Three Palestinian armies are crowding the
West Bank
The West Bank is an extremely small piece of land and its densely populated areas are even
more constricted.
According to the 1993 Oslo agreement, the Palestinian Authority (PA) is supposed to assert
administrative and security control over certain areas, designated Area A, and share
responsibility for security with Israel in others in Area B. The rest, Area C, was
supposed to remain under full Israeli control.
Area A, in effect, covers all major West Bank cities and towns. It is this area that is
suffering from a plethora of “armies” these days.
The Israeli Army has apparently decided to reoccupy the whole of Area A. While this has
been happening on and off for several months now, what is new about the current situation
is that Israeli leaders are talking of a long (even open-ended) stay in Area A rather than
of a limited incursion. If the current situation is not exactly a reoccupation, it sure
looks like one. The difference is that Israel refuses to assume responsibility for
administering the area its army now controls. In effect, Area A has been relegated to B
but not quite to C status.
The reoccupation appears to be a major operation. Israel called up reserves, according to
Directive 8, which suggests a state of war. Large forces were mobilized to carry out
“Operation Determined Path,” in addition, of course to the security wall the
Israelis are building between Israel and the West Bank and the continuation of
“surgical” strikes they say target leading militants but which in fact kill many
civilians in the process.
The declared objective of all this is to “destroy the infrastructure of
terrorism,” prevent Palestinian militant organizations from regrouping after the
blows they suffered during April’s “Operation Rampart” and take the war to
the enemy.
According to Israel’s definition, however, Fatah is a militant organization. So
Israel deems regular Palestinian forces to be at best suspicious elements, and at worst
belligerents.
Consequently, it was only natural that Israeli policy would lead to further erosion of the
PA’s abilities, depriving it of the opportunity to implement reform.
This is not merely an accidental byproduct of Israel’s military action. On the
contrary, it is based on Israel’s assessment that it cannot possibly do business with
the PA and its various institutions.
But Area A is not strictly the preserve of the Israeli Army. Various Palestinian security
agencies as well as the Palestinian police also patrol it. These agencies together make up
a semi-ordered, although overlapping and hydra-like system. The Palestinian security
agencies have always suffered from a confusion of purpose. Are they supposed to ensure the
security of Palestinian citizens? Or is it their duty to ensure Israel’s security?
Should they have anything to do with the unfinished business of Palestinian national
liberation? Should they be concerned with pursuing so-called Palestinian
“extremists” despite the lack of any prospects for a political settlement?
Analyzing each of these roles, it becomes clear that the Palestinian security agencies
have fulfilled all of them, even though one aspect has predominated at any one time
according to prevailing circumstances. While some joined the fight against occupying
Israeli forces, they also pursued Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) activists, even (as in what happened in Ramallah recently)
handing them over to Israel or to US and British wardens at Jericho jail.
This confusion (variously ascribed to multiple leaderships, contradictory personal
interests, and clashing loyalties) has been mainly due to the hybrid state of the
Palestinian cause itself. The Palestinians have been torn between building a civil
authority on the one hand, and completing the liberation of their native land on the
other. What made matters worse was that Israel chose to concentrate its blows on these
same security agencies. Their headquarters were targeted, their equipment destroyed, and
their movement limited. The Israelis also targeted Palestinian security leaders, who have
been suffering the same hardships and deprivations as ordinary citizens.
The PA considered its appointment of an interior minister to have been a significant step.
But the United States and Israel poured cold water on it, and kept on insisting that
Yasser Arafat do something to stop “terror.” In other words, they want Arafat to
stop terrorist attacks against Israel without the tools not to mention the political
incentive to do so.
While it is possible to imagine the mission the Israeli Army is carrying out in the West
Bank, it is infinitely more difficult to fathom that which the Palestinian
“army” wants to engage in or which its political leadership envisages for it
alternating as it has between confronting occupation and Palestinian opposition factions.
But there is a third army stalking the small landlocked area that is the West Bank; a
secret army made up of suicide bombers and fighters intent on entering into direct armed
combat with the occupying Israelis. This army has no central command, no general staff,
and no officers. In this army, there are unlimited opportunities for individual and
regional initiative.
Neither do the factions making up this “army” have a unified strategy. Hamas,
Islamic Jihad and the PFLP have no qualms about launching operations in the entire land of
historic Palestine against any Israeli they can lay hands on. The Democratic Front for the
Liberation of Palestine, another “third army” faction, on the other hand insists
on targeting only the Israeli Army.
Fatah, for its part, has been oscillating between these two positions. While maintaining
that operations within the lands occupied in 1948 are impermissible, they nevertheless
carry out such operations if they want to avenge the assassination of their own leaders in
the West Bank or Gaza. Fatah says that it only targets the Israeli military, but in this
definition they include not only settlers but also anyone who visits a Jewish settlement.
This secret army has one avowed goal: To eradicate the Israeli occupation and to continue
the resistance until the Israeli Army withdraws from the Palestinian territories occupied
in 1967.
Beyond this bare minimum, however, disagreements start to appear. Some factions have no
objections to combining military action with diplomacy. Others declare that they would
cease their struggle once a Palestinian state is established in the territories occupied
by Israel in 1967. There are those who advocate holy war (jihad), and say that they would
never sign a peace treaty with Israel.
Confrontation is inevitable between the Israeli Army and this “third army.” But
Israel has been using the “second army” the Palestinian security forces
against the third. By refraining from targeting Gaza directly, Israel is behaving as if it
is using the militant organizations as a pretext to get rid of the Palestinian security
agencies.
There is also friction between the “second” and “third” armies that
rise and fall according to the pressures exerted on the PA.
It is said that it is very difficult for two armies to coexist in the same country, much
less three and each with its own agenda and accusing the other two of conspiring
against it to boot.
It seems impossible, in the short term at least, to solve this complex situation. Not even
a favorable political prospect appears to provide a panacea. There is a simple reason for
this: no political solution on offer can adequately deal with a situation that has led to
such a profusion of conflicts. Joseph Samaha is the
editor in chief of the Beirut daily As-Safir. He wrote this commentary for The Daily Star
Copyright © The Daily Star |
