An independent study by London-based Chatham House and the University of St. Andrews on voting irregularities in Iran’s June 12 presidential election shows that fraud in the election was likely. However, the study does not give any information to back up the widespread claim that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would have lost if the election were completely free and fair.

Analysis

More than a week after the Iranian presidential election, information detailing allegations of widespread vote fraud is starting to surface. Defeated presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi has released his letter to the Guardians Council disputing the election result, claiming irregularities in monitoring, ballot supplies, the high number of mobile polling booths (which are more susceptible to ballot box stuffing) and the limited amount of time spent counting votes. These allegations cast more suspicion on how the vote was conducted, but Mousavi also resolutely claims that the high voter turnout in this election would have worked in his favor.

An independent study on the voting irregularities by the London-based Chatham House with the University of St. Andrews seems to refute that point. The study raises a number of valid points on areas where the numbers were likely fudged, but does little to confirm the popular view that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would have necessarily lost in a zero-fraud situation.

Chatham only analyzes data patterns and does not attempt to highlight any specific claims of fraud. The information in the Chatham report falls into three categories: irregularities in turnout, Ahmadinejad’s voter support and the question of rural voters.

The Chatham study concludes that irregularities in voter turnout indicate the likelihood of widespread fraud. Upon close inspection of the numbers, STRATFOR broadly agrees with this claim. On average, turnout was up 25 points from the 2005 elections, but the size of the increase varies widely from province to province, ranging from only a 1 point increase in Sistan-Baluchistan to a 32 point rise in Mazandaran (a turnout increase of roughly 50 percent). Five provinces — Mazandaran, Yazd, Gilan, Zanjan and Qazvin — registered more than 90 percent participation, with the former two registering more than 99 percent.

These voter turnout irregularities are consistent with common methods of election rigging, from ballot box stuffing to the use of dead voters to outright fabrication of results. STRATFOR also agrees with Chatham that there is no correlation between the degree to which turnout increased and the level of support for either Ahmadinejad or Mousavi.

Chatham also implies that Ahmadinejad’s new votes — a 113 percent increase compared to the first round of 2005 — cannot be accounted for. This is where things get fuzzy. Chatham assumes, without citing any polling data, that those who voted for conservative or reformist candidates in 2005 would repeat their voting choices in 2009. While the failure to do so may raise an eyebrow, it is not in and of itself an indicator of fraud. It must be remembered that in the first round of elections in 2005 there were three genuinely popular candidates: Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani came in first, and Ahmadinejad barely came in second with 19.48 percent of the vote. Ahmadinejad then went on to win the second round by a margin similar to what he won by in the recent election. Once the participation increase is factored out, the margin of victory is in the same ballpark as Ahmadinejad’s 2005 win.

Finally, Chatham asserts that there is no apparent correlation between the urban or rural nature of a province and its level of support for Ahmadinejad. Based on the province breakdowns of the 2009 and 2005 results that Chatham used for its study, STRATFOR broadly agrees with this assertion. The vote in rural Iran may have been tampered with, but there is nothing in the data to suggest that there was any more or less tampering in more urban areas. Because the election data appears to be flawed to begin with, no conclusive analysis can be drawn on how exactly the urban-rural vote was divided and to what extent it reflected the reality on the ground.

In short, the additional information now being released about voting irregularities reinforces claims of fraud, but it does nothing to support claims that a free and fair election would have made for a certain Mousavi win.

This article is published at Lebanonwire by agreement with www.stratfor.com, the world's leading private intelligence provider.

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