Many observers missed the most interesting item in Syrian President Bashar Assad’s much-publicized interview with the Washington Post’s Lally Weymouth last weekend. It had to do with the conditions under which Syria would agree to resume negotiations with Israel.
Weymouth asked Assad: “What is the basis on which you are offering to start talks with Israel?” He responded: “UN resolutions, Madrid, and the Saudi initiative.” She followed up with this question: “Do you demand that Israel agree to give back what Prime Minister (Ehud) Barak offered, or will you negotiate without conditions?” Assad replied: “If you want to negotiate, you need a basis. So the basis is the Madrid conference.” This dovetailed with a statement last week by Butheina Shaaban of Syria’s Foreign Ministry, in which she remarked: “Syria is always ready to resume negotiations on the basis of the Madrid Conference, UN Security Council resolutions and the principle of land for peace.” Shaaban was speaking after an Israeli newspaper reported that Assad’s brother, Maher, had met with a high-ranking Israeli Foreign Ministry official in Amman to see about resuming talks with Israel.
Something fundamental seems to have changed in Syria’s negotiating stance vis-a-vis Israel, and the statements by Assad and Shaaban, as well as those by unofficial Syrian representatives in the past year, indicate what it is: Syria has quietly abandoned its demand that past understandings reached bilaterally with Israel after Madrid be the basis for any new negotiations.
Why should this matter? Because in his rounds of talks with successive Israeli governments, the late President Hafiz Assad fought tooth and nail to ensure that prior understandings would be respected. There was a reason for this: Syria had extracted significant concessions from Israel, helping push their talks, in the words of Israeli negotiator Itamar Rabinovich, to the brink of peace.
Two such understandings are well known: Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s “promise” of August 1993, and the security non-paper agreed by Syria and Israel in May 1994. The so-called Rabin promise was a conditional proposal, handed to the then US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, in which Rabin agreed to a full withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 lines on the Golan Heights, in exchange for what Israel considered satisfactory security arrangements and genuine peace.
The security non-paper was an unsigned document that defined what the two sides saw as the guidelines for security arrangements accompanying a settlement. The document was significant for several reasons: though unsigned, it was the first jointly approved text after Madrid. The parties showed they could mutually agree on a framework for security objectives. And Syria gained a device allowing it to maneuver on the scope of its expected demilitarization in and around the Golan after an Israeli withdrawal.
Given the importance of both understandings, it was extraordinary that Syrian officials avoided mentioning them in all their recent public statements on a resumption of talks with Israel. Indeed, by mentioning Madrid as the basis for such talks, Assad took Syria back to square one, effectively declaring prior Syrian negotiating gains invalid.
Why did he do such a thing? One might charitably assume it was a tactical ploy to test the waters and see how far Israel would go. The signs are not promising: Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon is plainly uninterested in addressing the Golan imbroglio, and the Bush administration is equally indifferent. By being flexible on preconditions for talks, Assad may have been sending a message that Israel would reject any Syrian offer, no matter how compliant.
This explanation may be partly true, but in its entirety is unconvincing.
Assad may be testing the waters, but the little that remains of his weak bargaining hand depends on reviving the negotiating steadfastness that made his father famous. By folding so
quickly on preconditions, Assad relinquished an underlying hardness that could have been profitable when talks resumed.
The presence of US forces on Syria’s border doesn’t explain the change in Syrian attitudes. One thing the US has not demanded is that Damascus delete its memory of prior dealings with Israel. The only explanation is that the Syrians are worried about the Palestinian-Israeli “road map.” If the much-maligned document leads to a settlement, Assad would be left virtually alone at the table with the Israelis. His chances of getting an adequate deal on the Golan would be minimal.
So Assad is dumping the cargo, and several passengers, to guarantee his track with Israel stays afloat and relevant. Up to now the Israelis and Americans have paid scant attention. They should: Assad is making a serious concession, and a chance just might exist to carry Syria and Israel fully into the abyss of peace.

Michael Young writes a regular column for THE DAILY STAR. His weblog is www.beirutcalling.blogspot.com

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