One of the most difficult intellectual works of a scientific researcher is to write or talk about his country with sincere objectivity. This work becomes even harder if he also happens to be a diplomatic envoy.

When Ambassador of Switzerland Carla Del Ponte spoke a few days ago at the Lebanese Embassy about her experience as Prosecutor General of the International Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, she said that an Ambassador's role is to speak for his/her government. But she possessed the spirit of an intellectual lecturer and managed to give a marvelous talk, which in no way offended anyone. I will try not to offend anyone. Believe me, it is not an easy task, especially when the subject deals with such internal issues.

Let me start by expressing my conviction that Lebanon is now safe from any potential war more than it ever was before; be it a civil war, the recurrence of which I never believed possible, or a war with Israel or any other country.

Why do I say so? In order to understand and evaluate the current existing situation in my country, one should consider the different factors that have long influenced and disrupted the peace and stability in this small country.

I will try to be brief:

1. The internal political and power division.

I believe there has been enough evidence since 1975 that Lebanon cannot be divided, nor can any group overcome the others and dominate. Lebanon is unique, in the sense that all political issues - whether internal or external - are interrelated with the religious factor, which can easily transform them into a confessional and even religious disagreement.

We have seen that this small peaceful country was not actually part of any war against Israel since the truce agreement of 1949. Nevertheless, it has been the playfield for the most numerous and savage wars that the region has seen since the establishment of Israel.

Many people have blamed and even bitterly criticized Lebanon's confessional constituency. But it is indeed for this very special and rather unique confessional form of Lebanon that this country is now a united, free, independent, sovereign and democratic country. Democracy in Lebanon has proven that it cannot be built on political statistics. It should be a consensus-like strategy, especially when it comes to serious decisions that could alter the basic principles; political, social, or economic, which were agreed upon in the tacit national Accord of 1943.

This is the reason for Lebanon going into war in 1958 when the then President Kamil Shamoun wanted to join Baghdad alliance. This is the reason for Lebanon going into war in 1975, when the PLO became a dominant factor, influencing both regional and international relations. This is the reason Lebanon was, very recently, at the edge of another civil war when it appeared that the country was going back to being a part of a regional and a regional-international conflict.

One must admit that this very confessional formation of Lebanon made the country very fragile and very attractive to external intervention. In politics, there is no room for passion and emotions. The once beautiful, very prosperous, democratic, free market and peaceful country, was very easily turned into a battlefield in the wake of settling the ongoing Middle East problem. Yes, everyone - Arabs, Israelis, and big powers - did not hesitate to send every type of weaponry as well as millions of dollars for their dirty war conducted on Lebanese territory to satisfy their political and strategic ambitions.

There have been no Arab-Israeli wars since 1973. Indeed, why would they destroy their countries, pay billions of dollars, and rescue the lives of thousands of their soldiers when they could, through and in Lebanon, solve the core issue, i.e. the Palestinian issue, especially when the condemned Cairo Agreement of 1969 had granted free passage and a free land on which the Palestinians could stage their own warfare against Israel?

Israel, on the other side, was happy to confine its warfare to Lebanon, hoping it might destroy and bring an end to the Palestinian political and military echelon, thus strangling the Palestinian ambition for political recognition. It took the United States and Israel more than fifty years to ultimately accept the right of the Palestinians to self-determination and thus accept their right to statehood. We had to pay dearly to bring this truth.

The war of 1975 reminds us of a similar example in 1960, when Britain and France spawned a civil war in Mount Lebanon between the Maronites and the Druzes - original people of that area - in order to create a pretext to interfere in the then ailing Ottoman Empire.

One might therefore conclude that this being the case, Lebanon will always be the victim of periodic wars. I would like to argue that, on the contrary, those hard and devastating experiences, considering the consequences, proved that the Lebanese could finally discover the very reason of Lebanon's existence: Being a message, a description given by H.H Pope John Paul II in 1997.

2. The Rise of the Islamic Resistance.

Following the second Israeli invasion and occupation of Beirut in 1982 (the first one was in 1978), and the eventual withdrawal of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Lebanon, a new phase in the Lebanese turmoil began. The PLO had vanished but a new resistance had developed. Actually, some main political factions that had fought alongside the Palestinians now turned to fight against the Israeli occupation. But they lacked enough resources to continue. In 1983, appeared the Islamic Resistance led by Hezbollah. This group enjoyed both the political and financial support of Iran and Syria who facilitated all their logistical necessities. Damascus was particularly attracted to this group, although it also supported all the other groups of resistance. The Islamic Resistance did not create a financial burden and served both its local and regional interests.

