The Presidential Deadlock

The Lebanese parliament reconvened on September 25 to elect a successor to current President Emile Lahoud, whose mandate expires on November 23. This electoral appointment was also the occasion for the parliament to gather in a formal session for the first time in almost a year. The legislative body had in fact not met since November 2006, when the disagreement over the creation of a national unity government between the March 14 coalition and the Hezbollah-Amal opposition bloc had led the latter to initiate a political boycott, causing the de facto paralysis of the Lebanese government.

However, existing political and procedural disagreements between the two main political coalitions, and the renewed climate of political violence within the country, led to a failure of the first electoral round and to the postponement of the parliamentary session to October 23. Currently, numerous outstanding issues severely undermine the possibility of electing the new Lebanese president.

First, the parties have insofar failed to concur on a joint presidential nominee, as proposed by parliamentary speaker and member of the opposition Nabih Berri, who had put forth a national reconciliation initiative based on the nomination of a consensus candidate. The negotiations between the opposition and the majority coalitions have been stalled over the determination of the procedures for the presidential election. The Lebanese constitution -- in its Article 49 -- establishes that the president must be elected by a two-thirds majority in the first electoral round, or by an absolute majority after the first ballot.

Therefore, the March 14 alliance argues that, in case the two-thirds quorum is not reached in the first electoral round, the government has the power to choose a successor to Lahoud relying on a simple majority. This interpretation would empower them to elect the president without the need to rely on the opposition (as the March 14 coalition has 68 of the 128 available seats). On the other hand, the Hezbollah-led bloc strongly rejects this constitutional interpretation and insists on the two-thirds quorum requirement, which would allow it to retain its veto power.

The debate and disagreement over the electoral procedures reflect the underlying conflict of interests between the parties, which has prevented them from nominating a consensus candidate. In fact, the replacement of Emile Lahoud is seen by both the March 14 coalition and the opposition parties as a strategic opportunity to shift the current balance of power in their favor.

Lahoud, a Maronite Christian -- as determined by the current Lebanese power-sharing arrangement -- has been in charge of the presidency since 1998. Although his mandate officially expired in 2004, he was granted a three-year extension of his term due to a controversial constitutional amendment brokered by Syria, which always viewed Lahoud as an important ally within Lebanon.

Since his re-election in 2004, relations between the pro-Western and anti-Syrian March 14 coalition and the president have been increasingly tense, and the termination of Lahoud's presidential term is seen by the majority parties as a unique opportunity to consolidate its power within Lebanese politics, as well as to strongly diminish pro-Syrian influences within the Lebanese arena.

Replacing Lahoud with an ally of the majority appears to be particularly important now that popular support for the governing coalition is, at least to some degree, waning. A recent example of this trend was the defeat of the March 14 candidate in the August 2007 elections for the vacant seat of Pierre Amine Gemayel, the former member of the government coalition who was assassinated in November 2006. The fact that Gemayel's seat was won by a member of the opposition has been interpreted as a negative popularity test for the ruling coalition.

Therefore, a core interest of the March 14 alliance is to consolidate its position in the government, and all the presidential candidates of the alliance, such as Democratic Renewal Movement leader Nassib Lahoud, Rally of Independent Maronite leader Butros Harb, or current Minister of Social Affairs Nayla Mouawad, would push forward an anti-Syrian platform, even if by different degrees.

The opposition parties, on the other hand, perceive the importance of maintaining a "friendly" president necessary to balance the influence of the governing coalition, and they would hence oppose the election of an openly anti-Syrian candidate. Unlike the majority coalition, the opposition parties have decided to rally behind one nominee and to support the Christian leader of the Free Patriotic Movement Michel Aoun.

Renewal of Political Violence

This polarized and chaotic scenario was further complicated by the recent renewal of violence and political assassinations. On September 19, only a week before the first round of presidential elections, parliamentary member of the March 14 coalition and of the Maronite Phalange Party, Antoine Ghanem, was killed in a truck bombing. Ghanem was the eighth anti-Syrian politician to be killed since 2004, and the sixth victim of political assassinations of March 14 members since the February 2005 murder of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.

The main objective of Ghanem's assassination was to further destabilize and polarize the Lebanese political arena, perhaps in an attempt to maintain the current political paralysis and impasse. Secondly, the killing has a very practical function: to hinder the March 14 coalition's numerical majority within the parliament, effectively preventing them from electing a candidate of their own choice. Both these objectives seem to further Syrian interests in reasserting influence over Lebanon, although the country openly denied any involvement in the political assassination.

The internal reactions to the killing of Ghanem varied, although all parties -- including Hezbollah -- expressed their condemnation. Current presidential candidate Boutros Harb commented that "this is an attack aimed at sabotaging all efforts to reach a solution to the current political crisis," and stated that the killing of Ghanem was tied with the upcoming elections. A much stronger reaction came from prominent majority leader Walid Jumblatt, who openly declared that he opposed any negotiation with "murderers," alluding to pro-Syrian opposition forces, such as Hezbollah.

These types of statements from the majority coalition clearly indicate an escalation of the political debate, possibly hindering the future chances for dialogue with the opposition. Furthermore, Prime Minister Fouad Siniora -- in what is likely to be perceived as a contentious move by the opposition -- asked the United Nations and the newly established U.N. international tribunal for Lebanon to help investigate the killing.

