This raises the question of how France will handle the Russia dilemma when it takes the EU’s helm. For years, France and Russia had a unique bilateral relationship that grew out of the cordial relations that France enjoyed with the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

But a large shift has occurred in Franco-Russian relations which was blatantly evident at the countries’ most recent annual security summit — an event that is typically a hallmark for their close relations. This year, the meeting was not just awkward; it was nearly hostile, since there little middle ground on the issues of the day. Russia opposes sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program; France co-authored the last two batches of sanctions. Russia opposes the U.S. missile defense program in Central Europe; France is rather nondenominational on the topic. Russia opposes Kosovar independence; France was the first state to recognize it on Feb. 18. Stratfor is sure that at some point during the meetings both sides had to have been thinking, “Why are we here?”

The traditional Gaullist position has been that global French influence depends upon Europe (which is to say, France) having room to maneuver independent of the superpowers. This resulted in Paris’ flirting with powers ranging from Moscow to Beijing to Tehran at the height of Western/American tensions with those countries. To the Americans, the French tendency to squeeze into the room is often — to be charitable — annoying, as it often produces a breach in the Western wall to be exploited. To the French it is all part and parcel of ensuring that French interests and capabilities are never taken for granted.

But that was the worldview of Charles de Gaulle and his successors, most recently Jacques Chirac. Those days are gone, and Nicholas Sarkozy, France’s freshman president, has broken with de Gaulle and Chirac. While France retains as opportunistic a foreign policy as ever, and its strategy is the same, its geographic scope has shrunk to match the regions in which it has far greater leverage: Europe and Europe’s immediate frontier.

That means instead of tweaking the Americans in order to shape the world, the French are now tweaking the Germans in order to shape Europe. Sarkozy’s spats with his German counterpart, Chancellor Angela Merkel, on everything from the EU’s Mediterranean policy to the euro are part of this strategy.

Meanwhile, the other party at the table — Russia — has also adjusted its worldview of late. The West pushed through Kosovar independence despite strident Russian objections. This embarrassment gravely damaged Russia’s standing throughout the world, particularly in Russia’s own periphery, where it has already experienced a series of reversals which it is trying to … well, reverse. In the former Soviet Union, many groups would like to ignore Russian interests and sprint Westward, while many who value Russian influence see such a public defeat as a sign that maybe they too should move on. Russia needs to “correct” both perceptions if it is to avoid the collapse of its entire international position. Moscow has taken the time during the Kosovo crisis to paint the West — especially the United States — as international aggressors since the West did not go through international controls to change the boundaries of states in Europe.

But this does not mean that Moscow has abandoned its tradition of using aggression to get what it wants. It has been working on “correcting” perceptions closer to home, in Ukraine and Georgia, stalling their Westward movements. This is working for the time being, but it does not mean Moscow will not find new ways of expanding its push against the West, especially since one of its mediators — Paris — is becoming more hostile.

This article is published at Lebanonwire by agreement with www.stratfor.com, the world's leading private intelligence provider. For any questions or comments on this article please write to analysis@stratfor.com

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