Judging by the actions and arguments of the opponents of disengagement from the Gaza Strip, the retention of Gaza and its settlements is more important to them than the survival of Israel as a democratic state. Though few will admit it, they are sowing the seeds of a civil war or unbridgeable political schism between sections of the Jewish population.

The constant, unbridled delegitimation of Israel's government and Knesset as undemocratic, the branding of the IDF as an agent of immorality and anti-Jewish action that should be opposed and deserted, and the teaching of Orthodox youth that divine law supersedes that of the state is leading to major disaffection, which is the prelude to a national split.

While people in a democracy should have a right to protest government decisions with which they disagree, just as the opponents of disengagement have had free rein to do, the resort to civil disobedience should not be viewed as an inherent right. It has been a holy cow in intellectual circles since it was conceptualized by Henry Thoreau and adopted by Mahatma Gandhi to fight British occupation; but the opponents of disengagement, in planning to employ civil disobedience, would do well to remember that Thoreau was an anarchist theorizing in a secure country, and that Gandhi adopted civil disobedience to bring down a government foreign to his country. He himself realized that the resort to civil disobedience was a declaration of war – not just a protest.

WHEN THE fruits of the anti-disengagement campaign ripen, no one can guarantee that the opponents, blinded by often-messianic fervor, will know how to stop in time, especially as the circumstances on the ground will be complicated and unclear. Once someone is shot, there will be no objective depiction of the reality or apportioning of the blame, and the killing and mutual recrimination will go on. One thing alone is certain: Israel will be weaker.

Those who harp on the dangers of a new intifada if the disengagement takes place might consider what that intifada can do against a divided Israel and a discredited government, even with Gaza still in our hands.

One can sympathize with the dismay of the settlers. They will lose their homes and livelihoods, though it is likely they will be generously compensated with cash and new housing. On the other hand, their dream of a Greater Israel has come undone, and this must be a painful loss.

Nevertheless, what one cannot accept is the widespread vilification of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon as a defeatist, a traitor or a puppet of the American administration. Every opponent of disengagement, even if he never served in the army, confidently professes to understand the military implications of our withdrawal from Gaza better than Sharon, who has been involved in every war Israel has fought, who brought the second intifada to its knees, and who is widely regarded as one of the world's top strategists.

Sharon, I believe, knows what he is up to, even if he isn't free to spell it out.

His decision to take down settlements derives from one central assessment: that Israel must emerge from the recent round of violence with borders it can defend from any sort of Arab attack. It is clear to him that the Palestinian side will never be able to concede us such borders at the negotiating table, meaning that to attain them, we must set them ourselves.

To do that at a time when the the world needs a pacification of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, in particular in dealing with the new assertiveness of the Islamic world, the only way to avert international obstruction is to provide the Palestinians with borders within which they can live prosperous and free lives.

This, however, requires removing certain Jewish settlements, which Sharon will do in keeping with his strategic judgment and with an eye to retaining as many settlers as possible on the land Israel will retain. His initiative, which began with Gaza, has already gained Israel international support it has not known since 1967, including an apparent major change in American policy favoring our retention of the larger settlement blocs in the West Bank.

Once the Palestinians have land, they will be constrained to form a state on it. If, as expected, the world puts them on their feet economically, they will have something constructive to focus on and their leaders will have an incentive to keep the peace. Should the Palestinian state threaten Israel, such behavior will be considered inter-state belligerency, and Israel will have more latitude to deal with it than it has today.

The writer, a research fellow at the Truman Institute for Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, was an adviser to the Ministry of Defense. His article was first publihed at the Jerusalem Post