Between the crowds that gathered today in Beirut to celebrate the martyrs of the opposition and the crowds that filled Martyrs' Square on Saturday to commemorate PM Hariri's assassination, the squares of the Lebanese capital are once again a stage where each party proves its ability to gather supporters - and hence its popularity on the eve of the elections due in less than four months.

Of course, we are not, as is hoped, before a new March 8 and a new March 14. And yet the two sides obviously transform both commemorations into an expression of the popular support they still enjoy. This is despite the fact that four years have passed since the two events that followed Hariri's assassination, this earthquake that turned the political map in Lebanon upside down, along with the relations among the main countries in the region.

By the standards of such popularity, we may say that the commemoration of Hariri's assassination was successful, whether in terms of organization, numbers of participants, and the language embraced by the March 14 leaders. They have reasserted the constants of the post-assassination national project - particularly restoring the state's freedom of decision after the Syrian withdrawal, highlighting the ability of this project to include Lebanese people from various trends, if they wish to join it.

In other words, the March 14 discourse was neither factional nor representative of the interest of a single sect. It is rather a speech that can rally all the Lebanese, irrespective of their affiliations, as long as dictated by national interest.

Such an orientation is commendable, so long as it aims to defuse domestic tension, especially in light of the serious threats to resort to weapons as a solution - as was apparent from the vengeful acts that targeted many participants in the Hariri commemoration. However, cooling down the internal front necessitates more than an open and moderate speech by the March 14 forces. They must differentiate the internal from the external factors, i.e. restore the internal political rules of the game, which can be controlled by the results of elections or the internal balance of power. It is like what used to take place throughout the various political crises in Lebanon, instead of the sole control factor being external pressure and interests prevailing over internal decisions and trends.

Realistically speaking, we need to ask: Are the internal language of openness and the calls for embracing the national project of sovereignty and independence - which is not supposed to be a bone of contention - enough to win over the "opponents"? It is true that all Lebanese politicians are fluent in "nationalist lingo," but the practical translation of this lingo based on national interest has always been the object of conflict. This was apparent during the dialogue sessions sponsored by the President of the Republic, especially when the so-called "defense strategy" was put on the table or when the government - which is supposed to be "consensual" - was confronted with decisions such as wiretapping in order to control the jeopardized security situation.

Still dominating the stances of some Lebanese politicians, the external links have proved to be the strongest when it comes to internal decisions. While Lebanon awaits the beginning of the work of the International Tribunal and the upcoming elections, the political map of the coming four years will be drawn. These external links and interests will be the main factor in the internal status quo. Hence, the calls of the March 14 leaders to give precedence to internal factors over external ones must be dealt with as mere wishes to defuse tension, rather than calls for some internal forces to severe their external links as this would be impossible in the current circumstances.