The episode at Al-Aqsa Mosque on Dec. 22, 2003, when angry Palestinians attacked Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher, damaged Egyptian-Palestinian relations. It is worth examining two aspects of the event to understand its lessons ­ the situation in Jerusalem and the struggle to control the holy places; and the specifics of Maher’s political and religious visit to a divided and occupied city.
It is no secret that today there is no Palestinian leadership in Jerusalem. The Palestinian Authority (PA) is weak and barely visible, save for the occasional employees’ organization, while the “elected” representatives of Arab Jerusalem in the Palestinian Legislative Council are busy with their own agendas. During the month of Ramadan, Islamists managed to display their strength in the city and the holy places. Yet while Al-Aqsa has served as a venue for people to come together, it has not been the focal point of a clear political message or consensus. The Islamic endowment establishment, or waqf, has lost its constituency and is regarded by most people as little more than an “employee” of the PA and the Jordanian government.
When he visited Jerusalem, Maher sought to add a visit to Al-Aqsa to his political mission. The arrangement was that he would enter the site from the Lion Gate accompanied by representatives of the waqf. However, at the last moment the Israeli escort changed the route and instead led the group through the Maghreb Gate.
A few Palestinians shouted at Maher on his way into the mosque, accusing him of collaboration and declaring that he was unwelcome. They saw the Egyptian mission as an attempt to advance “normalization” with Israel while Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon pursued the killings and demolitions in Nablus and Rafah and continued building a separation wall in the West Bank. Furthermore, Maher’s entry point to the Al-Aqsa compound suggested his acceptance and recognition of Israeli control over the Maghreb Gate (the entrance point for “unwelcome” visitors, namely Israeli settlers) and the entire holy compound.
Maher could have remained in the mosque to perform his prayers or, as he decided, he could have left the compound after the verbal insults. However, the Israelis stormed into sight, surrounded their visitor and made a scene. One must conclude that the highly experienced Egyptian diplomat put his fate in the hands of amateurs and did not have the wisdom to realize what was happening. It seems he was not briefed about the sensitivity of entering through the Maghreb Gate.
The Israelis sought to emphasize that they were the dominant power governing Jerusalem. They control the movement of goods and persons and have closed several Palestinian institutions. In the city, 250,000 Palestinians are still struggling to maintain their identity, culture, heritage and citizenship, while the Israelis consider them merely “residents.” When French President Jacques Chirac visited a few years ago, he objected strongly to Israel’s policy of dictating the terms of official visits and was about to cancel his trip. He was successful in visiting Al-Haram al-Sharif with the late Palestinian leader Faisal Husseini and managed to distance himself from the Israelis. The 2002 visit of Pope John Paul II was similar to Chirac’s, and again Jerusalemites were keen to underline the existence of their own separate entrance and exit as well as control of the holy site.
One cannot but admit that in the absence of a Palestinian leadership and strong national institutions, there will always be room for the Israelis to impose their agenda, while some angry spoilers will try to hijack events at the holy sites. Active in Al-Haram al-Sharif has been Hizb al-Tahrir, or the Islamic Liberation Party, a group of angry people that has since the 1950s disseminated a message of rejection and denial. They call for the return of the caliph and the establishment of an Islamic state, but they pose no threat to the Israelis. They have always been isolated from the rest of the Islamic movement, but are also able to disrupt and distort the image of Palestinian society, and the Israelis have used them to advance their own political agenda.
At the official level, Palestinians and Egyptians may be able to kiss and make up, but the two societies have different views. Egyptian columnists were harshly critical of the Maher episode, seeing it as an example of Palestinian ungratefulness for Egyptian sacrifices to their cause. At the same time, the Palestinian street sent a signal through Maher that they were angry at the weakness and lack of dignity of Arab regimes, which they believe have adopted a defensive position in order to survive, and are seeking to normalize relations with Israel while Palestinians bleed. Egyptians and others underestimate the scale of public anger with this acquiescence.
If there was a lesson in the Maher episode, it was that now is the time for Palestinian and Arab civil society institutions to build strong ties. This will allow all sides to develop a common position to help face future challenges, and will allow them to also work up the courage to avoid brushing problems or mistakes under the carpet, a tactic favored at the level of the Arab states.

Mahdi Abdul Hadi is chairman of PASSIA, the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, in Jerusalem. He wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR