It is now absolutely certain that Damascus has seriously decided to establish diplomatic relations with Beirut. Minister Walid Muallem's announcement in his visit to the Lebanese capital two days ago further confirmed President Bashar Assad's statements before and during the Mediterranean summit.

Such a step cannot be attained without Syrian initiative. A Lebanese demand in this direction, as important as it is, remains ineffectual, mainly because of the weakness at the state and civil society levels and the Lebanese failure to influence the Syrian decision.

Since the step and the concept behind it are linked to the Syrian decision, Damascus bears more responsibilities in this respect than Lebanon, both in terms of the pace and manner of implementation. On the other hand, they reveal the Syrian perception of the major shift in the relationship with Lebanon as imposed by diplomatic relationships.

Remarkably, Minister Muallem, who announced in Beirut the intention to exchange embassies, spoke about good ties between the Lebanese and Syrian presidents and the normalization of relationships between the two countries but never mentioned the relationship between the two states. He is even believed to have intentionally overlooked the reference to two states. After all, Muallem is the master of Syrian diplomacy and knows the meaning of every term in use.

In the past, Damascus used to respond to the demand for diplomatic relations with Beirut by claiming that such relations were useless and pointless given the good ties between the two countries and peoples (in fact, one people in two countries) and with the Lebanese political forces. They were indeed good from the Syrian point of view since any excluded party was cast as an enemy. With Syria's acceptance to establish diplomatic ties, the question is raised about the new relationship between Syria and the Lebanese domestic forces.

In the past, this issue was in the custody of security apparatuses which by their nature seek to create polarizations that do not necessarily fit with state-to-state relations. This issue has now moved into the hands of the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Hence, it will be coupled with a change in methodology. In the past, dealings were with allies, parties and figures, often at the expense of the Lebanese state. Today, relations should be between two official institutions and embassies on the basis of equal rights and obligations. This demands a clear Syrian announcement of the nature of the future bilateral relationship with Lebanese "allies" and the function of those allies in Syria's public policy.

At the same time, Damascus's announcement of diplomatic exchange with Beirut coincided with the efforts by the Syrian diplomacy to expand its activity, especially towards the West and a peaceful resolution in the Middle East. In fact, the declaration came as part of this movement. The question is whether the step towards Lebanon is imposed by the nature of the current international relations or is simply another step that is governed by and which completes the general diplomatic transformation where progress aims at marketing the policy of openness and where obstacles emerge whenever the conditions require pulling back and adopting tougher stances.

What raises all these questions and concerns is the contradiction in Syria's behavior. One the one hand, it rushes to invite President Michel Suleiman to Damascus to discuss relations with his Syrian counterpart - which perfectly fits with the schedule set in Paris for President Nicolas Sarkozy's visit to the Syrian capital. And on the other hand, it raises a number of problematic issues in Lebanese-Syrian relations that need to be resolved. This reveals Damascus's intention to keep progress under the control of its diplomatic needs.

Unless Damascus dispels these suspicious contradictions in its position towards the diplomatic relationship with Lebanon, its step will remain incomplete and will be doomed to fail.