It is up to Daniel Bellemare to decide his fate and historical career, either to end in oblivion, or to reserve a place in history as the man who prosecuted the alleged culprits to whom political assassinations are permissible in political and authority games.

It is up to Ban Ki-Moon to enter history as the UN Secretary General who brought impunity to an end in the Middle East, a region so accustomed to shady deals and eluding justice. Both men understand the responsibility involved in the quantum leap represented by lifting the cover off everyone involved in the terrorist political assassinations in Lebanon, regardless of their nationalities or positions.

Yet, what both should understand is that it is time for a qualitative push with new momentum in the course of the investigation, a push that corners and presses the culprits. The investigation has reached now such an advanced stage that does not tolerate dragging the foot or investigating what has already been investigated by four judges from different backgrounds and who have all reached the same conclusions over what happened three years earlier on the day the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and his companions were assassinated, not to mention the attempted and actual assassinations that preceded and followed this event. The need to start with a new strategy and momentum is urged by the fact that a few of the alleged culprits have initiated a defensive and offensive counter-strategy to forestall the investigation and the operation of the tribunal in view of influencing the course and timing of events by any means possible, including more assassinations.

Since the link among the investigation, the tribunal, and the paralyzed constitutional institutions in Lebanon has become evident even to the UN Secretary General who favors diplomacy and appeasement over confrontation, Ban Ki-Moon must now brief the Security Council on the needed - legally and morally available - mechanism to punish those who insist on overlooking international resolutions and the fundamentals of neighborly relations. Ban Ki-Moon and his colleagues have the opportunity to leave their mark on history with a fateful accomplishment for the Middle East and the United Nations: bringing an end to the era of impunity and escape from accountability for assassinating individuals, terrorizing people, and taking states as hostages.

Daniel Bellemare is only known in Canada, and now in Lebanon and the UN headquarters in New York. He would have remained unknown had Ban Ki-Moon not pulled him out of his retirement and entrusted him with two missions: as commissioner of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission into the terrorist act that claimed the lives of Hariri and his companion, and as prosecutor at the special tribunal set up by Security Council to prosecute the culprits in this terrorist crime and other political assassinations committed in Lebanon.

As commissioner, he will be the first among his predecessors who will also wear the prosecutors robe. Consequently, his prerogatives are essentially different. He is indeed preparing the files that he will himself present to the pre-trial judge to indict suspects. This alone changes the nature and tempo of his activities.

Bellemare started this mission earlier this year after his Belgian predecessor Commissioner Serge Brammertz had spent almost two years deliberately conducting his affairs in complete secrecy.

Brammertz truly believed that he had investigated terrorist acts away from politics and that he was repeating the investigation to verify with evidence the conclusions reached by his two predecessors, Detlev Mehlis of Germany and Fitzgerald of Ireland. Fitzgerald was the first to arrive in Beirut to initiate a quasi-police investigation, to practically point fingers at a network including Lebanese and Syrian officials, and to conclude that the Hariri assassination was politically motivated. Fitzgerald spent no less than two months of diligent work and investigation, as he focused on the need to reach the truth without hesitation and as soon as possible. And so he did. He carried out his tasks in accordance with his expertise and mandate: that is, to investigate.

Detlev Mehlis did not repeat Fitzgerald's investigation, but rather, continued it and was able to sketch a wider, more accurate and detailed picture. Mehlis almost depicted a complete picture of what happened when he detailed the acts of the "network" that extended from Lebanon to Syria, revealed phone calls from Lebanese officers linked to Syria, and spoke about the political motivations behind the assassination. Mehlis did all that in seven and a half months and was able to mobilize the necessary international and Lebanese momentum behind the International Independent Commission's demands to Syrian officials, such as interviewing prominent Syrian figures including President Bashar Assad. Mehlis then informed the then UN Secretary General Kofi Anan that he had evidence implicating senior Lebanese and Syrian security officials in these terrorist acts. This gave the Lebanese authority sufficient evidence to arrest and incarcerate the four officers until their arraignment at the international tribunal in accordance with Lebanese laws which permit indefinite provisional detention until arraignment.

Mehlis did not do all this alone, but with the help of his team and based on his long experience in conducting investigations into terrorist acts.

Then came Serge Brammertz to start digging in what both Mehlis and Fitzgerald had already concluded with their teams instead of fulfilling his delegated task: continuing the investigation. He decided to act as a prosecutor to verify and prepare evidence for the tribunal, whereas his task at hand was to complete the investigation. He did the opposite, neglecting the investigation and going far with politicization, while claiming that he did not politicize the investigation.

Brammertz believed that keeping the investigation away from the public eye was useful. But in doing so, he committed a grave error because he lost the momentum inherent in the Lebanese and Arab demands to unveil the identity of all parties involved in the political assassinations. This momentum was a primary political tool that Brammertz did not comprehend because of his limited experience and because, instead of possessing the mentality of a commissioner investigating into a political act of this size, he had the mentality of an international official.

