Iraq’s electoral commission Feb. 4 asked the country’s highest judicial power to decide whether an appellate court ruling allowing disqualified candidates to run in March 7 parliamentary elections is binding. On the same day, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki met with the Speaker of Parliament Iyad al-Samarrai, one of the country’s top Sunni leaders, where al-Maliki called for an emergency parliament session to discuss the legal controversy. Earlier, Iraqi National Coalition (INC) member Hamam Hamoudi said Feb. 4 that an appellate court decision issued Feb. 3 permitting more than 500 candidates with alleged ties to the Baath Party to participate in March parliamentary elections has no constitutional basis. The INC is a predominantly Shiite coalition led by Iran’s closest ally in Iraq, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI).

The appellate decision overturning the Baathist ban issued by the Justice and Accountability Commission (JAC), a Shiite-led body spearheading a national policy of debaathification, does not guarantee that Sunnis who run will be able to take office. Without such a guarantee, Iraq’s security situation will remain in flux.

The United States has pushed for such a ruling to defuse sectarian tensions ahead of the March vote. U.S. involvement in the matter has created a controversy between the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and the JAC. Commission chief Ali Faisal al-Lami called on the Iraqi government, especially the Foreign Ministry, to ask the U.S. Embassy to stop interfering in the matter. The embassy, however, welcomed the appellate decision and brushed aside al-Lami’s criticism, saying the JAC chief should approach the Iraqi judiciary on the matter.

U.S. involvement is related to concerns that Sunni disenfranchisement is likely to spark a renewed Iraqi Sunni insurgency — something that would severely complicate the U.S. withdrawal timetable from Iraq. Recent attacks against Shiite pilgrims in Karbala have highlighted the danger of a Sunni militant revival. According to a STRATFOR source, Iraqi Baathist insurgents were in fact involved in the attacks.

To counter this risk, U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden was in Iraq on Jan. 23 working to convince al-Maliki to repeal the Baathist ban in the interest of stability. To induce al-Maliki to comply, a STRATFOR source says Washington transferred Ali Hassan al Majeed (aka Chemical Ali), who was promptly hanged Jan. 25. Al-Maliki reportedly hoped the hanging of Chemical Ali would improve al-Maliki’s political standing ahead of the elections. In any event, al-Maliki also has grown concerned over the Baathist ban. This is because many of those on the blacklist, including leading Sunni politician Salih al-Mutlak, are on good terms with Iyad Allawi, a key Shiite rival of al-Maliki for the premiership.

Al-Maliki’s State of Law coalition also expressed reservations Feb. 3 about the decision to overturn the Baathist ban, claiming that the reversal was done “without much thought” and questioning whether “interference and political pressure” motivated the ruling. Al-Maliki is likely working to deflect criticism of a backroom deal between Washington and al-Maliki to back off the Baathist ban by joining the chorus of skeptics rejecting the decision. This political wrangling will continue to intensify in the lead-up to elections. Ultimately, the lack of guaranteed representation for Sunnis means Iraq’s security situation will remain volatile.

Iran’s quiet moves in this controversy will play a critical role. Tehran wants to signal to Washington that its influence over Iraqi Shiite politicians can seriously derail U.S. disengagement plans. Iran can exploit the political crisis in Baghdad for better or for worse in its own back-channel negotiations with the United States.

This article is published at Lebanonwire by agreement with www.stratfor.com, the world's leading private intelligence provider.

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