Just before traveling to Washington for talks with President George W. Bush, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak gave an interview to The New York Times in which he said that the Egyptian intelligence service had, on the basis of information from an agent who had infiltrated Al-Qaeda, warned US officials shortly before Sept. 11 that a significant operation against a US target was imminent.
The effect this had on the Bush administration can be gauged from its reaction. Washington denied it had received any such warning. The US Embassy in Cairo and various intelligence agencies checked their correspondence with the Egyptians during the period in question, and found no evidence. And Cairo offered no proof ­ or rather it wasn’t asked for any. And it did not volunteer any after hearing Bush remark, on the day Mubarak’s interview was published, that Washington is full of rumors about alleged Sept. 11 tip-offs, and that the whole issue is being investigated by Congress.
Mubarak’s assertion did, indeed, coincide with the opening of a confidential congressional inquiry into allegations that the Bush
administration had been forewarned that the suicide hijackings were being planned, but did not do enough to prevent them.
In other words, Mubarak’s statement added fuel to a fire that has been smoldering around the White House for some weeks. Was that conscious or inadvertent?
Mubarak probably made his remark ahead of the visit as a way of highlighting Egypt’s security cooperation with Washington and the need to develop it.
But, as the Arab saying goes, instead of mending the jug, he broke it.
It is unlikely that the Egyptian president was trying to exert pressure on Bush by providing ammunition to his domestic critics. He may have been oblivious to his American counterpart’s troubles over the matter, the reasons for them, and the players behind them. It will be intriguing to see how Mubarak extricates himself from this one.
Throughout history, many have been in a similar position to that in which the Bush administration currently finds itself. What had seemed before the event to be vague and speculative evidence ­ part of a dense mixture of information ­ that something might happen, looks, after disaster strikes, to have been an obvious forewarning.
There have been countless wars, revolutions, assassinations and such that took everyone by surprise, but which in retrospect could clearly be seen coming ­ the October 1973 war being one case in point.
Immediately after disaster strikes, people and politicians tend to rally round and give their leaders an opportunity to recover, retaliate or make amends. Only when the dust settles does the
recrimination start, or the attempted muckraking as is currently taking place in Washington.
So totally did the events of Sept. 11 determine subsequent US internal and foreign policy that America and its government have become captive to them ­ and also to opportunistic attempts to exploit them by domestic business, political or religious lobbies, or by certain foreign governments, for a wide variety of reasons.
It must be recalled that initially, the Bush administration shunned the international stage and neglected foreign policy. In the Middle East, it avoided mediating, while continuing to provide military, economic and political ammunition to Israel, and to uphold the objective of destroying the regime in Iraq despite European and Arab opposition.
Sept. 11 alerted Washington that it needed an international coalition against terror, and that it would have to arrive at understandings with its allies if they were to do its bidding.
It was in this context that the Bush administration recognized the need for a Palestinian state living peacefully alongside Israel. This new development was a disaster for the expansionist Zionist agenda in Palestine and its surroundings, effectively prohibiting Israel’s further aggrandizement and recognizing the Palestinians’ right to live at peace in a state.
That was followed by the Saudi-authored Arab Peace Initiative, which offered Israel full relations with the entire Arab world in exchange for its full withdrawal from occupied Arab territories, consistent with the US position. Bush declared his support, which was developed in the understandings he reached with Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah at their landmark get-together in Texas last April.
Earlier, the administration had taken a clear stand against Israel’s behavior in Jenin, and put pressure on it not to endanger the life of President Yasser Arafat. It then transpired that the administration might defer any military operation against Iraq until after it had finished settling the Palestinian issue, so as to prevent the offensive against Iraq from developing into a war between Islam and the West.
Capping all this, it began to be said that the Bush administration was putting together a comprehensive political settlement to the Israel-Palestine conflict, which would then be imposed on both sides.
In taking these steps, Bush sought to protect both his administration and his country’s interests as a prelude to success in the long and multi-faceted “war on terror.” It was, after all, going to be waged in a variety of ways, including by tackling the root causes of terror, as advised by countless leaders all over the world who urged him not to employ military action alone.
Such a development ­ a presidential success in bringing peace to the Middle East and overcoming terror ­ would be incompatible with the interests of certain domestic centers of power and a number of foreign governments. Thus came the intelligence insinuations to Bush’s domestic opponents that he and his administration are at fault for not preventing the Sept. 11 attacks.
There are certainly players outside America who want to ensure that Bush keeps the guns blazing around the world, and that he defends his internal position by keeping everyone preoccupied with the fires
of war and prolonging the period before the dust
can settle.
The likely candidates after Afghanistan have already been determined, starting with Iraq and then countries like Syria and Iran, plus the other targets identified by the media and lobby groups.
Resolving the Middle East conflict before launching such a war would bring to an end the existing state of hostility to the US, and reduce terrorism by depriving it of its supporters and rationale. That would also, by extension, diminish the role played by military regimes and by states serving
as offshore American military bases.
External intelligence leaks to the US Democratic opposition ­ about Bush and his administration having known of the Sept. 11 attacks ­ are warning shots, alerting the president that those who fired them can make sure he exits the White House under a cloud, as well as hurt his party ahead of legislative elections. The Democratic opposition cannot pass up such an opportunity. But a closer look at the figures that have taken up the attack, and at their internal and external connections and prejudices, would offer a lesson on how things are run in Washington.
It is into this stormy sea that Mubarak threw a spear on the eve of his trip to Washington. He hoped to catch some recognition of the importance of the Egyptian-US security relationship, to justify military and economic aid to Egypt. But instead he hit his friend Bush in the rear.

Abdeljabbar Adwan is a Palestinian analyst. He wrote this commentary for The Daily Star

Copyright © The Daily Star