syria or Iran. Syria has been seeking to cultivate good relations with Europe and the US. Iran, already facing tightening sanctions due to its nuclear programme, does not want to open up a new front in its long-standing confrontation with the West.

Beirut's rapprochement with Damascus came after the 2009 reconciliation between Syria and Saudi Arabia. Washington's oldest ally in the region, the Saudi monarchy also has close relations with the Hariri family. Rafiq Hariri was a former business partner of the late King Fahd. On the regional level, rapprochement with Syria drew Lebanon back into the Arab fold, strengthened by the reconciliation not only with Saudi Arabia but also with Jordan. This development followed a tentative warming of relations between Damascus and Washington.

Ever since its emergence as a separate entity Lebanon has been torn between its close cultural and political connections with the West and its Arab identity. This internal struggle produced both the 1958 and 1975-90 civil wars and sustained Lebanon's confessional divisions between Maronites, who favour the West, and Sunnis, who feel a close connection with the Arab world.

The rise of Shia mass movements in the 1970s complicated the picture by making Iran a key player on the Lebanese political scene.

Improved relations between Damascus and Lebanon's Sunnis, led by Hariri, and the close connection between Damascus and Tehran and the Shias, led by Hizbollah, mean that Beirut has distanced itself from Washington and is unlikely to play the US game on the regional level. This development comes at a time the Arabs are particularly disillusioned with the US which, a year ago under the

leadership of President Barack Obama, seemed to be adopting a more even-handed approach to the Palestinian/Arab-Israeli conflict and to be reaching out to Arabs and Muslims with the object of cultivating dialogue and improved relations.

But over the past year Obama has done nothing to halt Israel's colonisation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem or end Israel's siege and blockade of Gaza. While Obama is withdrawing US troops from Iraq, the US seems to be abandoning this country to political chaos and violence while stepping up operations in Afghanistan. On the home front, US citizens are displaying increased hostility towards Muslims who are reacting with anger and frustration. Christian Arabs are afraid they will be regarded as allies of the Christian West. At such times of trouble little Lebanon usually seeks the comfort of Syria's welcoming arms.

Michael Jansen is a freelance journalist and author of the book The Battle for Beirut: Why Israel Invaded Lebanon.