The ruling families in the Arab monarchies (Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman) appear to have mastered the art of quick, quiet successions. Although a republic, power has passed smoothly from father to son in Syria. The same may occur in Egypt, Yemen, and Libya. It probably would have occurred in Iraq if the U.S. had not intervened there. Algeria and Tunisia are not "hereditary republics," but the former displayed a formidable ability to defeat a strong Islamist opposition while the latter has been relatively stable.

Lebanon and Sudan have been plagued for decades by conflicts that have also damaged their non-Arab neighbors (Israel in the case of Lebanon, and Chad as a result of the Darfur conflict in Sudan). But these conflicts in Lebanon and Sudan have caused far less damage to these countries' Arab neighbors. (Indeed, with regard to Lebanon's Arab neighbor Syria, it is Syria that has caused far more problems for Lebanon than vice versa.)

Invasions launched by Iraq's Saddam Hussein caused very serious problems for neighboring (non-Arab) Iran in the 1980s and (Arab) Kuwait in the early 1990s, but both these efforts failed. The American-led intervention in Iraq has led to widespread conflict in that country, refugee flows into neighboring ones (especially Jordan and Syria), and the potential for a wider regional conflict. But although non-Arab Turkey appears determined to become militarily involved there, the conflict in Iraq has not yet spilled over into neighboring Arab states or Iran.

Whatever else they can be criticized for, most Arab regimes have proved highly adept at self-preservation, preventing both Islamic revolution and democratization alike.

But will this situation continue? While most Arab regimes have been stable for decades, there was a time in the 1950s and 1960s when the Arab world experienced numerous coups and other conflicts. Further, the Soviet bloc was highly stable for decades before crumbling in a relatively short period of time. These two examples show that instability is possible in the Arab world, and that long periods of authoritarian stability can come to an abrupt end. And there are forces in the Arab world seeking to end the authoritarian stability maintained by incumbent Arab regimes. Unfortunately, the most powerful of these do not favor democratization, but the installation of Islamic revolutionary authoritarian regimes instead. But as was mentioned earlier, Arab regimes have been highly successful at containing these forces seeking change.

In looking at the future of the Arab world, then, the most likely scenario appears to be that the current regimes will remain in power and will successfully manage leadership transitions from one monarch or president to the next. A less likely scenario is that revolution will overthrow one or more of the present Arab regimes and replace them with authoritarian revolutionary regimes. Yet this scenario appears far more likely in the Arab world than in the West or more stable regions elsewhere. Democratization in the Arab world – whether instituted by any of the present regimes or installed via a "color revolution" as in Georgia or Ukraine – appears to be the least likely scenario. But notwithstanding its incompleteness and subsequent vulnerability, Lebanon's "Cedar Revolution" of 2005 shows that this scenario is not impossible.

What all this implies is that while the current regimes in the Arab world are likely to remain in power, change is possible. And if change comes, it is more likely to be sudden and dramatic than gradual and incremental. In sum, even if the current Arab regimes remain stable, theirs will be an unstable sort of stability.

Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University.