Summary

Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr has been in Iran for some time. In his absence, his movement in Iraq is in danger of collapsing. While in Iran, al-Sadr is at a religious school, studying so that he can shore up his credentials and improve his standing in other Shiite leaders’ eyes. However, Tehran could well be trying to keep al-Sadr out of Iraq in order to improve its position in talks with the United States.

Analysis

Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr has set the global rumor mill spinning in recent days, with some sources claiming he is lying comatose in an Iranian hospital from food poisoning and others maintaining that he has officially resigned from the political scene. Whatever the truth is, Stratfor can discern that al-Sadr is in Iran, and his movement in Iraq is in danger of breaking apart.

Prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, al-Sadr was expected to follow in the footsteps of his late father and uncle and become a powerful Shiite cleric in Iraq. But the toppling of Saddam Hussein in 2003 presented the young, aspiring leader with a unique opportunity, and al-Sadr dropped out of the Hawza (religious school) and formed his Mehdi Army to join the intra-Shiite struggle over control of Baghdad. Though al-Sadr proved his militia was a force to be reckoned with in Iraq, he did not have the religious credentials or political experience needed for him to be taken seriously by his Shiite rivals in the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, led by Abdel Aziz al-Hakim (with Iranian backing). The al-Sadr name in and of itself still carried a lot of weight, but if al-Sadr had any chance of furthering his career in the Shiite community, he would eventually have to return to ayatollah school in the Iranian Shiite holy city of Qom.

Stratfor first learned of al-Sadr’s decision to go back to school about a year ago, and raised the idea that the al-Sadrite movement would be in increasing danger of imploding the longer he hid out in Iran. At that time, sectarian violence was on the rise and al-Sadr could not be too confident that he would not end up on the U.S. military’s hit list. His retreat to Iran appeared in many ways to be a temporary refuge.

But al-Sadr did not return home. Even after the United States struck a deal with his movement to sign a truce and bring down the level of attacks, al-Sadr remained largely hidden in Iran, relying on his associates to relay messages back to his followers in Iraq. On March 10, his aides made a rather desperate appeal on al-Sadr’s behalf, explaining to his followers in An Najaf that al-Sadr is stepping away from the day-to-day operations in Iraq to pursue his religious education, but that he will remain in close contact and follow events in Iraq “from a distance.” This message fueled speculation that al-Sadr was retiring from his political career and putting a committee in place to manage his movement. Al-Sadr had also earlier acknowledged that many of his closest associates have betrayed him and abandoned his movement. On March 10, Iraq news source IraqSlogger reported an unusual protest in the Kasra wa Atash area in the eastern part of Baghdad near Sadr City — a stronghold of the Mehdi Army — where around 100 protesters chanted anti-al-Sadr slogans, calling him a traitor to the movement for hiding out in Iran and signing a truce with the Americans.

It is expected that not everyone in al-Sadr’s movement would be on board with his move to pull back from a radical posture and enter the political mainstream by signing a truce with the United States, but the combination of the Shiite leader’s absence, the large number of defections from his movement and the fact that now anti-al-Sadr protests are being carried out by his followers, raises the possibility of the Shiite movement fracturing beyond repair. Such a scenario would seriously undermine the U.S. military’s strategy in Iraq to create security conditions for political reconciliation among Iraq’s warring factions.

If al-Sadr — and possibly his movement — is facing a matter of political life and death as many of his followers now question his commitment to the group and his credibility as a leader, why has he chosen to continue studying in Iran? Logic dictates that the leader would first at least attempt to get his house in order during this tumultuous time and then return to the lengthy process of studying to become an ayatollah.

Though al-Sadr needs to make a name for himself and shore up his religious credentials to compete with his Shiite rivals, the situation appears too volatile for him to stay out of the political scene, much less announce to his followers that he is formally stepping back from his duties in Iraq. Moreover, with U.S.-Iranian negotiations over Iraq playing out, al-Sadr has to ensure he remains part of that equation. After all, if the perception sets in that al-Sadr has lost control over his movement and Mehdi militiamen begin running amok again in Iraq, the United States will see less utility in dealing with al-Sadr.

The Iranians are likely playing a major part in keeping al-Sadr away from Iraq at this stage in the game. Early on, Tehran recognized al-Sadr’s vulnerability as a political neophyte and Hawza dropout. When Iran extended its security umbrella to al-Sadr last year while he was on the run from U.S. forces, it had a plan to develop him into an Iranian proxy — another tool for the Iranians to use in negotiating with the United States over Iraq. The Iranians are likely using a carrot-and-stick approach in taming al-Sadr, sprinkling threats against his life with promises to secure a prominent place for his bloc in the Shiite-dominated government, as long as he can help create the appearance that the Iranians are writing his script.

With the United States dropping hints that it is coordinating with Israel behind the scenes to target Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Iranian regime needs to show that it can just as easily respond by unleashing its Shiite militant proxies in Iraq. And with al-Sadr under Iran’s thumb, or so it appears, Tehran can signal to the United States that while the Mehdi Army is playing nice for now, Iran holds the key to overturning the results of the surge. Al-Sadr, meanwhile, can only hope that his family name will help carry him through the current crisis while he buries himself in his books.

This article is published at Lebanonwire by agreement with www.stratfor.com, the world's leading private intelligence provider. For any questions or comments on this article please write to analysis@stratfor.com

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