Analysis

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki on March 26 warned militants and organized criminal elements in southern Iraq’s Basra province that they have 72 hours to surrender to Iraqi security forces or face harsh consequences. Al-Maliki’s comments come as he is personally overseeing a major security operation in the oil-rich, Shiite majority region.

This latest security operation is an attempt by the Shiite-dominated central Iraqi government to establish its control in the country’s second-largest city and main energy hub.

So far, 40 people have been killed and another 200 wounded in two days of fighting between government forces and Shiite militias in southern Iraq. While the U.S. military insists the operation is not directed at militiamen loyal to radical Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr, and al-Sadrite leaders maintain that the Mehdi Army is adhering to the truce the movement recently extended, al-Sadr has called for al-Maliki to leave Basra and for talks aimed at resolving the confrontation.

Basra had been under the control of rival militias and organized criminal syndicates even before the British formally handed over security responsibility three months ago. Before the handover, some 22 rival Shiite groups vying for control over the region signed an accord to end the factional fighting.

The failure of the British to secure Basra despite sustained light coalition casualties there after summer 2007 and the collapse of the Shiite factional accord, finally forced the central government to take matters into its own hands. The government had to act to secure the region, which is critical to the country’s economic well being. The operation provides al-Maliki — who has long come under criticism for failing to establish security and has seen his government plagued by defections from Sunni and Shiite factions — an opportunity to strengthen his position.

Significantly, the operation also aligns with the interests of the country’s most powerful Shiite movement, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) led by Abdel Aziz al-Hakim. Basra is among the few regions in the Shiite south where the ISCI — Iran’s principal Iraqi Shiite ally, which dominates Iraqi security forces in the south — faces a significant challenge. The governor of Basra is from the Fadhila party, an ISCI rival. The al-Sadrite movement also has a significant street presence in Basra. And the Basra region’s energy sector is under the influence of organized criminal elements.

Targeting the chief rivals of the ISCI, which seeks to establish an autonomous Shiite region in the south, gives al-Hakim’s group an opportunity to consolidate itself in what is perhaps the most important part of the Shiite south. This could prove quite useful ahead of provincial elections set for later this year.

Stability in Iraq’s Shiite areas also better serves Tehran’s long-term interests; a southern federal zone could help achieve such stability. Such a Shiite region is contingent upon the Shia dominating Baghdad, however. This is where the Sunnis most threaten Shiite and Iranian ambitions, and explains why Iran needs the Shiite militia card to counter the Sunni threat wielded by the United States.

It is in the short-term interests of al-Maliki and al-Hakim to offer Washington a way to reduce U.S. reliance on Tehran for stability in Iraq. Ever since the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Iranians have used their tremendous influence with the Iraqi Shia to manipulate the United States. This Iranian influence has led to back-channel negotiations between the United States and Iran, talks that have gone on for some time. Over the past year, these talks have occurred publicly.

However, earlier this month an unusual break with the pattern occurred when U.S. officials refused to meet their Iranian counterparts for a fourth round of talks. The improvement in the security situation in Iraq both in the Sunni and Shiite regions over the past year probably explains the rupture. The changed situation on the ground in Iraq means the United States is not completely dependent upon Iranian cooperation anymore.

Further insulating the United States from the Iranians, while an al-Sadrite truce was secured with Iranian assistance, the U.S. military has established its own ties with al-Sadr’s movement. The U.S. security position in Iraq also has improved as the United States shifted the Sunnis from waging an insurgency to attacking al Qaeda.Though Washington can reduce its contacts with Iran, it cannot end such dealings altogether. The Basra operation will serve as a litmus test of just how far Washington can push Iran aside.

For the most part, the current security operation is an initiative of Iraqi security forces. And despite al-Maliki’s and al-Hakim’s close alliance with Iran, their individual and respective parties’ needs and their mutual position of being sandwiched between Iran and the United States could allow Washington to press ahead with improving security in the Shiite south. But despite the al-Sadr dilemma, the Iranians still retain much room to maneuver in terms of Shiite schisms. Therefore, it is too early to say how successful the United States will be in its efforts to break its dependence on Tehran.

This article is published at Lebanonwire by agreement with www.stratfor.com, the world's leading private intelligence provider. For any questions or comments on this article please write to analysis@stratfor.com

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