Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has suggested that Iraq’s 2010 budget should prioritize reconstruction over security. Al-Maliki’s statement might represent a bid to attract more Shiite votes for the upcoming elections, in which case it could well prove counterproductive.

Analysis

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said Oct. 7 that the country’s 640,000 security personnel are a drain on the national budget, and that security expenses are hindering reconstruction projects. Al-Maliki specified that 74 percent of Iraq’s $58 billion budget for the current year was absorbed by the salaries, materiel and operations of the security apparatus, and suggested that next year’s budget would prioritize reconstruction over security.

Al-Maliki’s statement comes at a delicate time for Iraq’s security situation. The United States is in the process of drawing down its forces in Iraq, and the consensus on Iraq is that the security situation is at best extremely fragile — and at worst showing signs of deterioration. Making matters even more delicate, the country’s second national elections will be held in December. To succeed in those elections, al-Maliki will have to walk a fine line between his sectarian past and the nonsectarian future he has promised Iraq.

As Iraq progresses beyond the post-U.S. invasion period of chaos and occupation and seeks to become a functional country, cuts in military and security spending are inevitable. Spending three-quarters of any national budget on security is patently unsustainable, and spending more on development could well help solidify some of Iraq’s recent security gains. So while security remains a deep concern, there is considerable justification for reductions in Iraq’s security spending.?

But numerous other factors influenced al-Maliki’s statement, including his electoral strategy, which has sought to cast himself as strong ruler capable of leading Iraq into a secular nationalist, nonsectarian future. A second aspect relates to al-Maliki’s deep concerns about the implications of incorporating former Baathists and Sunni nationalist insurgents into a security apparatus dominated by the Shia.

Despite his efforts to shed his Islamist sectarian past and forge a nonsectarian Iraq, al-Maliki remains committed to Shiite supremacy in the Iraqi political system. This goal is complicated by his dependence upon certain factions of the Sunni Awakening Councils that belong to his State of Law coalition. Sunni Parliamentary Speaker Iyad al-Samarrai’s recent call to respect the sacrifices of members of the now-disbanded Saddam-era military reflects the pressures on al-Maliki to prove his nonsectarian bona fides.

Al-Maliki is thus caught between the need to balance his nonsectarian political platform with his deeply sectarian past. Maintaining his coalition in no small part depends on his walking the seemingly contradictory line of assuring the Shia that he stands for Shiite domination of the government and security apparatus while assuring Sunnis and Kurds that he supports their full integration into the system. This is tough balancing act given that ethno-sectarian divisions are hardwired into Iraq’s political fabric. But if al-Maliki expects to come out on top in the January 2010 parliamentary elections, he must do his best to strike this balance.

The Iraqi prime minister has used the sectarian card to expand his support among his core constituency, the Shia, in response to the formation of the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) by his rivals — the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and the al-Sadrite movement — the top two Shiite sectarian groups in Iraq. Encouraged by the success in the provincial polls last January as he seeks to ensure his position as the principal leader of post-Baathist Iraq, al-Maliki has resisted joining an Iranian-backed coalition dominated by ISCI and its Shiite allies. Instead, al-Maliki embarked upon a mission to beef up his own political vehicle, the State of Law, which includes Shia mostly from his Islamic Dawa party, a faction of Sunnis from the Awakening Council, and a token Kurdish and Turkomen presence.

Al-Maliki’s State of Law will face off against the INA in January 2010. There is no guarantee that State of Law will enjoy the same success it found last January. In fact, the INA so far has done a good job of laying the groundwork to win a majority of the Shiite vote. State of Law performed poorly in Sunni areas in last January’s elections. Al-Maliki’s efforts to balance between limiting the Sunni’s share of power and including Sunnis in the political process will not win him too many votes there this time either. In the north, mainstream Kurdish parties who bitterly oppose al-Maliki’s vision of a more centralized Iraqi designed to contain Kurdish autonomy always compete on their own Kurdistan alliance list. This means al-Maliki’s chances of success depend heavily on his ability to attract the Shia away from the INA.

And this is where his announcement of cuts in the security budget comes into play.

While his announcement is only preliminary, and there are no firm details on cuts yet, he is planning on using the cuts as a tool for controlling and reshaping Iraq’s military and internal security apparatus. While couching the cuts in terms of financial constraints, al-Maliki could actually be sending the message that he is planning to resist Sunni integration and cap the number of peshmerga (Kurdish militia) in the national security apparatus — after all, such integration would not be cheap, so security budget cuts could nix it. This could, of course, be mere election season rhetoric, and moreover, al-Maliki may not even be in a position to implement such changes after the January 2010 elections.

Nonetheless, al-Maliki hopes the cuts will draw Shiite voters away from the INA by assuring them that his nonsectarian agenda will not mean an end to Shiite-dominance over the Iraqi security apparatus. He wants to sell the idea that his nationalist manifesto is in fact a better means of securing the interests of the Shia. At the same time, placing limits on the peshmerga might win some Sunni votes despite Sunni-Shiite tensions: The Sunnis need allies in their conflict with the Kurds in the north. Al-Maliki’s plan to keep the Shia in the top spot could also placate Iran, which desires continued Shiite dominance in Iraq.

There are however, limits to this approach. If al-Maliki is using the budget cuts to shore up his support base among the Shia, this only underscores how many Shia do not support him. And the Shia might well worry that budget cuts will impact them negatively, especially those from the ISCI, the al-Sadrite movement and other opponents of the prime minister. So the budget cuts approach may well mean only a modest increase in Shiite votes, and might even prove counterproductive if he turns off more Sunni voters than he attracts new Shiite voters.

This is a tough political balancing act for al-Maliki, and whether he will keep his balance remains unclear. Given that sectarian political tensions are on the rise and the security situation in Iraq is already fragile, even the prospect of cuts has the potential to trip him up.

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