| Trying to make sense of Washingtons Middle
East policy There is much discussion in the Arab press of noticeable indecision and feuding
within the Bush administration over Middle East policy, after Secretary of State Colin
Powell was seemingly rebuked by the White House for the remarks he made in his interview
reported in this column yesterday with the Saudi-run pan-Arab daily Al-Hayat.
And while Arab commentators try to make sense of the conflicting signals from Washington,
many are convinced that if anyone is charting Americas course in the region, it is
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.
The UAE daily Al-Khaleej sees no inconsistency between President George W. Bushs
avowed refusal to consider a timeline for the establishment of a Palestinian state in
keeping with his professed vision, and Powells suggestion to Al-Hayat
that a provisional Palestinian state could be set up as a step toward full
statehood as part of a final peace settlement with Israel.
Their remarks combined clarify the features of the American game for formulating a
booby-trapped solution outside the remit of international law or UN resolutions, the
Gulf newspaper says.
Bushs remarks imply that he wants to avoid making any commitment about the
Palestinian state he promised, in deference to Sharon, who wants more time to finish
destroying the current Palestinian Authority (PA) and tailoring a new one to his
specifications and to Israels political and security needs, and also to complete the
destruction of the Palestinian economic and social infrastructure so as to present the
Palestinian people with a new fait accompli, Al-Khaleej writes.
Powell, for his part, made clear that the administration was committed to a Palestinian
state, but then went on to cast it in an ambiguous framework, hitherto unknown to
political science, it remarks. History has never previously recorded, nor has
the world ever witnessed in times ancient or modern the establishment of a
provisional state. But in its quest to impose its hegemony on the world
by force, the Bush administration believes it can not only impose the solutions that
suit it, but also create and restructure states according to its interests.
With the US treating Israels interests as its own and prepared to justify anything
in the name of combating terror, the invention of a
provisional Palestinian state serves Israels purpose of blocking the
establishment of a genuine Palestinian state that enjoys independence and sovereignty.
But, Al-Khaleej writes, America has no problem with a provisional state that
would be on Israeli tryout, and in a suspended condition until it
conforms to Israels wishes and designs.
In political science there can be temporary governments or interim administrations,
but there is no such thing as a provisional state that can become a
permanent state if it succeeds in performing its American- and
Israeli-designated function, and taken out of existence if it fails, the paper says.
Faced with this American invention designed to evade responsibility for the
establishment of a genuine Palestinian state and continue indulging the Israeli side and
adopt Sharons view about future solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Arab
states and the Palestinians must be wary of falling into traps, Al-Khaleej counsels.
Abdelwahhab Badrakhan, writing in Al-Hayat, says that while Powells statements can
sometimes be as encouraging as Bushs are exasperating, theyre supposed
to be expressing the same policy if there ever was one.
The difference between them is that Powell no longer needs the State
Departments spokesmen to clarify what he means, whereas Bush drops verbal bombshells
and his spokesmen are left to limit the damage. But most times it transpires that what the
president said, rather than what the spokesmen explained, is the real policy.
Washingtons approach to the Middle East is a perfect example of how to put
together a nonpolicy, says Badrakhan.
It is a package of obfuscation and ambiguity, in which the only coherent element is
unqualified support of Israel at the expense of international law and norms, of
American values, and of Washingtons relations with the Arab and Islamic
worlds.
Everything else is a product of internal politicking within the administration and
Congress, where the Zionist lobby dominates.
So when Bush declares his commitment to achieving peace by engaging with all parties, the
Congress can come up with legislation targeting some of those parties, and tie his hands.
And while Bush may be persuaded that he needs to deal with a certain party, his
vice-president, defense secretary or advisors might not be, and that also inhibits
effective action to achieve breakthroughs.
When Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak suggested a timetable for Palestinian-Israeli
negotiations, he did so to ensure the talks would be serious and not end up in a
maze or endless dark tunnel. Yet, taking his cue from the Israelis, Bush declared
that he was not prepared to agree to such a timetable. This was where Powells role
came in, explaining to Al-Hayat that the president had merely indicated that, at the
instance when he was speaking, he had not yet come to a decision about the subject.
Powells explanation ostensibly sounds reasonable and convincing. But it so
happens that the Palestine question has been dragging itself for half a century. It so
happens that there is a peace process which has been waxing and waning for over a decade.
It so happens that Bush and Sharons views are astonishingly analogous. And it so
happens that the Bush administration has made plain from the outset its distaste for
proposing any Middle East initiative. A timetable means a commitment, and the
administration wants to avoid involvement so long as Israel is not ripe for
peace and she will never ripen now that she has been buoyed by her military
victory, Badrakhan says.
