Here we are, finally, witnessing the first day of President General Michel Sleiman's term in office. This "miracle" was unlikely had the Doha Accord not managed to hold back the two conflicting camps from slipping further toward full confrontation. This, however, was not free of charge. As price, the side that took to the streets against Prime Minister Fouad Siniora's government obtained the conditions that it had been demanding for 18 months, especially the right to veto inside the new cabinet, protecting its arms from domestic accountability with a cover from the content of the agreement which calls for refraining from any future use of arms to achieve political gains.

Yet, implementing the provisions of the Doha Accord both on the ground and in the political sense is a violation of this very provision as it recognizes the consequences resulting from the use of arms to achieve political objectives. Were it not for this use of arms, described by Sayyid Hassan Nasrrallah as a use of arms intended to defend arms, the Siniora government would not have backed off its two resolutions, nor would the consequences of this decision for the government and its political supporters have taken place.

The other provision of the Doha Accord that pertains to extending the authority of the state on all its territories and over its relationship with all armed groups, on the other hand, will be no less suspicious when the time for implementation comes than the provision that discusses the use of arms. Hezbollah's leaders did not hesitate to clarify their position over their right to keep their arms, a matter that Nasrallah is expected to confirm in his speech today. Sheikh Naim Qassim, the deputy secretary general of Hezbollah had already said that Hezbollah's weapons still maintained a defensive function after the liberation to prevent Israel from returning since the Israeli project for Lebanon is not over yet. Amal Movement clarified further by adding that the resistance was still an urgent Lebanese need against Israeli ambitions.

Hence, the components of the time-bomb that is ready to explode at any time are in place, inherited by President Michel Sleiman at the beginning of his term. It is a bomb that is intended to keep the new era and its president captive to the rationale of Hezbollah and its supporters which claims that the state can maintain full sovereignty over its territories, in political decision-making, and with respect to arms and war under one condition: When Hezbollah realizes, based on the tests it puts the state through every now and then, that the state is capable or qualified to do so. Even obtaining the right to veto cabinet decisions, a unique and dangerous precedent in any democratic system, dos not guarantee Hezbollah's subordination to political decisions.

What makes Sleiman's position more precarious is that he steps into the new settlement on a politically weak platform as his share is limited to no more than three out of thirty ministers, even when the agreement on his nomination and election enjoyed national consensus on his person and on the fact that his rise to the presidency constitutes an opportunity to get the country out of the dark tunnel. This situation is unprecedented in comparison to the state of previous presidents at the beginning of their terms since the agreement over them, foreign in most cases, delegated to them significant power to be in control of the political decision at the expense of the interests of different and conflicting currents.

This state leaves the new president with one of two choices. The first choice is that of coexistence with the question of arms and its consequences on the ground on the basis that coexistence is more beneficial than confrontation. General Sleiman adopted this settlement in the last confrontations as he had done as army commander through his cooperation with the resistance in the South, a cooperation that extended far beyond the implementation of Resolution 1701. Such a choice, if adopted by the new president, will lead to comparing the Doha Accord to the famous Cairo Agreement with respect to legitimizing other arms alongside the legitimate arms of the state under the pretext of settlement and the desire to avoid confrontation. That experience proved that its only accomplishment was postponing the explosion for a later date. The second choice is that of living in the shade of the nation and state in every sense, described by Sleiman yesterday as one of the slogans of his era. The state is expected to be capable of exercising its authority in a manner that differs from what was seen in the previous phase, whenever the interests of the nation and the majority of citizens demands, and regardless of the desires and commitments of a few.