Al-Zarqawi's Calculus
By Fred Burton

In recent days, there have been numerous reports in the press and from government sources speculating whether al Qaeda -- meaning both the leader of its Iraqi branch, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and foreign Sunni fighters -- might be preparing to vacate Iraq. It is interesting to us that the questions are being raised simultaneously by a number of independent sources -- interesting, but not altogether surprising, given some of the tremendous pressures now being brought to bear against jihadists in Iraq.

The pressures are building to incredible levels as Iraqis prepare to vote in an Oct. 15 referendum on the new constitution. As we have noted on several occasions, foreign jihadists have been piggybacking off the Sunni nationalist insurgency since formal combat in the war ended in 2003 -- creating an incredibly complex dynamic. The jihadists have been actively attempting to discourage Sunni participation in the vote -- or buy-in of any sort in the political process -- and for good reason. There is a very real danger that Sunni political involvement would eventually deprive the jihadists of their support and base of operations in Iraq. Indeed, there have been several signs that many Iraqi Sunnis are distancing themselves from the foreign jihadists. At the same time, U.S. and Iraqi forces are mounting a fresh military offensive targeting the jihadists in different parts of the country.

But there could be even more direct threats to al-Zarqawi at the moment.

A week ago, the U.S. military announced that troops had killed a man who was believed to be al-Zarqawi's top deputy, Sheikh Abdullah Abu Azzam, and captured another militant in a raid in Baghdad. Al Qaeda, in its own statement, confirmed the death but attempted to cast doubts on just how well-placed Azzam actually was within the organization. If more recent statements by Iraqi officials are reliable, however, it would appear that he was extremely well-placed: The country's interior minister said this week that the Iraqis had "got hold of a very important letter" from Azzam to al-Zarqawi discussing the repatriation of the foreign jihadists -- who have now obtained valuable skills in explosives and other tactics -- back to their home countries.

Leaving the contents of the letter aside for the moment, the statement itself indicates that the U.S. and Iraqi forces involved in the Baghdad raid were able to pick up some useful intelligence concerning al-Zarqawi. Had Azzam been captured alive -- which was the U.S. forces' intent -- he would have been treated as a treasure trove of information about al-Zarqawi (who has a $25 million bounty on his head) and other issues. He apparently went down fighting, leaving intelligence agents to pick through personal effects, computer files, cell-phone records, pocket litter and any other forensic evidence they could find to continue mapping out al Qaeda's network and strategy. If al-Zarqawi is one to be concerned about his own hide, the Baghdad raid in itself could have him thinking about relocation.

Now, the reliability of Iraqi statements about Azzam is not a given. Officials in Baghdad have been pressuring Iraq's Sunni Arab neighbors to help suppress the movement of jihadists into the country, and it's not inconceivable that the interior minister, Bayan Jabor, used the news of the raid and Azzam's death to further the political point. It is also possible that the purported letter from Azzam does not exist at all. To a certain degree, however, that is a moot point, because the incentive for al-Zarqawi and his fighters to vacate Iraq -- with U.S. forces are now conducting a highly public new offensive, and the outcome of the Oct. 15 vote is far from certain -- is very real.

But there also is incentive for them to stay. And which way the pendulum swings, in the end, will make a world of difference for the political, commercial and security dynamics of the Middle East.

For purposes of this discussion, it is important to treat the movement of skilled al Qaeda operatives and the possible relocation of al-Zarqawi himself separately. Both are important issues that point to the potential future for al Qaeda, but they are not, strictly speaking, interchangeable.

Certainly, the repatriation -- or export, if you will -- of skilled logisticians and fighters, from what could be viewed as the training ground of Iraq, would have serious implications elsewhere. It has been our view that al Qaeda, as an organization, has taken serious losses over the past four years, particularly at the middle level of the organization -- the tactical planners, logistical operatives and bomb-makers who, at the height of al Qaeda's strength, were moving between the top leadership and the grassroots jihadists and would-be suicide bombers around the world. If the young jihadists who have gained valuable on-the-job training in Iraq -- which has acted as something of a magnet for the ideologically inflamed -- were to disperse outward, that middle layer could be reconstituted.

At the same time, such a diaspora would lend itself to a shift that has become more evident in recent months: the broadening of al Qaeda from a centrally guided organization toward more of a grassroots-fed movement. In this sense, the mention by Jabor that jihadists might return to their home countries "to transfer their experience in car bombings in Iraq" is sinister and significant, since such a move would be entirely in keeping with bin Laden's original goal for al Qaeda -- to serve as "the base" from which generations of Mujahideen would draw strength for their own insurgencies against apostate regimes in the Muslim world.

Viewed in the narrowest sense, the shift toward local insurgencies is troublesome. Setting aside the possibility of an Iraqi jihadist diaspora, it means that al Qaeda-related activity would become more widespread but shallower -- with still-deadly but likely smaller-scale attacks around the world carried out by agents with little tactical training or expertise. However, if operatives who have trained in Iraq (where improvised explosive devices are making quantum leaps forward in terms of design and technology) are able to escape and mount new attacks elsewhere, we would probably have to remove "shallower" from the assessment.

