Lebanon is at a decisive juncture that will determined its destiny, entity and regime. This is what everybody agrees upon in and outside Lebanon. There are two parallel lines, independent of each other, in the concept of a solution to the current crisis. There is a concept that is expressed by a fundamental force in the majority (especially Walid Jumblatt and Samir Geagea), and in the opposition (especially Hizbullah and the Aounist movement). This concept is based on the notion that a solution means leaving the juncture for a political situation that conforms to the specifications that each one of them devises for Lebanon. Therefore, the speech of each side seems to be in contradiction with the one issued by the other.

There is another concept that is expressed by a force that considers itself to be harmed by any situation that radically changes the current conditions. In its view the solution is a solution to the current crisis endured by the country rather than the parties. Therefore, it tries to focus on what can bring together, that is, a settlement that presupposes mutual concessions and retreats from definitive speeches.

It is very easy to adhere to fundamental positions. This does not cost any actual effort politically speaking. It responds to the wishes of a motivated public, because of instigation and mobilization. As for the settlement, it presupposes studying the givens of the country, including internal changes, and the givens of the crisis and its external dimensions. Therefore, it supposes that the concession is not a gift that is offered to the other party to extract special guarantees (and a share) from it, but rather the concession must respond to the profound meaning of the formula of coexistence among the sects and also among the political difference. The next situation will not be an image of a party wants, but rather a changed image. No particular party has the right to impose what it wants on the state and on the society.

Therefore, resolving the current dispute is the easiest part of dealing with the crisis. In this lies the difficulty in reaching a settlement: reaching the approach to the constitutional deadline for electing a new president without the appearance of that which indicates that the search aims at Lebanon's crisis. Rather, it aims only at how to extract the concession from the other side. Therefore the essence of the settlement is lost in technicalities and constitutional articles, to which a unified explanation will not be found, and the threats of the collapse of the structure.

Perhaps as a result of this fact, or this methodology on the part of Lebanese parties in dealing with the crisis, there are those who say, especially Arabs, that it is not possible to help the Lebanese if they do not want to help themselves, with the knowledge that there is an Arab decision to intervene in solving the Lebanese crisis, and not only assistance, on the part of the local and external parties. This decision has remained pending, despite two attempts that were undertaken by the secretary general of the Arab League. While waiting for the Lebanese to help themselves, the crisis is still turning in the same vicious circle.

However, there are those who cannot wait. Waiting means risking reaching the presidential deadline without a president, and the possibility of a vacuum in authority that is followed by a big split in the state. This is the essence of the mission of the three European ministers in Beirut. They came, perhaps in a last attempt to mediate between the Lebanese. However their fundamental objective is to maintain the unity of the state, which is the sole guarantee of their not becoming involved in an armed conflict in south Lebanon. The reinforced UNIFIL forces, of which most of their soldiers and equipment came from the countries of the three ministers. cannot operate without a unified Lebanese state, because their relationship is with the government, which will not be the source of one resolution in case of a vacuum. The rules of engagement of these forces permit them to resort to armed force in the event that their security is in danger. The vacuum in Lebanon, which will not be without effect upon its armed forces, may tempt all those who opposed Resolution 1701 by challenging UNIFIL and involving it in combat that the Europeans do not appear to be prepared to wage in south Lebanon.

The Lebanese and the Arabs are betting on time for a solution. However, the Europeans are the ones who may pay the price of this waiting. Perhaps the need to avoid the institutional vacuum is what is impelling them in this urgent way. They will not wait for their soldiers to be transformed into sharpshooting targets.