Neither Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert nor former US ambassador to the UN, the hawkish John Bolton is pleased to hear about the desire of what Supreme Guide Khamenei dubs the Great Satan to return to Teheran through the window of an interest section.

The American wish was revealed - regardless of how disappointed Bolton may be as Pentagon refrained from bombing the nuclear facilities in Natanz and Isfahan - only days after American media leaked news about Israeli air force games that were supposed to be rehearsals for such a strike. The revelation also came following the return of the Europeans to waving the financial threat against Tehran at the request of President George Bush. Nonetheless, the equation is ultimately unbalanced between a small stick (sanctions against a bank and a bunch of individuals) and several carrots that the Europeans and the Americans agreed to offer Iran in the final hour of Bush's term as the American president seeks to replace the Swiss channel that handles interests between Washington and Tehran with an American office at the capital of the Islamic Republic. This would be a first since 1979 and will permit the initiation of direct dialogue between the Republic and the Great Satan, even if it only came through the gate of an interest section.

While the immediate question has to do with the implications of the US administration's desire to break the ice with Tehran before it leaves the White House early in 2009 and even before Khamenei presents his final word in accepting or rejecting the western incentives that aim at ending Iran's uranium enrichment, it is certainly that the US desire in itself almost represent an absolute elimination of a military American option against Iran. Consequently, this revelation is a discouraging message to Israel, assuming it ignores the immediate consequences of the military choice regardless of the exaggerated threats from the Revolutionary Guard.

However, the American flirtation with Iran through the interest section channel which suddenly became an urgent American need 29 years after the hostage crisis at the US embassy in Tehran will not be good news for several parties in the region for two reasons:

The first is that the Iranian regime has yet to offer sufficient guarantees of giving up any ambitions to possess a military nuclear program when it rejects even a temporary suspension of uranium enrichment.

The second is that the American step toward opening up to Tehran by establishing a direct channel may come across as a hasty preemptive "reward" at a time when the Islamic Republic has not given its final word over the scope of the regional role for which it forcibly wants American-European recognition. This magnifies anxiety among the states of the region since they have gotten used to Washington's neglect of their interests at the last minute when the time comes for the bazaar of grand deals.

In the Iranian bazaar, it is useless to refer to President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad's toughness with Bush. In fact, even a few among Tehran's press have mocked the former's statements about a conspiracy to kidnap and assassinate him since it was easier for the Americans to kidnap him when he was on their territories during his participation at the UN General Assembly. The bazaar has its regional reading that considers a major war unlikely while Washington and Paris race over splitting roles:

American flexibility with Tehran involving several carrots while France maintains a harder line under the pretext of Ahmedinejad's hatred to Israel; and American rigidity with Damascus coinciding with French openness that starts under the Lebanese ceiling.

While the French are displeased with the fact that as Iran's influence diminishes in Iran, it expands in Lebanon, President Bush - who will be able to pass on points to the Republicans at home before the presidential elections if he signs a security treaty with Baghdad - will claim a remarkable diplomatic victory if Khamenei put the nuclear crisis file on a track toward resolution after attempts with small sticks and many carrots.

While the many carrots began with offering Iran the guarantees that allow it to declare another victory by winning the nuclear fuel necessary for civilian energy, they certainly will not end before covering the negotiations over regional security, starting with the Gulf, including the Middle East, and ending with massive western investments in the Islamic Republic that allow it to combine the possession of regional power with economic power.

It is the ambition that justifies Iran's desire for a rapid return to negotiations with the major powers before the opportunity is lost. The American too grabs the opportunity. Meanwhile, rather than watching or counting the sticks, the rest of the region will be paying the price.