Analysis

Deputy Hamas leader Moussa Abu Marzouk said March 18 that the Palestinian Islamist movement in control of the Gaza Strip is ready to accept a Yemeni-brokered deal for reconciliation with its secular rival, Fatah. Reuters quoted Marzouk as saying Hamas officials would meet with Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh and “inform him of the movement’s acceptance of the Yemeni initiative.” The senior Hamas offical did not say whether that meant that his group is prepared to relinquish its control over the Gaza Strip.

The agreement calls for the situation in Gaza to return to the way it was before Hamas seized control of the territory and for early Palestinian elections to be held — conditions endorsed by Fatah leader and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and so far rejected by Hamas. Gaza-based Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri explained that while Hamas has agreed to discuss all points contained in the Yemeni initiative, there are no preconditions in the agreement, though it lists items or points for dialogue. Delegations from the two factions will meet separately with Saleh.

The region’s two principal Arab states — Egypt and Saudi Arabia — along with Qatar have thus far failed to resolve the differences between the two rival Palestinian factions (largely because of interference by Syria and Iran, which hold sway over Hamas). Thus, it is hard to have confidence in any such deal being brokered by Yemen — a minor player in the Arab world with its own financial and militancy problems.

However, there are two factors which give the Yemeni deal the potential to lead to a breakthrough in the stalemate. First, Marzouk — Hamas’ Damascus-based No. 2 — is in Sanaa to participate in the indirect talks. While the Hamas leadership based in the Palestinian Territories has shown signs that it is ready to negotiate, the movement’s central leadership in exile, led by Khaled Meshaal, can torpedo any such move. Second, and more importantly, Hamas is faced with a dire situation because of internal and external pressure from both Israel and the Arab states. Hamas desperately needs to break the gridlock that could erode its influence in its stronghold of Gaza.

Just as Hamas must maintain a tough stance against Israel, it cannot afford to be seen as caving in to rival Fatah, and therefore it cannot relinquish control of Gaza — which it forcibly took over June 14, 2007 — without getting something in return. The proposed fresh elections are a means by which Hamas can agree to a return to status quo ante. That way it can also nullify Abbas’ dismissal of the Hamas-led coalition government the same day Hamas took over Gaza.

It is unlikely that Hamas’ January 2006 electoral victory would be reproduced if new elections were held. Instead, a fresh vote likely would level the playing field between the two sides in parliament. Having its parliamentary majority reversed is a price that Hamas is probably willing to pay in order to get out of its current predicament. Furthermore, fresh elections would not change the geopolitical divide between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. On the contrary, it would institutionalize the split, because Fatah — which lost in the West Bank in the 2006 elections — would be able to stage a comeback.

It remains to be seen whether the Yemeni initiative will in fact lead to a breakthrough. But even if it does, it is likely a temporary fix that will not alter the geopolitical divide among the Palestinians.

This article is published at Lebanonwire by agreement with www.stratfor.com, the world's leading private intelligence provider. For any questions or comments on this article please write to analysis@stratfor.com

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