The Implications of a Partial U.N. Relocation From Afghanistan

THE UNITED NATIONS on Thursday announced plans to relocate about 600 personnel who have been working in Afghanistan. The move follows a recent attack on U.N. living quarters in Kabul that left six people dead. The relocation is intended to be temporary, and U.N. personnel will continue to work on their projects from afar. But the message is clear: U.N. officials believe that the organization’s foreign employees in Afghanistan are vulnerable.

Even as U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration contemplates its strategic options in Afghanistan, senior commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal is pushing forward with a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. This model of warfare entails a generally protracted effort to win the support of the local population. As an outside power, the U.S. military has inherent difficulty with blending in and understanding the local population. This limits the availability of intelligence, it makes identifying the enemy difficult, and it can make traditional advantages -- such as overwhelming firepower -- self-defeating if they are not wielded with discretion.

But COIN also implies the need to establish a friendly political environment. NATO forces use provincial reconstruction teams that coordinate a broader spectrum of government services than military units can provide. Aid agencies are also critical and will continue to play an important role after troops have left.

Attacking aid agencies therefore can be an effective tool. Aid agencies can be particularly casualty-averse (especially when it comes to Western foreign nationals), and when push comes to shove, they are not able to operate in highly dangerous conditions. While they take advantage of the opportunity to employ locals, they also rely on an outside, professional presence to orchestrate operations.

"The more that can be done outside of the military rubric, the more the military will be able to focus on its core goal: security."
Aid agencies have to be visible, dispersed and engaged with populations that may or may not be friendly to foreign powers. Essentially, if they are to conduct operations, they are vulnerable to attack. In less hostile environments, this is part of the job. But when there cannot be a reasonable expectation of security, they cannot do their jobs. If the U.N. is not able to protect its personnel in Kabul, it speaks volumes about maintaining safety throughout the country.

The more that can be done outside of the military rubric, the more the military will be able to focus on its core goal: security. The problem is that if aid agencies are unable to help with the development side of counterinsurgency, the burden falls to an overstretched military -- or the work doesn't get done.

Provincial reconstruction teams are still at work. Thousands of Afghan nationals are still employed by the U.N. But on Thursday, the U.N. took a significant step back from Afghanistan -- a step that parallels those of many NATO states that refuse to commit new resources and are anxious to withdraw from the country.

The U.N. has not given up on Afghanistan. But by drawing down personnel at what McChrystal repeatedly has declared to be the critical moment in the now 8-year-old campaign, the move raises serious questions about the efficacy of the current strategy.

This article is published at Lebanonwire by agreement with www.stratfor.com, the world's leading private intelligence provider.

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