Iran, Iraq and the West: Accusations and Denials

Summary

Iran categorically denied Oct. 6 that it is behind an increase in attacks against British troops in southern Iraq, saying that scandals the United Kingdom has faced in Iraq have made London invent "this lie." Taking a tongue-lashing from Washington, London and Riyadh over the country's nuclear ambitions, the Islamic republic is using the Iraq card to give the West a choice -- to treat Iran as a cooperative partner in stabilizing Iraq, or as an enemy with enough assets to stir up trouble for coalition troops in Iraq.

Analysis

British Prime Minister Tony Blair said Oct. 6 that new explosives used by insurgent groups in Iraq could be linked to Iran or to Lebanon-based militant group Hezbollah, although he said he lacked conclusive evidence to back up the claim. Blair's statements were immediately followed by a stern denial from the Iranian Foreign Ministry, which accused Britain of diverting blame for the continued insecurity and instability in Iraq and reiterated Iran's interest in supporting a positive and constructive policy toward its Iraqi neighbor. Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari then said that he does not agree with accusations that Iranian Shiite Muslims are interfering in Iraq's internal affairs, adding that current relations between the two countries are friendly. Finally, Hezbollah rejected Blair's accusations as excuses for its inability to effectively counter resistance in Iraq.

The stream of accusations and denials began Oct. 5 when the United Kingdom said that Tehran's elite Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps supplied a dissident faction of the Mehdi Army -- the armed wing of radical Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr's movement -- with technology developed by the Lebanese radical Shiite Islamist group Hezbollah to manufacture an "explosively shaped projectile."

That Iran is backing Shiite militants is no surprise -- neither are reports that tie Hezbollah to Iraq; Iraqi officials have said that the Lebanese Islamist group had facilities in southern Iraq. In fact, there is an Iraqi Hezbollah group with ties to controversial Iraqi Shiite politician Ahmed Chalabi. The Iraqi Hezbollah was included in the first Iraqi political body created by the U.S.-led coalition when the group's leader, Abdel-Karim Mahoud al-Mohammedawi, was appointed by the Coalition Provisional Authority to the Iraqi Governing Council in July 2003.

With these assets in hand, Iran is demonstrating its capability to unleash the Shia against U.S.-led coalition forces if pressure against Tehran exceeds the Iranian regime's tolerance level. Iran, however, has a sincere interest in seeing a Shiite-dominated government emerge in Baghdad to expand the Shiite orbit of influence into the epicenter of the Arab world. Why, then, would Tehran encourage Shiite militias to attack coalition forces?

Iran is searching for a way to escape the pressure cooker, as the list of problems confronting the regime grows by the day. On Oct. 6, U.S. President George W. Bush accused Iran of using "terrorist propaganda to blame their own failures on the West and America and on the Jews" and said that state sponsors of terrorism do not deserve any more patience. On the nuclear issue, India has publicly withdrawn support for Iran by siding with Washington out of its own self-interest. Furthermore, relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran have become increasingly strained over political developments in Iraq, as Riyadh has publicly voiced its concerns over Iran's influence seeping across its borders into Iraq. Finally, a look into the Shiite heartland reveals a schism within the clerical regime in Tehran, which is struggling to repair any damage done by the newly elected regime of younger and inexperienced regime loyalists in handling the nuclear crisis.

Iran's main objective is to restart negotiations to buy time on the nuclear affair and avoid being referred to the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) on Nov. 24 when the board of governors meets next at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) headquarters in Vienna. In the meantime, Iran must consider what leverage it can use to counteract growing pressure against the regime. Following India's move to back Washington against Iran, Tehran hinted that it could play the oil card to bring energy-hungry allies to its side. The Iranian president later denied ever dropping that hint, but in any case Tehran would be shooting itself in the foot by limiting its own oil revenues. Faced with this difficult choice, Tehran has decided to use Iraq as its tool of choice.

The political process in Iraq is certainly progressing according to Iran's wishes. The Shiite-led government in Baghdad has made assurances to pave the way for the likely passage of the Iraqi constitution in the Oct. 15 referendum, and for elections in December to consolidate heavy Shiite control in the country in accordance with Iranian interests. To maintain its confident posture, however, Tehran must signal to London and Washington that the Western powers and Saudi Arabia will be unable to diminish its growing influence in Iraq. As a result, its support of Iraqi Shiite militias allows Tehran to remind U.S.-led coalition forces that it has the power to make an already dire situation even worse. The targeting of British forces for the attacks is based on the Iranian assessment that, because the two sides have diplomatic ties with each other, London will not take drastic steps in retaliation.

Meanwhile, Iran can focus on resuming talks with the European trio of the United Kingdom, France and Germany to buy time on the nuclear issue. Tehran and Washington have long been engaged in backchannel talks while the nuclear crisis continues to absorb the media's attention. This concealed level of cooperation came to light Oct. 6 when it was revealed that a U.S. State Department briefing proposed to the Bush administration to consider enhancing diplomatic contact with Iran. According to the report, the briefing has been circulated as part of an effort to thwart Iranian nuclear ambitions and to effect domestic political change in the Islamic republic -- which entails approaching close associates of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and even opening up a small "interests section" in Tehran staffed by U.S. consular officers.

A resumption of negotiations over Iran's nuclear program is likely to take place in the coming month. To keep Iran on its toes, tame domestic dissent and placate Riyadh, Washington will continue to publicly ratchet up the pressure against Tehran. In the meantime, Iran will need to utilize its Iraq lever with extreme caution to prevent the Nov. 24 IAEA meeting from opening the door to a UNSC referral.

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