Until recently, in addition to Ali Benflis, the secretary-general of the National Liberation Front (FLN), another nine high-profile individuals had announced they would run for the Algerian presidential election next April 8. All have admitted that their efforts may lead nowhere because the incumbent president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, controls both the administrative apparatus that organizes and runs elections and the ability to allocate state funds to local municipalities whose support he seeks.
In recent weeks, Bouteflika has deployed other means of patronage. He has engaged in marathon visits to several parts of the country, where he has handed out public housing and service grants, or he has announced new development plans for towns on his itinerary. Moreover, some of the president’s rivals believe that the Algerian military ­ which had promised to remain neutral ­ may have already decided to back him, mainly because there seems to be no other candidate worth supporting.
Bouteflika’s opponents accuse him of quashing democratic freedoms through a sustained crackdown on the media. They say the president has used laws and employed other legal action to go after newspapers and journalists who have criticized him and his governing style. Bouteflika also stands accused of having balked at implementing promised reforms, of having ignored parliamentary and constitutional rules, and of having given himself exclusive access to state-run television (the only visual media in Algeria) during the election campaign.
Up until last Tuesday, the pool of actual or declared opposition candidates for the presidency included five former prime ministers (including Benflis and Ahmed Benbitour), one former foreign minister (Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, who leads the as-yet unrecognized Islamist party, Wafa) and a retired army general. Also standing were Said Saadi, the leader of the Berber-based Constitutional and Democratic Rally; Abdullah Djaballah, leader of the Islamist Movement of National Reform; and Louisa Hanoun, the leader of the communist Workers Party. On Tuesday, however, the Constitutional Council rejected the candidacy of all but six contenders because they had not met the requirement of garnering 75,000 citizen signatures for their candidacies from 28 of the 48 wilayats, or governorships, or from 600 elected officials. Those officially in the race against Bouteflika are now: Benflis, Saadi, Djaballah, Hanoun and Fawzi Rebaine, an unknown who heads a small nationalist party, Ahd 54.
A few of the candidates stand out, not because they constitute a serious electoral threat to the incumbent president, but because of the damage they might inflict on Bouteflika’s legitimacy and that of the electoral process.
Hanoun’s case in particular is significant. She decided to run in the name of women and of the impoverished masses. She always opposed the cancelation of the 1992 parliamentary elections, has called for the reinstatement of the banned Islamic Salvation Front, and has openly backed the grievances of the Berber militant movement of the Kabylia region. Even though she is not considered a serious challenger, she is among the first female presidential candidates in the Arab world.
Even though Bouteflika’s adversaries could not agree on a common strategy for opposing him (for example pulling out of the race, rallying behind a single strong candidate or challenging the legality of the process), they have signed a collective statement that draws attention to Bouteflika’s constitutional violations since his accession to power. The statement, which was made public, was sent to the military chiefs of staff, the presidents of the Senate and National Assembly, and the European Union and the US, with the hope that all could use their influence to help guarantee a fair election process.
Hocine Ait-Ahmed, the leader of the Berber-based Front of Socialist Forces, is another influential political figure who has been highly critical of Bouteflika. He has announced that his party would not take part in the election and has called for a boycott to undermine what he says is a predetermined result. His party has requested the postponement of the presidential election, which, according to him, should be run by an independent commission and accompanied by a vote for a “sovereign and constitutive” Parliament.
As things stand today, Algeria’s political environment on the eve of the presidential election is murky, but also familiar. Even though the pool of candidates is rich in number and the jockeying is interesting to observe, political reality in the country does not seem to have evolved much since the presidential election of 1999. For one thing, most of the 10 original contenders are members of the political elite, have governed at one time or another, and were seeking to return to power armed with electoral legitimacy ­ and that includes Bouteflika. After the elimination of half of the contenders by the Constitutional Council, the only serious challenge to Bouteflika comes from Benflis.
The current election acrobatics seem, once again, to fly above the heads of most Algerians, who are likely to respond with apathy on election day, as happened in the last presidential and parliamentary elections. The euphoria that greeted the political opening of 1989 has long faded away as a result of the decreasing responsiveness of political parties and institutions. The harsh reality of declining living standards for an overwhelming majority of the 32 million Algerians has given way to cynicism among the electorate.
Meanwhile, the armed forces remain the kingmaker. Since they appear to have given up on the idea of ousting Bouteflika, there is no serious obstacle to the renewal of his mandate. Moreover, the ambient yearning of Algerians for stability and social peace play in the president’s favor. He already has the support of the National Democratic Rally (RND), led by his current prime minister, Ahmed Ouyahia. The RND and the FLN formed a strong governing coalition until the recent split within the latter party. Given the backing Bouteflika enjoys from the RND, from the moderate Islamist Movement of Society for Peace, and from part of the FLN, he seems assured of a term renewal, despite the ill-feeling generated by his leadership style and policies in the past five years.
For some pragmatic observers, Bouteflika is the least undesirable among all the presidential hopefuls. Even though he is accused of “Bonapartist” tendencies, he seems to be genuinely interested in Algeria’s well-being, not just in his personal political survival for the sake of burnishing an abstract historical legacy. He has been able to co-opt both conservative holdovers from the previous era and moderate Islamists who see him as a good tactical ally. However, this has also made him a hostage to these two tendencies, so that he has resisted liberal reforms and enacted pro-Islamist policies.
The political realist in Bouteflika is likely to work on consolidating this alliance, forcing the hand of the undecided (including the military), and minimizing the impact of the “front against fraud” formed by his opponents. Unless something fundamental changes, this scenario, which has been building up since the 1999 election, appears increasingly likely as April 8 nears. Only a major and unsettling event would alter it.

Azzedine Layachi is associate professor of politics at St. John’s University in New York. He wrote this comment, the second of two on Algeria’s forthcoming presidential election, for THE DAILY STAR