The launch of discussions about improving and correcting Lebanese-Syrian relations indicates the new political phase that is at hand. In this new period, Syria should prove to western countries, led by France, that it will modify its behavior toward Lebanon - based on Paris' conviction that Damascus should exchange the openness that Paris has begun to show to it, for practical measures, and not just media statements. However, Syria does not give anything in return for what it obtains, until it completely consumes the possibility of benefiting from it, whether this involves foreign parties (France or others), or the Lebanese.

The Syrian leadership is evincing a desire to "go easy on" the new Lebanese president, to prove that it is facilitating things with Lebanese officials who are not enemies or rivals, as opposed to the political forces that stood against Syria's influence, policies and intervention in Lebanese affairs. Syria does not usually give something without putting forward conditions, especially since it believes that the price of negotiations with Israel should not be limited to a French-European opening to Damascus. Instead, it should include the acknowledgement that its allies in Lebanese internal decision-making should receive a preponderant share of influence, which explains why Syria is wagering on a victory by these allies in next year's parliamentary elections.

For this reason, Syria is linking any new step toward Lebanon to the course of its policy that seeks to guarantee a return to a majority, which will be in its interest in Lebanese political institutions. Among the prices to be paid as well in this scenario is that of guaranteeing openness by the US, even if only implicitly, which will pave the way for a restoration of Syrian-US relations after the conclusion of President George Bush's term in office.

Syria has wide room for maneuver with regards to Lebanon and to Syria's relations with western countries, especially if we add its deteriorating ties with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which will be a part of its calculations of coming steps in Lebanon. In short, the new phase of Lebanese-Syrian relations is not a rosy one. However, one of its new features is Arab and international sponsorship. If Lebanon had hoped for a relationship of equals with Syria, it will depend on Lebanon, and not on Syria alone. The question that arises here is the following: Can the Lebanese come up with a unified vision of their country's relationship with its Arab neighbor?

Much of this new phase will be determined by the extent, to which there is a Lebanese consensus on bilateral issues with Syria. Syria has succeeded in recovering a portion of the Lebanese, as part of its general strategy in the region, with Iran and others. Syria wants to recover "official" Lebanon, as part of this axis, and is not content with this single portion, for reasons having to do with history, geography and the region. However, the history of the two countries has also proven that the continuing state of internal strife and instability prevents the anchoring of official ties on a sound basis. The problem is that the factors behind civil strife still exist and are soundly-rooted, despite the formation of a national unity Cabinet. The factors of instability, which obstruct the formation of a unified Lebanese vision, continue to win out over the factors that support stability.

The most eloquent indication of this is the recent massacre of army personnel, who are entrusted with recovering this stability, as well as a number of innocent civilians. There are fears that various types of incidents will destroy this stability; the fears exist because the domestic dispute continues; the depth of this dispute was evidenced by the bickering that took place during the parliamentary debate of the Cabinet's policy statement.