Agendas

The impasse over the presidential election goes back over a year to the decision of the parliamentary opposition—led by Hizbullah, the dominant political force among the Shia and the best-armed military faction in Lebanon—to leave the government and to boycott parliament. Their stated rationale was to put pressure on the March 14th majority bloc in parliament to agree to form a national unity government in which the opposition would have the power to veto cabinet decisions. The main focus of opposition activity has since shifted to pursuing the goal of preventing the election of a March 14th candidate as president.

The opposition has couched its activities in terms of resisting US efforts to dominate Lebanon, safeguarding the rights of Hizbullah as a force resisting Israeli occupation, and ensuring fair representation of all of Lebanon's various sects and communities. March 14th has presented its political agenda as being based on a series of UN Security Council resolutions, requiring Syria to establish normal diplomatic relations with Lebanon, prohibiting the supply of weapons over Lebanon's borders to Hizbullah, and establishing a mixed Lebanese-international tribunal to try those charged with the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri, Lebanon's former prime minister, and several other related political killings.

The March 14th bloc has sufficient MPs to elect a president by a simple majority, but the opposition maintains that this would be illegitimate unless at least two-thirds of the 128 members (currently reduced to 127 owing to the assassination of Antoine Ghanem in September) were present. The opposition has already subverted one session through staying away. The speaker, Nabih Berri (whose Amal party forms part of the opposition) has called for a second session on November 12th, but this is expected to be put back two days to the final deadline for a formal parliamentary vote. If this session fails, there are still ten days until the incumbent, Emile Lahoud, is scheduled to leave office, and MPs could, theoretically organise their own vote during this period without clearance from the speaker.

Patriarch's call

By custom, the president of Lebanon must be a Maronite, the largest Christian sect in Lebanon. This has placed the head of the Maronite church, Patriarch Nasrallah Butrus Sfeir, in a pivotal position in the negotiations to arrive at a consensus candidate. The process being discussed is said to entail the Patriarch presenting a shortlist of candidates to Saad al-Hariri, in his capacity as the leader of the March 14th bloc, and to Mr Berri, in the hope that the two politicians can agree on one name to put forward to parliament. The spectrum of candidates ranges from Michel Aoun, a former army commander whose Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) is part of the opposition, to a cluster of March 14th candidates, including Nassib Lahoud (a distant cousin of the incumbent), Butrus Harb and Charles Rizq. The possible compromise candidates include two former cabinet ministers, Jean Obeid and Robert Ghanem, who have no strong associations with either of the rival camps. The dark horse is General Michel Suleiman, the commander of the army, who could be elected subject to a constitutional amendment being passed. He could also assume power if no president is elected, as Mr Lahoud has said that he would hand over his office to General Suleiman in such circumstances. The army commander is on relatively good terms with both Syria and Hizbullah.

Mr Aoun's pact with Hizbullah scuppered his chances of winning the support of March 14th for his candidacy, although he has recently sought to build bridges with the government, holding several meetings with Mr Hariri in Paris. However, it is unrealistic to expect Mr Aoun to line his MPs up behind a March 14th candidate without the approval of Hizbullah, and ultimately Syria. None of the March 14th candidates has shown much stomach for going through with the election in the face of an opposition boycott, as this would run the risk of triggering a mass campaign of civil disobedience—or worse. The difficulty facing the so-called consensus candidates is that their election would represent a victory for the opposition in denying the parliamentary majority the chance to elect the candidate of its choice. This would be likely to compromise such a president's ability to resist pressure from the opposition on issues such as the appointment of a prime minister and the handling of sensitive issues of state, such as relations with Syria, Hizbullah's weapons and the Hariri tribunal.

Syria's price

The French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, has deployed three of his top advisers—Claude Guéant, Jean-David Lavitte and Boris Boillon—as well as his foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, and a special envoy, Jean-Claude Cousseran in pursuit of the goal of helping Lebanon through the presidential election and establishing a new basis for dealing with Syria.

Syria ostensibly has much to gain. France is in a position to revive the stalled process of approving an EU Association Agreement, which would pave the way for a big increase in economic aid, and Mr Sarkozy has indicated that he is prepared to promote a resumption of Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations, either as part of the proposed Annapolis conference, scheduled for late November, or in parallel to it. Faisal Miqdad, Syria's deputy foreign minister, told the Economist Intelligence Unit that Syria was insisting on a separate invitation to Annapolis, with assurances that the issue of the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights would be on the agenda, as a condition for its attendance. As currently conceived, the Annapolis meeting is restricted to Israeli-Palestinian issues, and Syria's presence would be on the basis of a collective invitation to a 13-member Arab League steering group.

In order to realise these benefits, Syria is expected to do what it can to prevent any untoward events occurring in Lebanon over the next two weeks—notably political assassinations—thereby allowing the Lebanese, with a little help from the French, to agree on the election of a new president. Syria will also be required to affirm its intention to abide by UN resolutions covering its relations with Lebanon. However, there are some large flies in the ointment. The Hariri tribunal poses a serious threat to the internal stability of the regime of Syria's president, Bashar al-Assad, if, as seems likely, senior security figures in that regime figure on the eventual charge sheet. Syria would have the means to torpedo the tribunal if it were to re-establish critical levers of control over the Lebanese government, whereas a stable Lebanese government would contribute to the tribunal moving ahead with its business. Another formidable obstacle in the way of the French efforts to coax Syria into co-operation is the likely reaction of Iran and Hizbullah, neither of which are beholden to instructions from Damascus.