Summary

Iranian parliamentary elections began March 14. The outcome will highlight splits between the two main conservative factions, which are vying for first place. And while the elections will not have a huge effect on Iranian foreign policy, they probably will make building a national consensus on all topics more difficult.

Analysis

Iran’s eighth parliamentary elections since the founding of the Islamic republic in the 1979 revolution began March 14. The outcome could well make reaching a national consensus on foreign and domestic policy issues all the more difficult to attain.

As many as 44 million voters are eligible to choose the makeup of the new 290-seat Majlis. A quarter of the seats are allocated to Tehran and other major urban centers; the remainder is apportioned to smaller towns and rural areas. Turnout is not expected greatly to exceed the 50 percent that voted in 2004. Initial results from Tehran are expected by late March 15 or the next day. Final results will not be announced until several days after the voting because of the need for a second round.

A total of 4,476 candidates are seeking seats in the new body. This figure was winnowed down from 7,597 by the Guardians Council, a 12-member appointed clerical body that oversees legislation and has the power to vet candidates for public office. Most of the disqualified candidates were reformists or moderate conservatives.

Unlike in 2004, in this election the conservatives are split into two main camps — the Unified Principlists and the Broad Principlists — both of which have their own internal splits. The first camp consists mostly of ultraconservative elements allied with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The second camp is composed almost solely of pragmatic conservatives who oppose the maverick president, especially his handling of the economy and his radical approach to foreign policy matters. Confusingly, many candidates are included in both Unified Principlist and Broad Principlist candidate lists.

The outgoing parliament was quite hostile to Ahmadinejad; the incoming one could even further entrench the president’s opponents within the conservative establishment. Precise predictions of the electoral outcome are impossible given the lack of transparency in the electoral process, the lack of a political party culture in Iran and the overall complexity of the situation. But the pragmatic conservatives and their ultraconservative rivals are in a close competition for first place and could get somewhere around 100 seats apiece. The reformist camp, already marginalized because of the Guardians Council’s disqualifications, in all probability will come in third place with approximately 40 seats. The reformists controlled roughly the same number in the last parliament. Several independents also will win seats in the next Majlis.

On the domestic policy front, the new parliament will devote a great deal of time to trying to reverse the economic meltdown that has occurred on Ahmadinejad’s watch. Inflation and unemployment now officially stand at 19.2 percent and 10.7 percent, respectively.

The elections will have very little direct bearing on foreign policy issues, such as the U.S.-Iranian negotiations on Iraq, the nuclear controversy and Lebanon, for two main reasons. The first relates to the Iranian political system. Numerous institutions — including the Supreme National Security Council; the Expediency Council; the executive branch led by the president and his Cabinet, especially the Foreign Ministry; and the office of the supreme leader — dominate the foreign policy sector to parliament’s exclusion.

The second reason relates to the configuration of forces in the upcoming parliament. Iran’s unicameral legislature has only an indirect bearing on the foreign policy decision-making process via shaping the debate within both the state and society. Unlike its predecessor, this parliament probably will have a number of heavyweights from the pragmatic conservative camp, including Ali Larijani, a top Ahmadinejad opponent and former national security chief. Larijani enjoys the backing of numerous clerics from the religious city of Qom, where he is seeking a seat.

The split among the conservatives will make building a national consensus all the more difficult. The pragmatic conservatives generally will not align with the reformists; however, in a crisis situation regarding Iraq or the nuclear issue, the two sides very well could forge an ad hoc alliance against the hard-liners. Should the president’s moderate conservative opponents emerge as a major bloc in parliament, an even greater tug-of-war between the executive and legislative branches could emerge. This could make it difficult for Ahmadinejad to win a second term in Iran’s 2009 presidential elections.

At present, U.S.-Iranian talks on Iraq have reached a significant impasse, a situation further complicated by the assassination of Hezbollah operations chief Imad Mughniyah by Israeli intelligence and the rising tensions in the Levant. A divided parliament could exacerbate this impasse confronting Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who makes decisions based on consensus among the various stakeholders in the Islamic republic. He already must contend with an internal stalemate between pragmatists and hard-liners on how to deal with the United States.

Parliamentary elections could well reshape the domestic political landscape, producing a split parliament and worsening internal Iranian competition. All in all, a reconfiguration of forces in the Majlis will render a national consensus all the more elusive.

This article is published at Lebanonwire by agreement with www.stratfor.com, the world's leading private intelligence provider. For any questions or comments on this article please write to analysis@stratfor.com

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