According to some historians, the religious background also played an important factor. The Islamic Resistance is Shiite. The Shiites and the Alaouis - rulers of Damascus - pertain to the same religious school. Syria, however, denies that factor. Whatever the reason, there is no doubt that this particular Group became the main local actor that would influence all the forthcoming developments in the country.

The Israelis tried to enforce an agreement with Lebanon that they claimed would bring definite tranquility to the country and allow an Israeli withdrawal from its territories. Syria and its allies, however, considered that this agreement would bring Lebanon under Israeli influence thus alienating it from its Arab neighbors, especially Syria; a development that would undoubtedly endanger Syrian security. Patrick Seale once wrote about the necessity of recognizing that, as long as the Arab-Israeli conflict remained unresolved, Syria's vital security interests laid in Lebanon, where it could not tolerate a hostile government or the influence of a hostile external power.

President Amine Gemayel refused to sign the Agreement at the last minute. It was clear that this agreement would not survive but would give assured legitimacy to the Israelis. The latter retaliated to this refusal in a very painful way. They retreated from the mountain area without coordinating their withdrawal with the Lebanese Army staging the scene for some local factions - mainly the Maronite and the Druze belligerents - to enter into a fierce war that lead to some of the worst massacres of the time, even worse than the ones in the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian camps in Beirut.

Following the Israeli withdrawal, the Syrian army, upon the invitation of some Lebanese fighting factions, pushed its way back into all vacated areas. Some historians believe that Syria was also manipulating the locals. It was notable to see at the time some fierce fighting amongst groups of the same confessional, religious or political placement. Supposedly allied factions such as Amal (Shiites) and the Progressive Party (Druzes) fought against each other in Beirut. Amal (Shiites) fought against Palestinians (mostly Sunnis), and Maronites fought against Maronites, and so on and so forth.

The only positive aspect of this situation was that it proved without any doubt that the war in Lebanon was not a religious war but that each of the opposing factions were using their confessional background to mobilize belligerents and create a shield to defend their existence.

They may have been successful in manipulating people for a while but the role of the shield itself was indeed, the most important. It did not only shield them, but also the very existence of the system and the country itself.

The assigned multinational peacekeeping mission became a farce. The carnage of Sabra and Shatila, the bombing of the US Embassy on April 18, 1983, the bombing of the Marine headquarters building in Beirut on October 23, 1983, suicide attacks on the Iraqi and French Embassies, numerous major car bombings, scores of other suicide attacks, and hostage taking, all turned Beirut into hell. Vice Admiral Edward Martin of the United States stated in an interview that "prior to October 23, there hadn't been any real terrorism" and the US accused Iranian-linked militants, naming specifically Hezbollah. This situation demonstrated that the war in Lebanon was not a part of the Cold War any more, but part of the Iranian-American tacit war.

3. The Taef Accord of 1984 and its aftermath.

The situation in Lebanon was chaotic and held no possibility of a productive outcome without Syrian involvement. The Syrians were dominating, both by force - having more than 30 thousand of their army employed all over the territory - and by political alliance - having attracted the majority of the political parties by playing an intermediary role, and not allowing any one party to overcome the others.

The Lebanese moved to try and find solutions to stop the civil war. This had not been previously possible because of the cold war and the refusal of some powers to yield to the existing superiority of the Syrians in Lebanon. They had always been afraid and suspicious of Syrian ambitions to annex Lebanon. Syria refuted those accusations and their late President Hafez Assad assured that: "We are one people but in two countries". The Syrians argued that they wanted to make sure Lebanon would not be used as a passage to destabilize their internal security.

The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war made it easier for the United States and the European countries to accept the dominant role of Syria, taking into account different interests. An agreement on October 1989 was easily reached in Taef (Saudi Arabia) proving that the internal part of the entire problem in Lebanon constituted but a very small fraction. The Agreement stipulated that the Syrians would help keep security in the country for two years, allowing the Lebanese Army and internal security forces to rebuild their power accordingly. Then the Syrians would redeploy, moving up to the Bekaa Valley and remain there until the Lebanese Government ask for their complete withdrawal.

