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Global Intelligence, Stratfor, March 30, 2006

Lebanonwire

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Lebanon: A Threat to the American University in Beirut

Summary

Lebanon has recently experienced a spate of discoveries of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and bomb-making materials, with numerous IEDs discovered in Beirut. Most recently, a small IED was found March 22 in an American University of Beirut lecture hall, with no significant effort made to conceal the device -- suggesting that the IED was intended to send a warning to the university rather than to cause carnage. The incident indicates that if political conditions in Lebanon or elsewhere in the Middle East change for the worse, the university and its faculty could be at risk.

Analysis

Lebanon has experienced a spate of discoveries of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and bomb-making materials in recent weeks, with numerous IEDs discovered in Beirut. In the most recent of these incidents, a janitor discovered an IED in a paper bag in the American University of Beirut's (AUB's) Issam Fares Hall at approximately 9:30 a.m. March 22. According to Lebanese police, the device contained slightly more than 7 ounces of explosives connected to a detonator (although other sources say the IED was not actually wired). It was placed in plain sight near an elevator, suggesting that whoever planted it wanted it to be found instead of having it detonate.

In a country where political expression often takes the form of bombings and assassinations, such incidents do not particularly stand out. They have been part of an ongoing campaign by opposition elements to prod Lebanon's hesitant government into showing greater flexibility on the issue of Cabinet enlargement. However, the device at the AUB also sends a strong signal to the university, to its sponsors and, by proxy, to the United States.

For militants, AUB is a vulnerable and target-rich environment. Many of the professors are U.S. citizens and many of the staff are dual U.S.-Lebanese citizens. There are also many U.S. exchange students attending the university. In addition, the campus is heavily politicized, with student activist groups representing all elements of Lebanon's tumultuous political scene. Thus, any number of groups could be responsible for planting the device. Getting an IED into Issam Fares Hall in itself is no major accomplishment; while the perimeter of AUBs' main campus is protected by the Lebanese army and internal security forces, the security guards employed by the university do not present an effective defense or deterrent.

Issam Fares Hall, located just off campus, is protected only by university security personnel. On a day when no guest speaker was scheduled for the lecture hall, there would be practically no security to bypass at all. In Beirut, materials and know-how for making IEDs are readily available, with grenades available on the black market for $15 in one Armenian Christian neighborhood, for example.

A bombing on campus that kills U.S. citizens, or the kidnapping of an American professor or other faculty member, would also have an impact in the United States. During the 1980s, the AUB became a focal point for U.S. involvement in Lebanon after several faculty members were kidnapped by the militant group Hezbollah. The situation eventually led to what would become the Reagan administration's arms-for-hostages scandal.

Whoever planted the IED intended to communicate that the university will not be off-limits if the political situation in Lebanon deteriorates further. If fighting breaks out between Israel and Hezbollah again, or if tensions between the United States and Iran reach a breaking point, the university could become a battleground.

Unlike in the 1980s, any renewed violence involving AUB could well see U.S. faculty and staff targeted for assassination, rather than for kidnapping, in the event of a major U.S.-Iranian conflict. Hezbollah, acting as an Iranian proxy, could create havoc on campus at AUB. This could include a campaign of assassinations carried out by Hezbollah -- or by elements of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or Ministry of Intelligence and Security using the group as cover for Iranian operations in Lebanon.

This article is published at Lebanonwire by agreement with www.stratfor.com, the world's leading private intelligence provider. For any questions or comments on this article please write to analysis@stratfor.com

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