The ten hi-tech warplanes which Lebanon might be receiving, if the Russians keep their promises, will not be the answer to the predicament this country has been facing since its independence and since the establishment of the state of Israel. The question remains: Is this country's strength in its weakness, or is its weakness the source of its strength? Indeed, these planes may soon turn into a new problem if we fail to take into consideration the country's complex political and sectarian composition, as well as the "armies" deployed on its soil, both local and regional, and the security islands that are off-limits to the state and its security forces.

But why does the Lebanese Army need fighter jet planes when its role is nearly restricted to that of a limited internal police force, under the condition of consensus between the various parties?

If the aim is to confront Israel, then the Russian deal seems pitiful when compared with the enemy's arsenal, and it certainly cannot stand up to a highly sophisticated war machine that surpasses it hundreds of times. These ten planes may be destroyed, whether on the ground or in mid-flight; their fate may also resemble that of the planes Saddam Hussein sent to Iran or buried in the sands when he realized that the Western coalition to liberate Kuwait was serious and immeasurably surpassed the capabilities of his then sophisticated army.

Lebanon learned during the war of summer 2006 that it would face Israel alone, and that joint defense agreements and special relations would not be helpful. Thus it seems that any attempt to thrust the army into confronting Israel is tantamount to suicide, and there is no space here for "bombastic" stances and "patriotic" exaggerations which lead to nothing.

On the other hand, if the aim is to reinforce the army's role in confronting terrorism, then it does not need planes, but rather for its intelligence and special fighting abilities to be reinforced. It would also need to reach an agreement with Palestinian leaderships to prevent extremist organizations from setting up their networks and training facilities inside Palestinian refugee camps, as well as a similar endeavor with Syria to pressure organizations loyal to it to respond to such demands and facilitate the work of Lebanese security forces, while awaiting a solution to the problem of the weapons of the Palestinians.

In any case, the problem with these weapons cannot be resolved with force, which is what Lebanon has experienced and known ever since armed Palestinian activity began four decades ago. Lebanon has also tried it many times, whether in confrontations with the Palestinians, in the War of the Camps launched by Shiite militias, or even in the Israeli invasion that expelled the PLO but could not eradicate the camps and their weapons.

It should be remembered that the Lebanese Army did not start the last Nahr Al-Bared war, but waged it in self-defense and in order to defend the country in the face of a terrorist organization armed and directed from abroad. Even such a defensive role became the focus of domestic controversy and had its limits carefully defined in its relationship with the regional neighbor.

In case the aim of the Russian deal is to respond to the project of a "defense strategy" put forth by Hezbollah and its allies, which would turn Lebanon into an arena for endless fighting, then it is responding to an error by a similar error. Indeed, what can protect Lebanon from Israel's hostility will never be a few planes and tanks, or even the rockets the destructive results of which we witnessed two years ago. Rather, it is reinforcing the cease-fire agreement with international guarantees, disbanding armed militias and integrating as many of their members as possible into the army and security institutions, keeping the right to decide war and peace entirely at the hands of the state, and declaring Lebanon's positive neutrality as a prelude to entering the peace process. Anything else will only lead to more destruction.