The existence of contingency plans for a U.S. military drawdown in Iraq comes as no surprise, but the fact that Gen. Ray Odierno publicly announced such plans is noteworthy. Odierno’s announcement speaks to conflicting short- and long-term goals in the country and the region, especially in regard to Iran.

Analysis

Gen. Ray Odierno, the commander of United States Forces-Iraq (USF-I), has made it publicly clear that the United States has alternative drawdown plans for Iraq, not just the official plan to bring home some 46,000 of the 96,000 U.S. troops that remain in the country by the end of August. Under the current scheme, U.S. troop numbers will remain steady for two months after Iraq’s delayed national parliamentary elections, now slated for March 7, then rapidly draw down to around 50,000 by the end of August, including the withdrawal of all “combat” troops — those scheduled to remain will be engaged in training, advising and supporting Iraqi security forces.

While contingency plans are something USF-I was certain to have prepared, the public announcement of such plans is noteworthy and comes at an important geopolitical juncture, as the United States has several competing interests in which the Iraq drawdown plays a significant part.

Afghanistan is certainly a consideration. While the timetable for an Iraq drawdown is subject to change, the Pentagon already has begun shifting its military focus eastward and sending troops and materiel into the land-locked country. Though a significant contingent of U.S. troops will remain in Iraq to train, advise and support the Iraqis until at least the end of 2011, the U.S. government has no intention of sustaining nearly 100,000 troops in Iraq any longer than absolutely necessary.

At the heart of the issue is Iran, the single most influential regional player in Iraq. And when it comes to Iran, the United States has competing short- and long-term interests with regards to the status and size of USF-I. At the height of the violence in Iraq in 2006, U.S. troops were suffering at the hands of deadly improvised explosive devices known as explosively formed projectiles that could be traced back to Iran.

With so many American troops on the streets just across the border in Iraq, Iran had a number of militant proxies and weapons with which it could intensify the costs of the U.S. occupation in terms of lives. U.S. troops are nowhere near as ubiquitous on Iraq’s streets as they once were, and they are far less vulnerable now than they were then, but so long as they remain in Iraq in significant numbers, they will remain in close proximity and vulnerable to Iranian machinations.

Similarly, Iran retains enough influence and militant ties in Iraq that it could attempt to reignite ethno-sectarian tensions, undermining all that the United States has accomplished with the surge. Even beyond the potential for the loss of U.S. lives, the delicate ethno-sectarian balance of power was hard won, and Iran’s leverage should not be underestimated.

The combination of these two levers — the ability to inflict casualties on U.S. troops specifically and the ability to undermine the security and political situation in Iraq generally — makes for one of Iran’s most compelling deterrents to attack. If the United States has to choose between keeping Iraq stable or attacking Iran at the price of that stability, Washington has thus far chosen the former. So the drawdown of USF-I is an attractive way to reduce American vulnerability and strengthen the American position in regard to Iran.

But in the short term, U.S. combat power in Iraq is also a powerful countervailing force against Iranian influence and meddling. It is a stabilizing force when it comes to balancing ethno-sectarian tensions and maintaining the fragile balance of power. And it allows the United States more military options when it comes to supporting Iraqi security forces and keeping a lid on the security situation — thereby lending enormous political leverage to the United States over the Iraqi government.

Odierno has now signaled that the United States takes this latter consideration — leaving forces in place to maintain stability — every bit as seriously as the former — extricating U.S. forces from the conflict. Though officially Iran is not a consideration in terms of the drawdown timetable, Tehran’s influence and intentions regarding Iraq are of central importance.

This article is published at Lebanonwire by agreement with www.stratfor.com, the world's leading private intelligence provider.

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