Iran plans to present its position on a U.N.-drafted nuclear fuel deal on Oct. 29. Sticking to tradition, Iran ignored the earlier deadline of Oct. 23 to give a response to the P-5+1 on the plan to ship its low-enriched uranium (LEU) abroad, stalled for a few days and then drafted up a counterproposal designed to prolong the talks.

Iran has already made clear that it is unsatisfied by the plan to ship the bulk of its LEU out of the country for further enrichment. An Iranian state television report from Oct. 26 caveated that Iran would be demanding significant amendments to the proposal. Those amendments are unlikely to satisfy the P-5+1 negotiating team, and so the negotiations will continue -- or so Iran hopes.

Iran may be taking note of a critical meeting occurring in Moscow Oct. 28 between U.S. National Security Adviser James Jones and Russian Security Council Chief (and former Federal Security Service head) Nikolai Patrushev and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Patrushev is believed to have extended the invitation to Jones in the past week, and STRATFOR sources in the Kremlin have indicated that in this meeting, Lavrov will be trying to get a better read on U.S. intentions regarding Iran.

Before heading to Moscow, Jones said Oct. 27 that the United States will respond if the negotiations with Iran fail to produce concrete results. He reiterated that Iran "now needs to follow through on its commitments" and that "nothing is off the table" in terms of U.S. options in dealing with Iran. While maintaining an expected level of ambiguity, Jones is clearly signaling that the U.S. administration is prepared to take a tougher stance on Iran and will not allow this diplomatic phase to continue indefinitely -- a pledge that Obama recently made to Israel.

Israel, meanwhile, is keeping quiet, but is also busy laying the groundwork for more decisive action against Iran. The Israelis have been engaged in some complex diplomatic maneuvers as of late. Opposition leader and former Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni is (not coincidentally) in Moscow the same day Jones is meeting with Lavrov. It is important to keep in mind that the Israeli political system operates very differently from the U.S. system. Even though Livni is in the opposition, she is still very much in the ruling circle, which includes Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Ehud Barak and President Shimon Peres. Livni can thus be dispatched as an Israeli emissary to negotiate with the Russians and still maintain some deniability by being in the opposition.

Livni appears to be playing the role of good cop for Israel in dealing with the Russians. Israel has deep concerns about Russian support for Iran, and does not want Moscow to deliver on threats to supply Iran with strategic weapons systems that could seriously complicate a potential military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. While Livni is aiming for a strategic compromise while in talks with Lavrov, Barak has been meeting with Polish and Czech leaders in Central Europe. By sending a clear warning to Moscow that Israel can meddle in Russia's periphery just as much as Russia can meddle in Israel's Mideast backyard, Barak appears to be playing the role of bad cop for Israel. Both diplomatic tracks are designed to keep the Russians from increasing their support for Iran.

This article is published at Lebanonwire by agreement with www.stratfor.com, the world's leading private intelligence provider.

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