The majority of the Lebanese, represented in the community of March 14, can steer the situation in their favor, even though inappropriate global or regional winds may blow now and then. The only way to carry out its move should be, first and foremost, by remaining a majority.

In its action rationale, it emulates - or should emulate- the front line modus operandi requiring from each member to control his ceiling and adapt it to a middle average accepted by other parties. Such a mature behavior is not rare, since we can detect it in most of what emanated, and is emanating, from Lebanese leaders such as Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and the leader of the "Lebanese Forces" Samir Geagea. Since the former designed his cabinet and the latter was released from prison, their behavior has been wise and rational, taking into consideration the other allies, their interests and aspirations. But the stability of such an approach is still jeopardized by an obstacle represented by two other main poles in March 14, the leader of "the Progressive Socialist Party" and the leader of "the Free National Bloc".

It is true that this obstacle has been partially overcome over the past two weeks. However, overcoming truly, convincingly, and reassuringly this obstacle requires from Walid Jumblatt and Michel Aoun a further degree of aloofness and transcending. Neither the personal - including the moody - nor the sectarian, especially at this time, should have priority over the national. This is not preaching, since it is a fact based on two realities. One of them is that the national, in its Lebanese definition, has to take into consideration the personal and the sectarian. The second is that the Lebanese nationalism today is not a stance and opinion but a mass preemption of a mass demise.

To be more honest, let's say that what Michel Aoun may undertake now shall determine, or subvert, his eligibility to reach the Presidency of the Republic. The same applies to Walid Jumblatt and his passage from the leadership of the sect, to the leadership of the mountain, to the national leadership. Without reproving what both have offered to the independence issue, each in his own way, it remains that the mentioned issue is still half way and it will be difficult to judge its symbols until it reaches the end of the tunnel.

Even though one of the signs of our retardation, socially and politically, is expressed by the fact that we lack a public opinion making pressures on politicians, whether in the country at large or within each sects, yet we are facing massive challenges, be it in the form of assassinations and bombings, "al Qaeda's" extension to Lebanon, land or sea weapon smuggling, the proliferation of weapons blooming inside and outside the camps, or, last but not least, the remnants of the vanished authority and its president who is still able of curtailing and hampering. The challenge that is further becoming, one day after the other, central and prevailing is the Iranian, who seeks to link Lebanon to issues, totally unrelated to its quintessence. Indeed, the logical outcome of the behavior adopted by the ruling group in Tehran is to involve the entire region in a chain of terror, wherein Lebanon would be the most floppy and vulnerable loop. Thus, instead of preparing for the gradual pullout from fading and vanishing confrontations, it implicates the Lebanese in an escalating dangerous confrontation, where neither Michel Aoun nor Walid Jumblat would find a place for their sensitivities and ambitions.

Needless to say, the only weapon the Lebanese have is to maintain their Majority as a majority, and make it sustainable. Achieving the latter does not only contribute to curtailing the challenges but paves the way for a broader success liable to be relied on to attract "many" hesitant or complaining Shiites voices. The latter would be given a sustainable majority would have taken from a party force where politics and weapons, internal and external and opinion and blackmail are intertwined.