For al-Zarqawi himself, as a highly recognized lieutenant within the wider al Qaeda network, the question of whether to stay or quit Iraq is less clear-cut. There are, of course, questions of personal survival, but there also is a much more complex question as to al-Zarqawi's own ideological motivations and ambitions.

Certainly, any decision to stay put would be fraught with peril. There are the fractures within Iraq's Sunni community, the military pressures being exerted and the distinct possibility that his enemies might have just acquired significant intelligence -- about his current location, his plans, other members of the network and the like -- in the raid in which Azzam was killed. Meanwhile, another militant is in custody and, in all likelihood, being ruthlessly interrogated. If al-Zarqawi has any worries about what U.S. intelligence now knows, or about which of his associates may have been set up for surveillance, he probably feels that his own personal room to maneuver is growing quite small.

But this is where psychology comes into play. From his history, al-Zarqawi appears to be a swashbuckler: He burst independently onto the Iraqi scene in 2003 and made a name for himself by carrying out a series of gruesome, televised beheadings -- only later declaring allegiance to bin Laden's al Qaeda network, whose brand was so much better known than his own Jamaat al-Tawhid and Jihad organization. Moreover, despite the massive bounty on his head, he has been able to elude detection -- by some reports, narrowly -- and his forces have been able to continue with serious attacks against the motorcades of diplomats and other targets for quite some time. Al-Zarqawi very well might have reasons to feel confident and secure even if, in reality, he is not. The ego is a powerful (often unpredictable) force. There is also, of course, ideology: If he is a true believer, al-Zarqawi would hold that Allah will rid Iraq of the infidels, and that he and his forces are Allah's slaves in that cause.

It has been speculated that al-Zarqawi has aspirations, or is otherwise in the running, to rise up as a regional commander in al Qaeda's corporate structure. There are arguments for and against such a move: For one thing, it is not at all clear that al Qaeda still has a need for a formal "corporate structure," and it also must be noted that even among jihadists, al-Zarqawi is quite the controversial figure, given his penchant for ordering attacks against Muslim civilians. But, on the other hand, he is clearly a "doer," and that has made him valuable when top leaders like Ayman al-Zawahiri are in hiding, and when it is no longer clear whether Osama bin Laden is even alive. For dyed-in-the-wool jihadists, al-Zarqawi certainly has enough name recognition and street credibility to become a powerful and inspirational commander, which might help to shore up the image that al Qaeda seeks to project as the vanguard of political change within the Muslim world.

That said, it is not a foregone conclusion that he would have to relocate from Iraq in order to achieve greater power within the al Qaeda organization, nor even that vacating Iraq would be in al Qaeda's near-term interests, despite the pressures now in play.

There are two critical factors to consider here: The longevity of a major U.S. presence in Iraq and the true strategic value of Iraq as a base of operations -- for either side -- in the Middle East. While we cannot do more than raise pertinent questions about these issues and speculate on al-Zarqawi's mindset, we can say unequivocally that both factors are on the minds of U.S. leaders and, therefore, it is logical to assume they have at least entered the minds of jihadist leaders as well.

The timing of a U.S. troop withdrawal cannot but be crucial in al-Zarqawi's personal calculus, and U.S. political debates about when to withdraw have been public for quite some time. As the jihadists are likely very aware, the issue is a dicey one for President George W. Bush: Publicly, the president has vowed to stay the course -- but privately, knowledgeable U.S. government sources have told us, he is considering a significant drawdown before the congressional midterms take place next year, regardless of the status of an Iraqi constitution or ability to transfer security responsibilities reliably to Iraqi forces.

If al-Zarqawi buys into the public rhetoric, he might well conclude that long-term military pressures would make his continued sojourn in Iraq untenable. But if he bets -- as al Qaeda has in the past -- that the Americans are likely to fold sooner rather than later, logic would dictate that, if he is able (or if his command structure is strong enough that he need not be concerned primarily with his own physical survival), he would hunker down and wait out the storm. There certainly is precedent to follow: The victory of the Mujahideen in Afghanistan was won through patiently outlasting and wearing down the Soviets.

As we have noted, al-Zarqawi's forces are conducting a very aggressive campaign in the run-up to the Oct. 15 referendum, attempting to influence (or simply prevent) the Sunni vote. Moreover, al-Zarqawi has just issued fresh calls for a Ramadan offensive, meaning the current spate of violence is likely to continue for at least a few more weeks.

But from a tactical perspective, there would be real value in dialing back the attacks and then, eventually, simply lying low for a time once the Ramadan season and the Iraqi vote have passed -- regardless of the outcome of that vote. Given the recent crackdowns and all the speculation about a fresh jihadist diaspora, this could generate the impression that the militants have been wiped out, or at least sufficiently neutralized that plans for a U.S. hand-off and withdrawal will proceed apace. That would leave a fledgling government and predominantly Shiite security forces in control -- neither of which could be viewed in the same formidable light as the U.S. military. The implications need hardly be stated, and the gloomy scenarios -- for multinational companies, the economy, the oil markets, the political sphere -- spin up easily.

Again, we cannot know what is in the minds of al-Zarqawi or his associates, wherever they may reside in al Qaeda's command chain. Nor can they know precisely what is in the minds of U.S. leaders, though both sides could hazard educated guesses. We can expect to see a battle of wits playing out over the coming weeks, in which a post-election lull on al Qaeda's part could be an important stratagem.