The large number of sometimes violent clashes between the religious right and the army (the incident involving the head of Israel Defense Forces Personnel Directorate, Major General Elazar Stern; the removal of soldiers from the Tomb of the Patriarchs; the confrontation during the most recent evacuations of outposts), on the one hand, and the declarations about "the conquest of the state and its elites," on the other - these have all created a sense that the "State of Judea" is about to take over the State of Israel, and that we should man the barricades already. Now.

But the apocalyptic description of the danger in itself stems from a combination of two mistaken assumptions: One, that the religious public is totally subordinate to its leadership and, therefore, if the latter calls for "a conquest of the state," hundreds of thousands of religious Zionists will join the battle as obedient soldiers. The second mistake is related to the mythic-demonic image of the settlers as "lords of the land," who succeed in bending all the Israeli governments to their will.

The reality of recent years should have discredited these myths. It has already been proved that even in Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) society, which has a relatively high level of centralization and obedience to rabbinic authority, the public does not always obey orders. This is even more true of religious Zionism, which is much more varied and decentralized: Most of its members do not believe in blind obedience to the rabbis, not to mention the fact that there are stormy disputes among the rabbis themselves. The mythological strength of the settlers stemmed mainly from the political alliance they forged with leading members of the secular right, especially Ariel Sharon, and in the absence of such an alliance, or alternatively, in face of the pressure being applied by a stronger power - such as the U.S. administration - even their demonic strength is revealed to be like that of Samson after his tresses were cut.

Anyone who didn't believe in this type of moderating influence before the disengagement, should at least have seen - in light of its results - to what extent the apocalyptic scenarios of a "civil war" and "the destruction of the Third Temple" were divorced from reality. This is because the vast majority of religious Zionists are, in fact, connected to Israeli society as a whole, and are committed to this connection not only as an ideology, but also as a spiritual need and as part of the fabric of their daily lives. For them, a position of isolationism, not to mention rebellion, is an even greater threat in terms of ideology and identity than is the evacuation of settlements.

Therefore, a call for isolationism and rebellion, even before it begins to affect society as a whole, if it ever does, will cause a deepening of the split within religious Zionism itself, and of the alienation toward that same isolationist group. This tendency has already been reflected in dozens of soul-searching conferences that have been held by religious Zionists since the disengagement.

Paradoxically, the only scenario in which an isolationist/rebellious stance could be adopted by the religious Zionist masses, would be in a case where Israel's elites make a mistake and identify the present call for defiance with all of religious Zionism, or even "only" with all the settlers. In such a case, there is liable to be a chain reaction that would lead to a "battle" against all of religious Zionism - an attempt to prevent the promotion of religious officers in the army, an undermining of all the hesder yeshivas (which combine Torah study and military service), a stubborn refusal to honor legitimate requests by religious Zionists (for example, regarding the integration of women into units of yeshiva students in the army, or the needs of the religious school system) and so on. In such a case, a feeling could spread among this public that it has been "marked," thus causing an augmentation of the desire for isolationism and rebellion, as a "self-fulfilling prophecy."

That doesn't mean that there is no danger in the present situation. It lies mainly in two focal points, the most prominent of them being the birth of a new generation of knitted-skullcap wearers. As opposed to the previous generation, which approached even the act of settlement out of motivation to "serve the country," and therefore accepted its authority when push came to shove, despite all the confrontation and trauma, many members of the new generation are motivation by New Age romanticism, which glorifies commitment to primeval values such as land and Torah, and sees commitment to "modern" values, such as the state and democracy, not only as less important, but even as negative. The second danger point can be found among some members of the older generation, who in cold political terms feel that they failed in the "balance of fear" that they tried to create in the past vis-a-vis the government, and are therefore liable to be tempted to support the young generation in its rebellious tendencies.

These phenomena definitely constitute a danger, and in the event that most of religious Zionism rejects them, their danger is even likely to increase - as is the case of all the desperate people who feel that even their public has become "bourgeoisie" and has betrayed them (Yigal Amir, the assassin of prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, testified about himself that he operated out of a similar feeling). But in order to deal properly with the danger, it is important to define correctly its circles and its scope: An eruption is liable to occur, which is a serious matter in itself, in the form of localized violent incidents, but not in the form of a sweeping rebellion on the part of all the settlers or all of religious Zionism. Such a distinction is important both for the issue itself and, as we have said, in order not to cause an expansion of the cycle of conflict.