All the militias were disarmed, except for Hezbollah. The latter was not considered militia but was supposed to confine its arms to the South acting as the resistance against the Israeli occupation forces in that region. The Syrian army was not allowed in that area. Israel wanted to keep a Security Zone within the Lebanese territory, thus defying UN SC Resolution 425 of 1978 and ignoring the fact that a United Nations Force was deployed in the area to form a buffer zone between hostile belligerents within Lebanon and Israel.

This situation gave Hezbollah a strong legitimate reason to keep its arms and become a mini-State within the State. The fierce battles that reigned in the South afterwards did not only bring devastation and misery to the Lebanese, but also resulted in the empowerment of Hezbollah and its endowment with exceptional experience, ever more solidifying its political stand.

Meanwhile, in Beirut, the Lebanese were exhibiting a different side of the picture. Reconstruction and rehabilitation were carried out with so much speed, it amazed the world. Lebanon became a unique example, one of a people with a strong will to live. Israel tried to punish the war in the South by frequently bombarding the infrastructure. But the Lebanese would not be deterred. They held up and returned prosperity and full dignity to their nation. It took 18 years for Israel and the United States to recognize that the Lebanese were serious in their fight for the liberation of their occupied territories and that there was no hope for a private deal or an agreement in isolation from other Arab countries, namely Syria.

Lebanon made it clear that it would be the last nation to sign a peace agreement with Israel. But meanwhile it would respect the Armistice Agreement of 1949 and establish a peaceful situation at the frontiers. Israel finally accepted Resolution 425, and in May 2000, it withdrew from the Lebanese territories that it had occupied in 1978 and 1982. There is no doubt that this development created euphoria in Lebanon and other Arab and Islamic countries. Hezbollah became a hero.

Although the Lebanese were proud of this achievement, the first of its kind in the Arab-Israeli conflict, most of them were worried about what was to follow.

4. The Israeli withdrawal and its aftermath

The victory of Hezbollah was indeed a victory for Lebanon. Hezbollah would not have been able to achieve this triumph had it not enjoyed full support from every segment of the society; public and private sectors, as well as all confessional groups had agreed to endure all Israeli reactions and defend the legitimacy of the resistance.

The Israeli withdrawal convinced many that the time had come to open a new chapter in Lebanon's life, to return to the role of a modern and civilized State and to disarm Hezbollah in favor of the Government. Hezbollah, supported by the Syrians and their allies, insisted the resistance should not stop, claiming that Israel still occupy Lebanese territory in the Shebaa Farms and Kfarshuba.

The United Nations considered that Israel had finally implemented Resolution 425 and proceeded to create an imaginary line, the "Blue Line", as a basis for future delimitation of the international borders. Lebanon, however, held some reservations, insisting that the Blue Line did not coincide with the internationally recognized borders as drawn by the Armistice Agreement. But the Secretary General of the UN considered Shebaa Farms to be Syrian as they had been occupied during the Six Day War of 1967, opting to place them under Resolution 242 and not 425.

Lebanon maintained the farms constituted Lebanese lands and presented legal documents to support their claim. The United Nations urged the Syrian concession to accept Lebanon's plea, but the former, although confirming at all levels that the land was indeed Lebanese kept refusing to give written testimony. Professors in Legal matters such as Dr. Shafic Mosri argued that those verbal testimonies were binding under Article 7 of the 1969 Agreement on International Treaties.

Those testimonies were considered legally binding as they had been delivered by the highest authorities in Syria, including the President, the Primer Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Representative of Syria to the United Nations. Those testimonies were explicitly accepted by Lebanon with no objection or reservation. Hezbollah's warfare, however, and though very limited, was criticized by the United Nations and considered a breach of the Blue Line.

The terrorist act against the United States on September 11, 2001 complicated the issue even further, especially that the US had included Hezbollah on its list of terrorist groups. Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafic Hariri (a Sunni), Walid Jumblat (a Druze leader) and some main Christian Maronite leaders were uncomfortable with the situation and pleaded for non- confrontation of the international community. The Syrians would not listen and those leaders were of course unable to confront Syria.

5. The Iraqi invasion and its aftermath.

On the 19th of March 2003, the US invaded Iraq. Irrespective of the declared pretexts, many Governments and International Analysts believed that this US invasion served only as part of a far-reaching goal; that of a new Middle East. Iran and Syria were much alarmed. Hezbollah, Hamas and other regional groups were also on alert, and Lebanon lost hope of neutralizing its case. More so, the Syrians and Hezbollah became even more suspicious of any call to disarm Hezbollah and stop the military activities in the South. The pro-Syrian Lebanese government and the President ignored the international stand regarding the Shebaa Farms, claiming they were Lebanese and insisting on the withdrawal of Israel, otherwise the military resistance would remain a legitimate national tool serving to enforce this withdrawal.

