Analysis

The New York Times, quoting unnamed U.S. officials, reported June 20 that Israel had conducted a major military exercise earlier in June as a rehearsal for a potential strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities. More than 100 Israeli F-16I and F-15I fighter jets took part in maneuvers over the eastern Mediterranean and Greece in the first week of June. The exercise also included helicopters, which could be used in rescuing downed pilots, with the helicopters and refueling tankers flying more than 900 miles — roughly the same distance between Israel and Iran’s uranium enrichment plant at Natanz.

An anonymous Pentagon official briefed on the exercise said a goal of the practice flights was to send a message that the Jewish state was prepared to act militarily if diplomatic efforts failed to halt Tehran’s uranium enrichment program. “They wanted us to know, they wanted the Europeans to know, and they wanted the Iranians to know,” the Pentagon official was quoted as saying. “There’s a lot of signaling going on at different levels.” The report added that Iran has shown signs that it is taking the threat of an Israeli attack seriously and is beefing up air defenses and increasing patrols.

It is very unlikely that this is the first such Israeli exercise, as the Jewish state is bound to be working on multiple contingency plans to deal with Iran should the need arise. Furthermore, a country that is planning an attack is not going to prepare in such a public manner. It follows, then, that these exercises and the subsequent reports are designed to rattle the Iranians. Tehran knows these are psychological operations, but it cannot be 100 percent certain; after all, Israel is highly militarily competent. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his camp will say the moves are meant to alarm Tehran, but others will consider that the threat is real. Therefore, the threat will exacerbate the rift within the Iranian clerical establishment, which will in turn shape the state’s official behavior.

Beyond the geopolitical aspects of the Israeli threat, Israel’s actual ability to strike at Iran warrants attention.

It is nearly 600 nautical miles just to get from Israel to the Iranian border. While this is within the combat radius of both Israeli Air Force (IAF) F-15I and F-16I fighters, they would be limited to targets only a few hundred nautical miles into Iran (there do not appear to be key targets in eastern Iran). Both the F-15I and the F-16I are fitted with conformal fuel tanks and would also be fitted with external tanks (which could be dropped as quickly as possible, as they were in the IAF airstrike in Syria on Sept. 6, 2007). If the strike aircraft can conduct the attacks without aerial refueling, the logistical complexities of the operation are vastly simplified.

The IAF would tailor these sorties for fuel economy — stretching each aircraft’s range as far as possible — but the ordnance each aircraft would carry that far would likely be quite limited. With a number of aircraft dedicated to combat air patrols, electronic warfare and the suppression of enemy air defenses, only some of the more than 100 F-15Is and F-16Is would actually be carrying ordnance to drop on a target.

Israel has reportedly acquired the GBU-28, a 5,000-pound guided bunker buster, from the United States. IAF F-15Is can carry the GBU-28, which would be necessary to even attempt to hit some of Iran’s deeply buried facilities. But nevertheless, Israel would be stretching the IAF to the very limits of its reach, and this would be an attempt to hit key facilities and set any nuclear efforts back as far as possible. The IAF would not be able — especially in one fell swoop — to hit every target associated with Iran’s nuclear efforts.

Indeed, it would probably have to avoid some targets located in areas with denser air defense coverage. Because it is so limited in numbers, the IAF would not be able to conduct a comprehensive attack against Iranian air defenses, but would only be able to attempt to momentarily blind it (again, as it did in to the Syrians in 2007) and take out any crucial air defense assets. (Iran took delivery of 29 Tor-M1 short-range air defense systems in December 2006 and January 2007).

However, this all presupposes a direct flight over Jordan or Syria and Iraq — and overflying Iraq is quite a presupposition. It would put both Washington and Baghdad — already struggling with complex and delicate negotiations — in a terrible bind, as the U.S. military would be unable to claim that it did not at the very least permit the attacks to take place — not to mention the affront to Baghdad’s sovereignty, which Washington has been working to build for years.

In short, any such operation would be fraught with operational risk. There are too many variables involved, and the possibility of error is significant. But Stratfor is patently unsurprised that Israel has contingency plans in place; it would be a shock if the exercise earlier in June was the first time IAF pilots had trained for such an attack. But neither the existence of Israeli contingency plans nor the June military exercises means that an attack is imminent.

This article is published at Lebanonwire by agreement with www.stratfor.com, the world's leading private intelligence provider. For any questions or comments on this article please write to analysis@stratfor.com

Copyright © 2005 Strategic Forecasting Inc. All rights reserved.

Copyright © 1999-2005 Lenanonwire^®.com. All rights reserved.