|
||
 |
||
|
||
|
||
Iraq: Bin Laden and al-Zarqawi's Win-Win
Deal The town was the scene in September of Operation Restoring Rights, major joint U.S. and Iraqi army operation to root out nationalist and jihadist insurgents that had been using Tall Afar as a safe haven and base of operations. After his eviction from the town, al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi swore revenge and declared war on Iraq's Shiite Muslims for collaborating with the U.S.-led coalition. Tall Afar, however, is not a predominantly Shiite town, which suggests that, if the market indeed was the actual target, the attack could have been meant to punish the city's residents for allowing U.S forces to rout the insurgents. It also is possible that the suicide bomber detonated prematurely or that the attack was somehow botched. Either way, it is another high-profile act associated with al-Zarqawi and his jihadist network. Over the past year, Jordanian-born al-Zarqawi has largely eclipsed al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden as the world's most notorious terrorist -- at least in terms of operational performance. Since the release in May 2004 of a videotape showing the decapitation of U.S. citizen Nicholas Berg, who had been taken hostage by jihadists in Iraq, al-Zarqawi, rather than bin Laden, has received the most attention from the media and the U.S. government. In his own constituency, however, he is far from rivaling the leadership of al Qaeda stalwarts Osama bin laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri. In fact, his extreme positions against the Shia, and the killing of Muslim civilians in Iraq by his bombers, have raised suspicions about his agenda. By conducting multiple and relatively frequent high-profile suicide bombings and other attacks in Iraq, al-Zarqawi's network has contributed to the deaths of more than 5,000 civilians and members of the Iraqi security forces since April alone, in addition to hundreds of U.S. soldiers and Marines. In the same time period, the rest of al Qaeda has been unable to effectively operate against the U.S. and Afghan governments in Afghanistan. Al-Zarqawi's network in Iraq, which numbers anywhere from 500 to 1,500 members, makes up a small percentage of the total insurgency, estimated at between 15,000 and 20,000 fighters. The jihadists, however, are associated with some of the insurgency's most violent attacks. In some cases, suicide bombers deployed by al-Zarqawi's network have caused more than 100 deaths in a single attack. In addition, they have also attacked high-profile targets such as the U.N. headquarters and foreign embassies in Baghdad. The Sunni nationalists who constitute the bulk of the insurgency allow the jihadists to operate in Iraq because al-Zarqawi's network has proven to be an effective weapon against the coalition and Iraq's Shiite-dominated government. In October 2004, al-Zarqawi released a statement in which he announced his allegiance to bin Laden, and began referring to his network in Iraq, Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (Unification and Holy War Group), as Tandheem al-Qaeda fil Bilad al-Rafidain (al Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers). In a December 2004 statement, bin Laden confirmed this alliance, referring to al-Zarqawi as the "Leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq." In reality, by associating his network with al Qaeda, al-Zarqawi has made it stand out among the many jihadist and nationalist insurgent groups operating in Iraq. He has basically gotten "name-brand recognition." Allowing al-Zarqawi to use the al Qaeda name benefited bin Laden as well. The war in Afghanistan has not gone well for al Qaeda, as U.S. and Afghan forces have operated effectively against the jihadists. In fact, there has been virtually no al Qaeda activity in the country since the network was forced out in late 2001 -- the Taliban are the ones who are fighting in Afghanistan. As a result, al Qaeda has not been able to disrupt the political process in Afghanistan. Since his trail went cold after the battle of Tora Bora in January 2002, bin Laden has been in hiding, and his statements have been limited to a few video or audiotape messages released every few months. There is even speculation that the al Qaeda leader is dead. With these factors keeping him out of the news, bin Laden might have realized that he was in danger of being obscured by other developments in the global jihadist movement. In exchange for the use of the al Qaeda name, then, bin Laden gets to associate his network with the fight against the U.S. in Iraq -- and keep his name in the fight. If bin Laden is alive, he and his close associates possibly are able to engage in the broad strategic planning, financing and ordering of operations -- but at a slow pace. In addition, the nature of his isolation makes it difficult for him to rapidly respond to developments and ongoing crises. In Iraq, however, al-Zarqawi only had to abduct a foreigner, kill the hostage and post the act on the Internet, and he received instant international media coverage. Al-Zarqawi's relatively higher profile in Iraq may work
against him, however. He has narrowly escaped death or capture by U.S. and Iraqi troops on
numerous occasions, and there is always the possibility that his Iraqi Sunni hosts may
betray or dispose of him and his network if they no longer have use for him. |
||
|
||
Copyright © 2005 Strategic Forecasting Inc. All rights reserved. |
||
|
||
Copyright © 1999-2005 Lenanonwire®.com. All rights reserved. |
||
|
