The "ordeal" of the coming elections, which will be held on June 7, is not what the majority of the Lebanese are worried about. Indeed, these elections might run smoothly at the level of security, in light of the measures that are being prepared for. In fact, there is no reason for the situation to be otherwise, since both of the main sides of the confrontation are currently making preparations to face the post-elections phase and to deal with its results.

The current majority does not find it in its interest to hinder or distort the electoral process, as long as it believes that it will ensure preserving its position as the majority. As for the current minority, it makes no secret of the fact that, whatever the results of the elections, these will not change anything in the current balance of power, which is in its interest on the ground, and in the interest of the choices it cares to preserve. Indeed, the minority considers that the elections might be an important political step, but surely not the "historic and decisive step that will determine the country's future", as seen by the March 14 Alliance.

Furthermore, it is no longer a secret that the camp that currently considers itself to be in the opposition - despite participating in the government - is preparing its "weapons" for the next confrontation, if needed. In fact, this confrontation will be essentially focused on the method which will be adopted to form the government, and how such a government will be designated.

The battle waged by this camp to impose the current Fouad Siniora government following the Doha agreement is the same battle that has begun to take shape in electoral stances and statements which consider that the national unity government must henceforth be adopted as a rule for the formation of future governments, based on the theory of national partnership and consensus democracy. An additional rule would be that of the obstructing, or guaranteeing, one-third, which today controls the decisions of the current "consensus" government. If such stances were to have a meaning, it is that the March 8 camp has prepared the necessary political tools to face post-elections choices, while the ranks of the majority are divided on the stances that they will adopt in the coming phase. Will all of its constituents boycott the government the current opposition might form if it obtains a majority of parliamentary seats, or will part of this majority be willing to walk out on the commitment it announces today (an announcement made in particular by the Future movement, as reaffirmed by its leader MP Saad Hariri), thus joining the government and giving the March 8 camp the opportunity to launch such a government under the slogan of "consensus"?

Although the internal dimension of this awaited confrontation over the designation of the future government is important, it would be unrealistic to ignore its regional dimension, and particularly Syria's stance on this Lebanese dispute.

President Bashar Al-Assad was very clear in his recent interview with As-Safir newspaper when addressing this issue, saying that Syria had no outstanding interest in the results of the coming Lebanese elections, except regarding what was agreed upon in Doha over the necessity of establishing national unity governments. He added: "we will not deal with any situation that reflects a lack of consensus in Lebanon", which means that future Syrian-Lebanese relations will not be as many would wish them - especially after the positive step of appointing a Syrian ambassador in Beirut - in case a government is formed that lacks the characteristic of partnership between all parties, as is the case of the current government.

The designation of the new government is not the sole expected source of disagreement. There is also the role that should be played by the President of the Republic in settling political disagreements, and particularly his right to participate with the next Prime Minister in appointing ministers. Here too the March 8 camp considers that the election of President Michel Suleiman as a result of the Doha agreement has consecrated his presumed role as a consensual president. President Bashar Al-Assad explains this role in the aforementioned interview, saying that the goal of the Doha agreement was the election of a consensual president "who would engage in a process of reconciliation over the issues of dispute". According to such an explanation, President Michel Suleiman's role becomes that of seeking solutions to disputes and of sponsoring agreements when they take place, without having the right to take this or that side on issues. In other words, President Suleiman will be blamed for signing the decree of any government that would not be designated as one of "national unity", as this would be considered contrary to his "function" as a consensual president, even if such a decree is perfectly sound constitutionally.