The first hint at the possibility that Serge Brammertz may have wasted almost two years came in Daniel Bellemare's first report to the Security Council and in his press conference this week.

Bellemare revealed that the Commission now had "evidence" allowing it to absolutely "confirm' that a "network" had planned, organized, and executed the Hariri assassination. He confirmed that this conclusion was not "theoretical," as the case was in Brammertz's era. Bellemare also added that he had found this "evidence" within two and a half months of assuming his mission. In other words, within just two months, Bellemare was able to verify the solid evidence of that "network" which Mehlis depicted and Fitzgerald pointed at, while Brammertz was unable to make such "confirmation" and insisted that such a conclusion was "theoretical."

Brammertz's tardiness and limited experience practically harmed the Lebanese who trusted the international investigation to prosecute those responsible for the assassination of their political figures, journalists, army leaders, and civilians. However, Brammertz's focus on Lebanese suspects may have led to evidence implicating Lebanese sides that were not previously and publicly mentioned in the investigation. This is a very momentous development, since mentioning such sides was previously a taboo.

What is not clear - and may only be clarified in the future - is whether Brammertz's focus on Lebanese suspects was the result of his concluding that it was impossible to reach non-Lebanese culprits, since he was receiving satisfactory cooperation from Syria, as he repeatedly said.

All these issues are of paramount importance when observing Daniel Bellemare's work at present, especially as he started his speech at the Security Council by demanding a six-month extension for the Commission's mandate. This clearly shows that neither the investigation is coming to a quick end, nor is Bellemare ready to move to prosecutorial tasks.

Daniel Bellemare's first step should be to avoid the mistakes of Serge Brammertz, especially restarting the investigation into what has already been repeatedly investigated. Bellemare has inherited most of Brammertz's team of 200 individuals, and he must have kept them for the purpose of continuity rather than making a new start. It is not clear what he meant when he said that he wants to "develop new investigation priorities," since the priorities are known, namely identifying the evidence, the witnesses and the culprits.

It is not clear why Daniel Bellemare has not taken on the evident task of any new commissioner, namely contacting his predecessors to make use of their expertise and experience and to take notice of their opinions, or at least for the sake of courtesy since they may be of use later. It is odd that Bellemare has not contacted Fitzgerald or Mehlis, especially as his predecessors are no more than three.

Moreover, his response as to why he had not contacted Mehlis is worth noting and may be damaging to Bellemare, as it made him appear too light despite his heavy figure. He referred to Mehlis' response to a question on whether he was familiar with Daniel Bellemare and in which he said that he had never seen him, heard of him, or spoke to him in his life. Bellemare appeared to be personally upset with this response and hence came his response that he had not yet felt the need to speak to Mr. Mehlis, that if Mehlis wanted to speak to him then he would know the means to do so, and that he had not heard from Mehlis since he had assumed his mission.

This is not a personal matter. It has to do with the institutional memory of a fateful investigation. It is the duty of every commissioner to put the investigation ahead of personal considerations. This is useful to avoid errors that could be costly for Lebanon and the region, especially the error of repeating the investigation or allocating resources to verify what has already been investigated. This is not the mission. The mission is to carry the investigation forward and to complete it as soon as possible, especially that it has gone on too long as a result of repeating the investigation.

In his report, Bellemare hinted that he wants to focus on getting to know "all" those involved in the Hariri assassination network and that he wants to conceal his files before issuing indictments to avoid revealing his cards in front of other culprits who may be keeping his statements and actions under scrutiny. He has the right to do so. He may not want to use the entire six-month extension that he asked for, but rather to have time at his hands as he prepares for the transition from the investigation to the prosecutorial phase. Yet, the impression that Bellemare made is that he will be taking his time without any deadlines or timelines, and without saying where the investigation stands. To this, he has no right.

The Lebanese, the Security Council and the UN Secretariat have the right to know the timeframes. It is the duty of the investigation at this turn to present the timeframes although not necessarily the deadlines. In fact, it would be useful for the investigation to act in a way that reveals the timeline as part of the strategy of pressuring the culprits to prevent them from feeling comfortable with the Commission's foot-dragging. It is also its duty to access the information that Fitzgerald and Mehlis had and that made them point at the possible involvement of senior Syrian officials in the assassinations.

Since Bellemare is not an expert in Middle Eastern-flavored political maneuvers, he should understand that every delay in the investigation, prosecution and tribunal constitutes a direct contribution to the strategy of buying time adopted by the parties injured by the investigation, a strategy aimed at escaping punishment and bringing the tribunal down. The variety of means available to these parties includes new assassinations, the elimination of witnesses and individuals who may be indicted, and the destruction of state institutions in Lebanon.

Let Mr. Daniel Bellemare surprise us with the momentum of a strategy that completes the investigation, launches the indictments, and revives fear in the hearts of the culprits who are currently betting on a preemptive strategy which Bellemare may regret later if he does not obstruct today.