The Syrians were distrustful of any successor to President Lahoud, whose term was to end in November 2004, and pressed for a constitutional amendment that would keep him in power for another three years.

Marwan Hamade, one of the Minister- members of the Democratic Gathering led by Walid Jumblat, resigned in protest to this controversial amendment, and on October 1, 2004, he managed to survive an attempt on his life. This attempt marked not only the divorce between Jumblat and the Syrian leadership - which had been hovering in the air for months - but also, the beginning of a fierce battle to oust the Syrian forces from Lebanon.

The legendary Prime Minister Rafic Hariri was nevertheless considered to be the main key political actor in the opposition to this new amendment. His bad relationship with President Lahoud was obvious. After, however, meeting with President Bashar Assad, he opted to vote in favor of the amendment. Jumblat attributed this change of heart to a direct threat from Syria which the latter denied.

PM. Rafic Hariri, a Sunni leader and a close friend to France, Saudi Arabia and other international powers, tried to keep Lebanon away from a potential confessional conflict between Sunnis and Shiites. He was alarmed by the emerging developments in Iraq and by the increasing influence of Iran in the region. Everybody knows that Hariri was the architect of Syrian relations both with France and Saudi Arabia. He strongly defended Syria and Hezbollah in Washington, the United Nations and European capitals. So, when France pushed for S.C. Resolution 1559 of September 2, 2007, declaring support for a free, fair presidential election, for withdrawal of the foreign forces, including the Syrians, and for disbanding and disarming all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, including Hezbollah, everybody considered that Hariri was now a part of a certain regional and international stream to contain Iran, which was considered the main winner of the outcome of Iraq invasion.

6. The assassination of Rafic Hariri and its aftermath

Hariri had not wanted to expel the Syrian forces from Lebanon. On the contrary, he had been trying to save the relations between Syria, the West and moderate Arab Sunni countries, namely Saudi Arabia and Egypt. His assassination, on February 14, 2005, shocked everyone, including the Syrians whose Government denied any involvement and strongly condemned the crime.

Hariri's assassination split the country into two political camps: the anti-Syrians led by his son, Saad Rafic Hariri, who attracted the Sunnis to the streets, by M. Walid Jumblat who did the same with the Druze, and by Mr. Samir Geagea and a number of Maronite leaders, who did the same with the majority of Maronites. The pro-Syrian side was led by Hezbollah and M. Nabih Berri, the Speaker of the Parliament, both Shiite. They attracted to the streets Shiites and other different factions who were close allies to the Syrians, including some factions from Sunni, Druze and Maronite origin.

The assassination triggered a chain of demonstrations. Up to a million protesters demanded an end to the Syrian role in Lebanon. At the start of the demonstrations, Syria had been maintaining a force of 14,000 soldiers as well as intelligence agents in Lebanon. Following the demonstrations, the Syrian troops completely withdrew from Lebanon on April 27, 2005 and the pro-Syrian government was disbanded.

The Security Council (SC) established - through the unanimous Resolution 1595, of April 7, 2005 - an international independent Investigation Commission based in Lebanon to assist the Lebanese authorities in all aspects of their investigation of the Council-code-named "Terrorist Bombing" that killed Hariri.

A Parliamentary four-round election, the first in 33 years to be held without the presence of Syrian military forces, was conducted between May 29 and June 19, 2005. It was won by the anti-Syrian coalition led by Saad Hariri and led to the appointment of Fouad Saniora, a close friend and ally of the Hariri family, as Prime Minister. He established his Government, on July 19, 2005 and it was the first Government to include Ministers from Hezbollah.

Hezbollah, although now part of a Government led by a Hariri ally, rallied hundreds of thousands of supporters on March 8 of 2005 to thank Syria. To some anti-Syrians, this rally was to "nip the independence movement in the behind".

One week later, on March 14, the anti-Syrians reacted with a rally of their own comprising of more than one million Lebanese people. These two rallies not only revealed a deep division within the society, but also underlined that political and national decisions should only be taken based on an agreement among the major factions - in as much as they represent their corresponding confessional groups - in the country.