The international community reacted with similar condemnation, and reiterated its interest in seeing the current Lebanese political crisis promptly resolved, as the current stalemate is seen as potentially destabilizing for the entire region. In this sense, the European Union urged Lebanon to overcome the current impasse and proceed with the presidential elections.

A similar statement, calling for the Lebanese elections to be "independent and free from foreign influence," came from the U.N. Security Council on the day following Ghanem's assassination. This declaration was later criticized by pro-Syrian parliamentary speaker Berri, who asked the U.N. not to interfere with Lebanese affairs. Another (unintended) effect of Ghanem's killing in the international arena has been the renewal of international attention toward the U.N. tribunal established to investigate the 2005 killing of Hariri. As an indicator of this trend, the United States recently pledged to contribute US$5 million to the tribunal. The tribunal, in fact, is seen as a potentially effective way to place a constraint over Syrian influence on Lebanese politics.

Finally, official statements from both Iranian and Syrian officials condemned the killing. Iran, unsurprisingly, sided with the Hezbollah-led opposition and declared: "Iran backs ongoing actions including Lebanon's Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri's compromise plan to solve the country's political crisis." Despite official denials of Syrian involvement in the current escalation of political violence, it seems quite obvious that the country would highly benefit from avoiding the replacement of pro-Syrian Lahoud with a majority candidate, and that it could use the current polarization and ungovernability to re-establish its influence over Lebanon.

Conclusion: Foreseeable Scenarios and Political Implications

The escalation of political violence and the failure to reach an agreement among the parties led to the failure of the first round of presidential elections. On September 25, the opposition bloc decided to boycott the parliamentary session, denying the March 14 alliance the required two-thirds quorum to elect the new Lebanese president. The parliament will now reconvene on October 23.

If a consensus candidate is not nominated by then, the majority parties have already declared that they would proceed to elect a candidate relying on a simple majority. This outcome would be extremely problematic, as it would likely lead to the rejection of the presidential nominee by the opposition parties, with the subsequent designation of an alternative candidate. The possibility of having two parallel governments operating within Lebanon would only deepen the political crisis and create a semi-permanent state of ungovernability.

Furthermore, opposition presidential candidate Michel Aoun expressed his strong rejection to this scenario by declaring: "Our message is clear: the election by a simple majority would be a declaration of war…The issue of the legal quorum is not open to discussion, and countries that back such a president [elected by a simple majority] will have to dispatch troops to protect him." This statement is particularly relevant, as it confirms the hypothesis that a unilateral election by the majority forces would lead to renewed factional divisions and violence, with an enormous potential for escalation.

Additionally, Information Minister Ghazi Aridi recently confirmed that both opposition and pro-government groups are currently running armed training camps across the country, a factor that only enhances the potential for internal strife and inter-ethnic violence.

Finally, renewed internal hostilities between the pro-government and opposition parties could enhance Syria's role in Lebanon, and it is difficult to predict whether its involvement would be limited to logistics assistance, or whether the country would consider more direct participation to support the Hezbollah-led opposition.

On the other hand, even a continuation of the current stalemate and the failure to nominate a successor to Lahoud before the end of his term would be detrimental to Lebanese stability, especially as the parties would hardly agree on any viable interim solution. Francois Bassil, head of the Association of Banks of Lebanon, recently stated that a renewed political impasse could lead to a widespread and severe economic crisis, which would further contribute to destabilizing and polarizing the country. Furthermore, a weak and paralyzed Lebanon would impair the country's national security and it would increase the threat of Islamist militants -- in some cases connected to transnational terrorist networks such as al-Qaeda and operating within Lebanon -- to openly challenge the government and assert their influence.

The best way to avoid this predicament would be the appointment of a consensus candidate between the two main political coalitions. In the days following the failed presidential elections, there have been a few positive steps in this direction. A first potential breakthrough was the meeting between parliamentary speaker Berri and prominent anti-Syrian leader Saad Hariri to discuss the nomination of a joint candidate. These talks were positively greeted by Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Butros Sfeir, who could play an important role by legitimizing the consensus candidate chosen by the two coalitions.

Furthermore, there have been talks about potential joint presidential nominees, such as Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh or army chief General Michel Suleiman -- who enjoys a wide degree of popular support, representing the only stable institution in Lebanon. A negotiated agreement between the parties would hopefully lead to the beginning of a national reconciliation process, and ultimately to a normalization of the Lebanese political arena.

The next two weeks will be crucial in determining the short term future of Lebanese politics and whether it will be characterized by the renewal of a national reconciliation process, or by increased polarization and instability. The ability of the local political leadership to agree on a presidential candidate, along with the effective prevention of further episodes of political violence in the weeks preceding the October elections will be crucial factors in shaping Lebanon's political horizon.

Benedetta Berti is a PhD candidate at the Fletcher School at Tufts University, a researcher at the Jebsen Center for Counter Terrorism Studies, and a teaching assistant in the Department of Political Science at Tufts University. Her work experience includes working at the Washington-based SITE Institute, the Tel-Aviv based Reut Institute, and serving as Legislative Fellow in the office of Congressman Adam B. Schiff (U.S. Congress). She holds a degree in Middle Eastern studies (summa cum laude) from the University of Bologna, and a Masters Degree in security studies and Middle Eastern politics from the Fletcher School.

The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an independent organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide conflict analysis services in the context of international relations. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader.

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