Similarly, he continues, Powell told Al-Hayat the administration would continue dealing
with Yasser Arafat as elected Palestinian leader. He presumably meant it, as he and other
US officials went to see him in his besieged headquarters.
But all that the Americans want from Arafat is that he arrange the process by which
he would relinquish power and go into retirement wherever he wants. In other words, they
have been recruited to implement Sharons wishes, he remarks.
When Arafat failed to show that he agreed with or understood what they meant by
reform, they sent the director of the CIA to threaten him. And when he behaved
as though he didnt hear the threat, and proceeded to form his new government, the
Israelis carried out the warning and prevented the government from meeting. Then Sharon
went to Washington to say he didnt like that government, and Bush said he
didnt like it either. This while the Arabs and Europeans considered it a step
in the right direction.
The Palestinians themselves had nothing but criticism for the new government,
but for totally different reasons. For them, reform should entail elections. But Sharon
doesnt want to see Arafat as a presidential candidate again, and Bush doubtless
agrees with him because reform, as far as they are concerned, means
Arafat not remaining leader.
Sharon is once again showing himself to be the maker of US policy. And when Bush
tells any visiting Arab leader that he is ready to act but doesnt trust Arafat or
doesnt favor dealing with him, that turns Arafats fate into an Arab
problem, Badrakhan reasons.
Saad Mehio comments in Al-Khaleej that those Arabs who think Bush is idiotic for
supporting Sharon as he pushes the Middle East into mayhem are mistaken.
Sharons policies indeed foreshadow a headlong plunge toward the precipice of
anarchy, explosions and security troubles for the region, but that doesnt
necessarily mean that Bushs endorsement of them is a symptom of insanity, he
remarks.
Bush knows exactly what he is doing, and he does not adopt Sharons military
and security outlook because the latter has exceptional powers of persuasion, but because
he wants to be persuaded in the first place, he writes.
Persuaded of what?
First, that the top priority for the US now, and perhaps for years to come, is war rather
than peace.
Second, that Israel is a strategic treasure to the US rather than a
tactical liability. Israeli intelligence provides an endless stream of
information on all things Arab. Its military establishment serves as an excellent
deterrent to anyone who might think, even merely think, of challenging the US (the example
of Gamal Abdel-Nasser in 1967). And its political leadership has, since the days of
Theodor Herzl and Chaim Weizmann, made a point of serving the hegemonic power in the
Middle East.
And third, that post-Sept. 11 America should not suffice with tinkering with the
regions regimes but replace them completely (the Taleban yesterday, the PA
today, a number of Arab states tomorrow), and Israel could play a big direct or
indirect role in that.
From such a perspective, the Sharonization of American policy makes sense, as
Israels supporters in the US have been arguing by citing the role it played during
the Cold War.
They point out that it thwarted radical Arab nationalists in Egypt, Lebanon,
Jordan and Palestine, and kept the former Soviet Unions ally, Syria, under
check for years. Its wars enabled the US to test its weaponry against Soviet-made
hardware. Israel also served as Americas channel for extending military backing to
regimes and groups that were unpopular with the American public, such as the apartheid
regime in South Africa, the Islamic Republic in Iran, and the military junta in Guatemala.
And Israeli advisers helped out US clients such as the Nicaraguan Contras, the
generals in El Salvador, and occupation forces in Namibia, while Israeli intelligence
helped the CIA gather intelligence and carry out covert operations. Moreover, Israel had
nuclear weapons and missiles that could have hit the heart of the Soviet Union.
All these valuable services rendered in the past appear urgently needed in the
present, says Mehio. The United States, having entered into what could prove
to be its toughest and most vicious war in the Middle East, will find it hard to resist
the idea of employing Israels military and security assets in such a war.
The pan-Arab daily Al-Quds Al-Arabi writes that during his latest visit to Washington,
Sharon was given an open-ended American mandate to carry on his crimes in the
occupied Arab territories, bury the Palestinian Authority, and deport its chairman, Yasser
Arafat, to any Arab or European country that might agree to take him in.
That was visible from the way Bush echoed Sharons rejection of the reforms Arafat
has been introducing into his administration, and stressed the need for new Palestinian
institutions that would nurture the emergence of new leaders.
So the Palestine question appears to be regressing to pre-Oslo days, with the peace
agreements effectively torn up and Sharon gradually reoccupying the West Bank and
tightening the noose around Arafat.
Sharon may be able to get his way in Washington, but he will certainly not be able
to achieve security and peace of mind for Israelis, the paper says. For the
Palestinian people will, quite simply, not cease to resist the occupation, either with the
PA in place, or after it has been exiled and the remnants of its institutions have been
destroyed.
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