Iran’s supreme leader has reshuffled the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The changes, which come at a critical time in terms of the country’s domestic and foreign policy fronts, represent a means of reigning in Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and of balancing the factions within the IRGC to facilitate the supreme leader’s control over the force.

Analysis

Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei appointed a number of new commanders within Iran’s elite military force, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Most notably, he made Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Naqdi the new commander of the Basij, a paramilitary force within the IRGC, replacing Hossein Taeb, a cleric. He also announced the creation of the position of deputy commander of the IRGC, to be filled by current IRGC air force commander Brig. Gen. Hossein Salami. (Brig. Gen. Amir Ali Hajizadeh will be the new head of the IRGC air force.) And Brig. Gen. Mohammad Hossein-Zadeh Hejazi was named the new commander of logistics of the IRGC Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Over the years, Khamenei has created several civil and military positions to balance factions and facilitate his control over the Iranian system, hence the new position of deputy IRGC commander and of logistics commander of the IRGC Joint Chiefs of Staff. By appointing a deputy to IRCG commander Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jaafari, who is considered close to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Khamenei is trying to check Jaafari’s power. (Khamenei had previously appointed a counterweight to Jaafari in the form of former IRGC chief Maj. Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi, whom Khamenei appointed as his military adviser after Jaafari became IRGC chief in 2007.)

Meanwhile, according to recent rumors on Iranian news Web sites, Maj. Gen. Hassan Firouzabadi, a civilian and head of the Joint Armed Forces Chief of Staff, was going to be replaced. Khamenei created the Joint Armed Forces Chief of Staff to oversee Iran’s two parallel military institutions, the IRGC and the Artesh (the regular armed forces). By appointing Hejazi as the logistics commander of the Joint Chief of Staff instead, Khamenei was able to keep Firouzabadi — a Khamenei loyalist — in the post he has occupied since 1989.

Separately, replacing the Basij commander could take some pressure off Khamenei by reducing the controversy that has arisen due to the role of the Basij in the brutal suppression of recent postelection protests and Taeb’s leading role in the affair. It is also a way of reining the increasingly assertive Ahmadinejad, who enjoys the support of hard-liners within the security establishment. Naqdi, an Iranian of Iraqi background and a former head of the Naja (national law enforcement agency) intelligence and countersmuggling center, was at one point removed by Ahmadinejad but has been brought back by Khamenei.

Since Khamenei is commander in chief of Iran’s armed forces, he will enjoy more control over the Basij by having a general at the paramilitary force’s helm. The Basij has long been a force composed of poorly trained religious zealots led by hard-line clerics, so bringing it under the control of a career military officer also could see improvements in the organization’s effectiveness. The outgoing Basij chief Taeb, who at one point was an official at the country’s main intelligence service, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, has meanwhile become head of IRGC intelligence.

Though a creation of the clerics, the IRGC has expanded far beyond its intended role as elite guardian of the Islamic republic tasked with defending it from both external and internal enemies. It has now emerged as the second-most powerful group within the regime, with a power second only to that of the clerics. In fact, the IRGC increasingly has come to dominate Iran’s economy, especially the energy sector. And the political power of the IRGC has been expanding, especially in the wake of the contested June 12 presidential election that saw an intraelite power struggle emerge that has weakened the clerical class. The IRGC has seen in Ahmadinejad, who has been spearheading a campaign against the traditional clerical elite, not just a kindred spirit but also a useful tool with which to dominate the system

As the current changes within the IRGC highlight, Khamenei is constantly trying to balance between loyalty and expertise — and especially important task given that the Islamic republic faces strong internal challenges and the heightened threat of outside attack. 

This article is published at Lebanonwire by agreement with www.stratfor.com, the world's leading private intelligence provider.

Copyright © 2005 Strategic Forecasting Inc. All rights reserved.

Copyright © 1999-2008 Lenanonwire^®.com. All rights reserved.