Since their Republic became independent, a "major political event" has rarely been absent from the lives of Lebanese, their crises and their wars. Thus, "salvation" has always been on hand. Today is the season of the presidential election and salvation, until 23 November. It's natural for this phase to be exceptional. However, hasn't it been this way ever since independence? In an exceptional nation where most of the presidents have been elected for the sake of salvation, they don't reach the end of their terms without this becoming a more insistent demand. Today, the exceptional is growing even bigger, and the political entity of Lebanon is on the verge of disappearing and annihilation. Each party that either takes part in or influences the election has a red line, and every Lebanese is waiting for the puff of white smoke to appear (perhaps black is required by the crisis conditions) and seeing the heat of the battle rise, growing higher at the various political levels.

However, Lebanon in 2007 does not resemble the situation in any previous "election": there is a war of legitimacy-illegitimacy between the steadfast government and the opposition, which that seeks to bring it down, even if voluntarily, and even if only shortly before the end of its term, so that the government pays the price for the so-called collaboration with the American project for the region and the country.

There is also the steadfast heart of Beirut, in its silence, lying at the heart of repercussions from the earthquake-like assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, and the series of other liquidations… and a trial for the killers. There are mediation, efforts and good intentions to solve the crisis, and other attempts that are challenged as soon as they cross the border into this small country, whose special features and diversity have occupied the time of major world capitals. This diversity is a blessing but for some it has become a complaint; there have been increasing complaints about the reality of the long-term goals of everything that has been prepared for Lebanon since the earthquake, and what led up to it.

These are merely simplistic titles for the reality of complicated crises in the "most difficult country in the world." Since 2007 and the election don't resemble past experiences, salvation this time has become a miracle, in light of the escalating regional-international polarization. Meanwhile, when it comes to the end of Lebanon's immunity and ability to tolerate the repercussions of this polarization and strife between neighbors, and great powers, anxiety is increasing.

If we leave aside the aspects of the earthquake and its repercussions, we should ask whether this Republic has ever been able to produce "national" immunity that would remove the need to ask for the mediation of the outside world, especially to halt the aspirations of foreign actors. History proves that the national accord of Lebanon's first independence was not alone in facilitating ways out of domestic crisis, while the Taif Accord is at stake in the current regional-international polarization; the Lebanese imagined a huge immunity to bickering within this same polarization… while waiting for the white smoke, or "password" coming from a friend or ally. This is specifically what leads Lebanon to the eye of the storm, since there has not been only one password, and it is likely that there won't be only one in the future, either. Meanwhile, politicians strive - some of them do not deserve the term "politician" - to come up with formulas and "modest" deals that quickly fall apart, under the weight of the regional conflict.

Therefore, Lebanese will not be dragged into wagering on the proposals of the domestic parties to the conflict, while remembering that the solution always comes with the approval of the outside world. The disaster of the coming presidential election is that this same approval or consensus has become a quasi-miracle, especially since the nightmare scenario of becoming a second Gaza has not disappeared, and since the survival of the Lebanese political system has become pending on the results of the conflicts between the great powers - these conflicts are much greater than the country's ability to tolerate the repercussions of these conflicts.

The debates underway today (about the need to see a simultaneous formation of a unity government and presidential election), and the opposition's hint that it will accept a military Cabinet if no consensus is reached with the government, do not hide the repercussions of these conflicts. For example, one model appears in the question by MP Samir Franjieh: "Can we pledge to protect Hizbullah from America, and protect 14 March from Syria?" as part of a declaration of intentions to facilitate domestic accord. A newer, more "eloquent" model of expressing the difficult possibilities regarding a flaring-up of the external conflict comes in Hizbullah's threat to take steps confronting a new president "brought in by the Americans as an employee or slave of theirs." Who elects the president, then? "Ordinary" Lebanese no longer pose the question and very few remember the exceptional aspects of electing someone in light of a crisis that paralyzes this small Republic, or a war, or other such big predicament, such as searching for a modified share of power for a given sect. Very few remember how many times the Constitution was not amended to facilitate an election or an extension, or condemn the remaining role of Parliament, after counting the number of presidential electors outside the country.

The 2007 election doesn't resemble others, because the "president of salvation" might not come this time, even if certain political stances are modified. The regime of sects and "their democracy" are no longer to renew the regime's immunity, especially after a long insistence on preventing the implementation of the Taif Accord, and seeing Lebanon remain a hostage, as it awaits the bigger political settlements.