A year later, all the 14 political factions of the country held the first National Dialogue since the Taef Accord. They agreed to disarm Palestinian factions deployed outside the country's 16 refugee camps and to establish diplomatic ties with Syria at the ambassadorial level. This outcome was hailed as a positive sign, noting that there had been a great deal of political tension in the country prior to this.

7. The 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war and its aftermath

Many foreign powers, especially the United States and its European allies, considered that the reelection of President Émile Lahoud would be a breach of Resolution 1559. The anti-Syrians in Lebanon also demanded his immediate resignation and refrained from dealing with him. This issue remained pending on the agenda of the National Dialogue.

Following the Syrian withdrawal in April 2005, a series of detonations targeting anti-Syrian communities and individuals further complicated the political situation and increased polarization among the Lebanese.

Nevertheless, The Lebanese were still hopeful that their political leaders might bring forward a unanimously acceptable solution and save Lebanon and its unique structure. But this hope was blown to bits when Hezbollah, in the midst of the process, and unilaterally, attacked Israeli posts and captured two soldiers. Israel grasped the opportunity, not only to retaliate but to repeat the 1982 full scale operation, hoping to destroy Hezbollah once and for all.

In July 2006, Israel launched a full scale war on Lebanon that lasted 33 days. Not only did this attack fail to destroy Hezbollah, it actually managed to make it even stronger by adding yet another historical achievement to the one of the year 2000; Hezbollah had succeeded in withstanding the Israeli attack for the entire duration without sustaining any casualties among its leaders or its military logistical installations. Israel finally had to withdraw, leaving behind around 2,000 Lebanese casualties, mostly civilians, including women and children. Israel's credibility, both militarily and ethically, was on the stand. The victims were again Lebanon and the Lebanese.

The government played a decisive role in bringing the Israeli war to an end. It introduced a 7-Point Plan, which envisaged a definite solution to all the remaining disputed issues between the two countries and promised to bring back stability and security to the area on both sides of the frontier.

The SC accepted the Plan under Resolution 1701 hence redrawing the basis of UNIFIL mandate in the area. The Resolution, once more, stressed the necessity to implement other resolutions, including 1559, which calls for the disarmament of Hezbollah. The 7-Point Plan was adopted by consensus in the Cabinet and in the presence of all its members, including the ministers of Hezbollah.

Hezbollah claimed that it did not reject the Plan, but had some reservations with regards to giving up its military resistance as long as there remained Lebanese lands under occupation.

Resolution 1701 was implemented and there has not been one single incident since August 2006. The Lebanese Army has deployed in the South for the first time in thirty years.

Hezbollah, however, was quickly rearmed and continues, until this day, to build its military forces as if in anticipation of a war instead of the end of one. Anti-Syrians accused Hezbollah of building power, not to fight Israel, but to enforce its national agenda. They accused it of being part of an alliance with Iran and Syria and of holding the country as battlefield for the ongoing conflict between the West and those two countries, especially Iran.

Hezbollah on the other hand, accused anti-Syrian factions of aiding Israel, going so far as labeling some of them as traitors and pro-American. All further dialogue was halted and Hezbollah completely rejected any further discussion about its arms. "The hands that try to reach for our weapons will be chopped off", warned Nassrallah, leader of Hezbollah and insisted his party and its allies be given more influence in the decision-making within the Government by claiming more than a third of the seats thus the power of veto as may be required.

The Government and all anti-Syrian politicians rejected the above accusations and demands. They reminded Hezbollah that had it not been for the generosity of their supporters, the one million displaced persons - comprised mostly of Shiite victims of the 33-day war - from the South, Bekaa and Beirut would have faced famine and death. They even accused Hezbollah of keeping Lebanon hostage to the ongoing conflict between Iran and the international community, for its nuclear ambitions. They said that Hezbollah's demand for the veto right was intended to dissolve Resolution 1701 and block the International Tribunal from trying political assassinations in Lebanon.

8. The International Tribunal and Its Impact.

There prevailed serious concerns that the Lebanese Judiciary System would not be able to try the political assassinations in Lebanon especially that the International Investigation Committee gave indications that the perpetrators might not be Lebanese. Cooperation would therefore be needed from other countries that remained free to either respond to the Lebanese petition or to ignore it. A SC Resolution would be able to serve better, and so the Government requested the Security Council to be part of the process.

The Council agreed and adopted Resolution 1664 on March 30 of 2006, as a clear indication of the international community's strong commitment and determination to punish all those unsolved crimes. Argentina was a member of the Council at that time.

