Pakistani Taliban militants conducted several offensives against police stations the morning of Oct. 15. The attacks come amidst a build-up of forces and rhetoric indicating an imminent, large-scale military operation in South Waziristan — the sanctuary of the Pakistani Taliban. The attacks against police stations are the result of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan’s continuing operations against the government while on the defensive. This latest wave of attacks was not particularly effective in tactical terms and illustrates the limitations of the militant movement.

Analysis

Roughly 12-15 militants were involved in assaults on three separate police targets in Lahore Oct. 15. Three militants attacked the Federal Investigative Agency (FIA) headquarters, killing five people. Two of the attackers died in the fight and one escaped. The second attack involved four militants targeting the Manawan police training academy on the outskirts of Lahore (a site that has been targeted before), killing nine police officers. Authorities were able to shoot and kill one militant while the other three died after detonating their suicide devices. A separate group of five to eight militants attacked the Elite Force police commando training center, killing a nursing assistant and a police employee. Two militants were killed in the ensuing firefight and the remaining three were killed when they detonated their suicide devices.

The FIA is Pakistan’s national police force. It is involved in investigating, interrogating and countering the threat of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Punjab — Pakistan’s core. It is not involved in operations in Waziristan and neither are the other police forces targeted in this attack. The military and the Inter-Services Intelligence agency are responsible for the operations in Waziristan, not the police, meaning that these attacks do not directly affect the state entities involved in the actual operations. Tactically, this means that these attacks will not directly affect the upcoming military operations in Waziristan. Attacks on the two training facilities might have a psychological effect on the new recruits, but will have few immediate effects on current operations. Even then, the psychological effects would not necessarily favor the TTP; often such attacks can actually strengthen the resolve of troops to defeat those who killed their fellow soldiers.

Therefore, the TTP’s intentions may have backfired: These attacks were a symbolic action designed to sow uncertainty and fear within the heartland that the militant threat persists, despite all the assurances from the government and military of moving into South Waziristan and shutting it down for good. The TTP has been under considerable internal and external pressure since the death of its leader, Baitullah Mehsud and is trying to demonstrate that it still poses a serious threat. This can explain the spate of attacks over the past week, including the Oct. 10 attack on the Pakistani military headquarters.

Despite the increased volume in attacks, the TTP did not demonstrate any new tactical capabilities, target sets or increased ability to kill Oct. 15. The group has employed teams of 5-10 militants using suicide belts and automatic weapons to strike Lahore, Kohat and Peshawar before and it has attacked police facilities many times in the past year. The targets in Lahore were not particularly well-hardened: the FIA headquarters in Lahore is open to the public, located in an urban setting. The other police stations were somewhat isolated and the training center in Manawan had been attacked previously.

The TTP militants proved in these attacks that they could assault the buildings (again, something that has been proven before) but they were repelled quickly, limiting the amount of damage inflicted. In each case, the security perimeters and protocols put in place by security personnel at each site absorbed and rebuffed the initial assault. TTP attacks are expected at such hardened sites and these attacks show that security measures in place are working, resulting in quicker police repression of an attack and lower casualties. Although inconclusive, initial reports show that 27 people total died in the Lahore attacks — approximately half of whom were the attackers themselves, resulting in a low ratio of attackers to targets killed. The TTP expended a large number of human assets (suicide bombers are some of the most valuable people the TTP has) and the resulting destruction was relatively small. In addition to inflicting minimal destruction, the attacks did not reveal any unknown vulnerabilities.

With military operations in South Waziristan imminent, the TTP is launching attacks while it has the wherewithal. The military offensive will likely affect the TTP’s ability to operate and control assets across the country. The TTP appears to be employing an all-out strategy — one that can be messy in the short-term. This will only increase the resolve of the military and political will of the government (not to mention the Pakistani civilian population) to move ahead with the operations in the near future.

The TTP likely has more resources available in the various parts of Pakistan, so STRATFOR anticipates more attacks. It will be critical to watch and see if the TTP changes its target set to other soft targets beside police training facilities to increase casualties. There are an array of vulnerable soft targets in Pakistan such as other government agencies, large civilian gatherings, or foreign targets such as aid agencies and hotels.

This article is published at Lebanonwire by agreement with www.stratfor.com, the world's leading private intelligence provider.

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