U.S. President Barack Obama may approve the 40,000 additional troops for Afghanistan that the senior commander there, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, has requested. While this is not yet a done deal, the question becomes one of implementation. McChrystal has clearly articulated a long-term counterinsurgency strategy. But just how effective these additional troops can be — especially in the time frame allotted for their success — remains an open-ended question.

Analysis

The debate over U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is in full swing in Washington, but it appears that U.S. President Barack Obama has moved closer to a decision on which direction he would like to take the war. STRATFOR sources have indicated that Obama may indeed approve a request by Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. general in Afghanistan, to deploy 40,000 additional troops to Afghanistan, bringing the total number of U.S. troops in the war-torn country to over 100,000, in addition to some 30,000 NATO troops — more than the Soviets had at the height of their occupation there.

It is unclear when the decision will be announced, and until it is made, the decision is hardly etched in stone. Nonetheless, it appears that the argument for giving McChrystal the chance to implement his strategy has prevailed in the White House for now. U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, who has long advocated for reducing the scope of the mission in Afghanistan will reportedly fall into line, at least for the moment.

The decision makers in the White House that are mulling over this strategy understand the political costs of being perceived as cutting the legs out from under McChrystal before giving the general a chance to implement his strategy. Though Obama will likely be taking a significant risk in tightening up his commitment to the war, he has a deadline in mind. McChrystal is already telling commanders on the ground in Afghanistan that they have only a small window — maybe 18 months — to show results. By the end of this timeline, the Obama administration will at least be able to demonstrate that it gave the top generals of this war the opportunity to operationalize their strategy.

But 40,000 troops do not just appear overnight in Afghanistan. Though the Pentagon has already tapped the units that would deploy as part of the surge and made preparations to be ready should more troops be approved, these units still have to complete workup training in preparation for the deployment (and the training and kit for Afghanistan is very different than for Iraq). Units that have already begun training might start to arrive in Afghanistan around January 2010, with the surge of troops taking place in the spring (a decisive period following the winter lull in fighting) and summer. The pace of their deployment will be further constrained by logistical and infrastructural considerations: There are more U.S. troops in Afghanistan than there have ever been, and more will only continue to strain already-stressed lines of supply.

Nevertheless, the Pentagon has long been preparing for this eventuality. The 40,000 number is almost certainly a carefully calculated product of not only what McChrystal would like, but what is possible given current global troop requirements and existing deployment practices. The main wild card here is Iraq. Should one of Iraq’s internal issues — or an external issue (Iran) — cause difficulties, the anticipated rate of withdrawal there could be slowed, complicating deployment metrics.

But even with the full 40,000 troops, the U.S. and NATO presence in Afghanistan is far from large enough to impose a reality on the country solely through military means — political accommodation remains essential for a lasting solution. Thus, the real question on STRATFOR’s mind is what these troops will be doing. McChrystal has been clamoring for a new strategy in addition to more troops, but has already been implementing many of the key points of the “hearts and minds” counterinsurgency campaign that he has been advocating. It is not clear that this strategy has been practicable on the ground. Rules of engagement have changed; however, in some cases, such as in Helmand province, U.S. Marines are still spending much of their time patrolling and engaging in fights with the Taliban, rather than “protecting the population,” as McChrystal dictates.

The problem is that McChrystal’s publicly articulated strategy is inherently defensive, which only invites more concerted assaults by the Taliban on isolated outposts like the one in Nuristan province. An attack on Oct. 3 saw eight American soldiers killed. An insurgent has inherent advantages in terms of knowing the cultural terrain and local intelligence — and the attacker has many advantages in such rugged terrain. Rules of engagement where the military priority is not repelling, pursuing and defeating that attacking element may only invite further attacks of this type, especially as these troops are dispersed around the country.

In short, it is not clear to STRATFOR that the strategy, as publicly articulated, can work — especially within the time frame specified. And this almost certainly is one of the key concerns for Obama, who well understands that Afghanistan is a deeply intractable and complex challenge for which even extraordinary resources may achieve little in the near term. And with the Johnson administration’s history with Vietnam in mind, Obama also does not wish to see his presidency become inextricably linked to a war that may not be winnable.

So, the crux of this issue is how the strategy will further evolve if McChrystal does indeed get his 40,000 troops, what exactly he hopes to accomplish in the next year and a half and how his forces will go about achieving it.

This article is published at Lebanonwire by agreement with www.stratfor.com, the world's leading private intelligence provider.

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