The report was issued in tandem with a series of recommendations to all parties, foreign and domestic, interested in the political outcome.

The report traces the historical social and political marginalization of Lebanese Shiites from the Mamluk era to the Ottoman Empire to the 1943 National Pact culminating in the arrival of Musa Sadr and the creation of the Amal movement.

With the arrival of Palestinians from Jordan in the wake of Black September in 1970 and the subsequent creation of "Fatah-land" in Southern Lebanon, Shiites felt helpless between Israeli strikes, abusive behavior by armed Palestinian groups, and being virtually ignored by the state. Following the Israeli invasion of 1982, this widespread sentiment helped leat to the formation of Hezbollah.

Fervently opposed to Israeli invasions and disturbed by Palestinian conduct, Shiites found answers in Hezbollah, prompting a Shiite cleric from the South, quoted in the report, to declare "thanks to Hezbollah, we are finally at peace: we got rid of the parties, the Palestinians, and the Israelis."

For Lebanese Shiites, the report concludes, it is more important for them to be reassured than represented.

The pullout of Israeli troops from most of the South in 2000 created an existential void for Hezbollah, the report found. If resistance against Israel served as the group's raison d'etre, the withdrawal served to weaken Hezbollah's domestic position.

In order for Hezbollah to remain viable, its message and position had to evolve. Citing resistance to Israel alone as being no longer tenable, resistance to Western influence, particularly that of the United States , through its proxy, Israel, became the new rallying call.

The report cites a turning point, if there is any particular one, in the Lebanese crisis with the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.

The reactions of various Lebanese groups set the tone for the subsequent political stalemate. The difference between Sunni and Shiite was stark.

While most Sunnis saw the murder of Hariri as a deliberate attempt by Damascus to decimate their community, the Shiites saw the creation of the March 14 coalition as further proof of their historical marginalization and a Sunni-Christian attempt, aided by the West, to both dominate Lebanese Shiites and disarm Hizbulla.

The summer 2006 war with Israel was seen by many Shiites as not an attack on Lebanon, but as another in a long line of attacks against Shiites.

Following a cease-fire and the passing of UN Resolution 1701, and having proclaimed a "Divine Victory," Hezbollah became the unquestioned face of Lebanese Shiites.

The war gave Hezbollah tremendous credibility within Lebanon specifically and around the Middle East generally.

Hezbollah's newly minted credibility gave it political capital, which they intended to use to further equal representation for the Shiite community.

Following the 2006 war, Hezbollah, having been given nothing politically, turned to street politics to push ahead their agenda, the report took on a life of their own - and dangerous sectarian overtones.

Hezbollah's aliance with the Christian opposition Free Patriotic Movement, led by MP Michel Aoun, was not sufficient to keep sectarian issues at bay, the report found, because ideological differences make it fragile.

The report suggests that interested Lebanese and foreign parties reach a compromise on a package deal for domestic politics, one which postpones dealing with the question of Hezbollah's weapons while at the same time limiting its ability to use those weapons.

Leaving off on somewhat of a bleak note, the ICG acknowledged that it prescriptions for ameliorating tensions within the Lebanese political system are no panacea and for there to be an end to cyclical crises, Lebanon requires sustained and serious internal political reform.