Analysis

Radical Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr on March 25 threatened a countrywide “civil revolt” if U.S. and Iraqi security forces keep targeting his followers. He called on Iraqis to stage sit-ins throughout the country as a first step. If demands are not met by then, al-Sadr said the second step would be to “declare civil revolt in Baghdad and all other provinces.” Al-Sadr threatened a third step but said it was too soon to announce what that might entail.

This move is a compromise position al-Sadr has adopted as a way to balance between pressures from within his movement — and from the United States and Iran — that force him to oscillate between cooperation and conflict. At this point, al-Sadr is simply trying to keep his movement together long enough to lead it through the metamorphosis from militia to mainstream political group. However, conflicts within his movement are likely to keep that from happening for a while.

Indeed, al-Sadr’s group is undergoing changes, and thus engaging in a strange mixture of behavior. Even as al-Sadr called for civil disobedience March 25, members of his Mehdi Army clashed with Iraqi security forces in the southern provinces of Wasit, Dhi Qar and Muthanna and took control of five districts in the town of Al Kut. Meanwhile, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is spearheading a major security operation in Basra to secure the city from rival Shiite militias and organized criminal elements. A day earlier, members of the Mehdi Army moved into southern and western districts of Baghdad and ordered merchants to close their shops. There are also reports that Iran compelled Mehdi Army elements to carry out mortar attacks in Baghdad’s Green Zone. These events are in line with Stratfor’s assessment that the al-Sadr’s movement, lacking cohesion, constitutes a long-term threat.

Al-Sadr, facing pressure from both the United States and Iran, realizes that he needs to consolidate his political power by transforming his group into a mainstream political movement. However, he is having a hard time steering his group toward this objective. First of all, there are divisions within his movement; some want the group to remain an armed militia, while others share al-Sadr’s vision of the group as a political power. Second, al-Sadr’s movement is still largely influenced by Iran. As Iran continues using certain rogue elements for its own geopolitical objectives, it becomes harder for al-Sadr to lead his group away from its radical origins and toward moderation.

The latest wave of violence involving al-Sadr’s militia is in keeping with Iran’s need to remind the United States that it can easily create problems in Iraq. The move comes after U.S. officials refused to meet with their Iranian counterparts for the fourth round of public talks in Baghdad, and after the assassination of Hezbollah operations chief Imad Mughniyah at the hands of Israeli intelligence. However, the recent attacks seem different from previous occasions in which Iran used Shiite militias to strengthen its negotiating position with the United States. Iran does not appear to be willing to go all out and abandon the truce, though it is concerned about U.S. attempts to influence al-Sadr and his group.

By exploiting the rifts within al-Sadr’s movement and encouraging rogue elements to fight, the Iranians run the risk of hurting the position of their primary Iraqi ally (and al-Sadr’s primary rival) the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), led by Abdel-Aziz al-Hakim. The al-Sadrites’ militia and political actions make it difficult for the ISCI to dominate the Shia and thus Iraq’s political landscape. Further complicating al-Sadr’s position is the U.S. and ISCI-dominated Iraqi forces’ objective to strike out at the Mehdi Army.

Iran’s conflicting needs to pressure the United States and to not endanger the ISCI’s position forces al-Sadr to alternate between cooperating and fighting. His call for civil disobedience is an attempt to alleviate some of the pressure from within his movement — and from Washington and Tehran — so that he can continue trying to steer his group toward the mainstream. Al-Sadr believes that Iraq’s provincial elections, slated for later in 2008, will help empower his group and facilitate its move toward mainstream politics. Furthermore, he is spending a great deal of time in Iranian seminaries trying to secure his religious credentials to help prevent his movement from imploding.

Al-Sadr is in a race against time and it remains to be seen whether he can get through this transitional phase with his political power intact. Likewise, the Iranians are caught between weakening their core support base among the Iraqi Shia and trying to enhance their influence in Iraq for a better position in the geopolitical duel with the United States.

This article is published at Lebanonwire by agreement with www.stratfor.com, the world's leading private intelligence provider. For any questions or comments on this article please write to analysis@stratfor.com

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