The Court was supposed to consider not only the terrorist crime that killed Hariri, but also whether or not all terrorist attacks in Lebanon since 1 October 2004 fell under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

The Tribunal would be of an international character, a "hybrid", similar to the Special Courts for Sierra Leone, East Timor and Cambodia. But its seat would be outside Lebanon for security reasons.

Negotiations and consultations between the UN legal counsel and authorized representatives of the Lebanese Government lasted from January 2006 to September 2006. The draft agreement on the Tribunal was welcomed by the Security Council. Lebanon had only to approve it and make it workable.

The Ministers of Hezbollah and Amal (also Shiite) in the Cabinet insisted on reviewing the draft. The other ministers, however, rejected this request, maintaining that this should have been done earlier especially that they had been duly kept informed of the developments during the negotiations.

The six Shiite ministers, along with a seventh Christian minister, ally of the President, thus presented their resignation. The Prime Minister refused those resignations but had to concede upon their insistence to a certain unprecedented method of work where resigning ministers kept their upper hands over their administrations but did not report the cabinet.

In October 2006, the President objected to the draft document setting up the Court and declared that no agreement could be reached without his approval. He also considered that the Government had lost its legitimacy as a result of the resignation of the Shiite ministers. His interpretation, however, was disputed by independent Constitutional experts.

The Government proceeded to agree on the draft and then referred it to the Parliament for ratification. Nevertheless, the Speaker - a key opposition leader - refused to convene a session, claiming the Government was not legal.

In the face of all these obstacles, the majority of the deputy members of the Parliament (70 out of 128) sent a memorandum to the SC expressing their endorsement of the draft and demanding UN action to establish the Tribunal.

After five months of tireless efforts, the Prime Minister sent the UN Secretary General a letter asking that the matter be put before the SC for a binding decision, The Secretary General endorsed that request and on May 30 of 2007, the SC adopted Resolution 1757, approving the Tribunal by 10 votes to 0 and 5 abstentions. The Council acted under Chapter VII, reaffirming its determination that the terrorist act of killing Hariri and its implications constituted a threat to international peace and security.

The Lebanese government considered the Resolution to be a victory for Justice, not for any one Party.

South Africa said it might politicize international law and set a precedent.
Russia warned that it could have serious political repercussions and considered it as interfering in Lebanese affairs.

The US said this was a manifestation that there would be no impunity for political assassinations, in Lebanon or elsewhere.

The prominent concern amongst all interested is that the Court not be politicized, something that is also acceptable to the anti-Syrian factions.

Analysts believe that the mounting political tension in the country has its very basis in the establishment of the Court. They argue that the Court may undermine the Syrian government and put the Syrian leadership at odds with the international community and even with its own population. The collapse of the Syrian government would entail a political disrupter in the lines of the opposition groups, due to the fact that their total logistic support depends on Syria.

Many pro-Syrians suspect the United States and Israel to be involved in this chain of assassinations. They see a US plan to block a democratic change in Lebanon, where pro-Syrians would play a leading role. They suspect that the US and Israel set the stage for a wider war in the region.

The leader of Hezbollah said that recent and past attacks against members of Lebanon's anti-Syrian parliamentary majority have yielded the intended reaction; that of automatically drawing condemnation from that coalition against Damascus. He added that "the hand that is doing the killing is Israel's". For outsiders, such a remark is considered to be political and containing no legal basis. Sheikh Nassrallah also maintained that Israel's objective is to have the resistance (Hezbollah) dragged into an internal strife to weaken and exhaust it. He added: "Israel is the prime beneficiary of any internal strife in Lebanon".

This is absolutely true. But, why should the Lebanese fight against each other?

9. May 7, 2008 and its aftermath.

Analysts agree that a major part of Lebanon's crisis holds its origin in the plan to establish the Court. Having been established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, interior actors in Lebanon or in the region now have very little room to influence future developments regarding the Court. All countries, including Syria, are now obliged to cooperate with the Tribunal.

Analysts also believe that the real reason for the ongoing crisis is that Hezbollah does not want to give up its arms. They believe that the institutional crisis that followed the resignation of the Shiites ministers held a major motive; that of distracting the attention from Hezbollah arms.

But, "why does Hezbollah need arms?" analysts ask. They argue that Hezbollah is no longer a resistance and even if it did wish to keep its arms under this pretext, it would never again think of attacking Israel. The 2006 war lesson and the deployment of forces from NATO, with UNIFIL contingents, make any similar attempt an act of suicide.

Furthermore, analysts argue that Hezbollah cannot ignore the fact that it has lost the Lebanese consensus with respect to its role as resistance. In fact, it is at such odds with many of the Lebanese that it may not even receive their support should Israeli forces decide to move into the country.

Analysts also add that the leaders of Hezbollah should be aware by now that the United States and other NATO countries have a sufficient surveillance network that allows them to track the movements and whereabouts of the belligerents and their party leaders. They thus conclude that arms are no longer helpful in safeguarding the party's security. On the contrary, they ascertain that only their integration into the civil and democratic echelon of the Lebanese system could possibly immunize them against any further pursuit.

Analysts believe that the arms are meant to be used in defense of Iran, mainly of its nuclear program, in case the latter was attacked by Israel. In addition, these weapons would also be needed to deter Sunni movement inside Lebanon or Syria, in case the war against Iran dragged the Gulf countries into the conflict. Likewise, they are needed to fortify Hezbollah's national role and earn them, and their fellow Shiites, a bigger share in the policy-making of the country.

Hezbollah denies all these ideas, except the one that it would fight with Iran in case it was attacked. It considers this an act of self-defense and a necessity as a part of its resistance against Israeli-American hegemony in the area.

Analysts believe, however, that following May 7, 2008, things have changed dramatically. It is recalled that Hezbollah had moved their forces into the streets of West Beirut and parts of the Shouf area in Mount Lebanon, using as pretext the decision by the Government to cut off its telecommunication system. Hezbollah believed that its forces would be able to sweep these areas in a few hours and that there would be no resistance from the population, mainly Sunnis and Druze.

Military analysts suggest that Hezbollah was seeking to create a buffer zone under its authority between the Litani River in the South and the Beirut-Damascus Highway in the North.
Being under siege, the Cabinet would then be forced to resign, and Hezbollah would force the election of its ally, General Michel Aoun, as President, and form a Cabinet according to its conditions.

Military analysts claim that the resistance of the civilians, the fall of many casualties on both sides, the eruption of a religious euphoria that would have led to a civil war, and the quick intervention of regional and international powers, all served to deter Hezbollah.

Another analyst went on to say that this move by Hezbollah had further motives; creating a tense atmosphere for the Syrians that would hinder their ongoing negotiations with Israel.

Hezbollah Party insist that all the above is but mere imaginary analysis, reaffirming that its move was only motivated by the decision taken by the Government, which would have culminated in the declaration of war against the Party. It stopped its move once the government backed off on its decision.

Whatever the truth, the situation in Lebanon is undoubtedly at a turning point. Everything suggests that the war is behind and the future is bright. Syria, the main and most influential foreign power in Lebanon, sent some very positive signs, including;

1. being quick to back Qatar on its move to mediate an agreement to solve the stalled institutional crisis in Lebanon and thus allow for the election of a new President.

2. being firm and obvious that President Assad will accept the establishment of diplomatic ties at ambassadorial levels between the two countries.

3. The positive development in the peace process with Israel and the recognition by Syria of the need of a US role, thus calling indirectly to open a new page with Washington.

4. The declaration by President Assad that Shebaa Farms are Lebanese, thus facilitating the ongoing diplomatic efforts to bring on Israeli withdrawal from that area and put it under UN forces, according to Resolution 1701, as a step to allow a delimitation of the borders with Syria.

5. The repeated reports not refuted by Syria, about a change in the line of power in Damascus and that a main suspect of Hariri's murder is under house arrest.

6. The new tone in the speech of the main allies of Syria in Lebanon, who are now calling for national reconciliation.

Further positive signs include:

1. The refusal of Germany to add Hezbollah to the list of terrorist groups like Hamas.

2. The quick development regarding the release of Lebanese detainees in Israel, which helps to resolve another pending issue, according to Resolution 1701.

3. The request by the US, that Israel surrender maps on mines and cluster bombs in South Lebanon.

Finally, the Doha Agreement itself, which embodies a clear road map to settle all pending issues amongst the Lebanese, including the election of a national unity Government, the adoption of a new election system, and the formulation of a national strategy that entails disarming Hezbollah.

* Dr. Hisham Hamdan is the Lebanese Ambassador to Argentina since September 2000. He is also a researcher, translator and writer of several books on Lebanon, the the Middle East and world affairs. Email: afahamdan@hotmail.com

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