It was scarcely two days after the UN Security Council issued Resolution 1409 before Baghdad agreed to its provisions. This was a rapid response by Iraqi standards ­ especially compared to the 18 months it took them to agree to “oil-for-food” Resolution 968.
The reason behind this ready agreement was not that the Iraqis feared an American strike, but rather because 1409 was a victory for Baghdad: It was a giant step toward a total lifting of sanctions and regaining control over oil revenues.
The consensus within the Security Council that made 1409 possible (and which was trumpeted by the US as a great victory) had a price:
l Resolution 1284, which the Security Council passed on Dec. 17, 1999, linked a softening of the American position over sanctions to a return of UN weapons inspectors to Iraq. Resolution 1409, by contrast, gave Iraq all the inducements contained in 1284, but without linking these to any mention of a return of the inspectors. The new resolution also renewed the oil-for-food programs for a further six months without asking Baghdad for any new commitments.
l When Resolution 1284 was passed, Washington justified the “concessions”
it made by saying that it wanted to deprive Baghdad of using the suffering of the Iraqi people as a card to gain sympathy. But the Americans made even more concessions through 1409, underlining Baghdad’s success in using sanctions to gain regional and world sympathy, and will continue to do so as long as its oil revenues remain under UN control.
l Resolution 1284 stipulated that Iraq would be allowed to freely import humanitarian goods included on a list without reference to the UN sanctions committee. Resolution 1409, by contrast, permits Iraq to import not only humanitarian supplies, but all civilian goods. Only dual use items would be referred to the sanctions committee for approval. It has to be said, though, that many items on this list (such as diving suits) are not traditional Iraqi imports anyway.
l Resolution 1409 stipulates that all Iraqi import contracts be decided upon by the UN weapons monitoring body and the International Atomic Energy Agency within 10 days of receiving them. When these bodies suspect that some goods are dual use, they must then refer the contracts in question to the sanctions committee made up of the Security Council members. Even then, this does not mean that such contracts would be rejected automatically.
l This mechanism ensures that neither the US, nor Britain, nor any other Security Council member state can henceforth be held responsible for delaying or rejecting contracts for goods bound for Iraq. The onus has been shifted to a UN technical committees. There is no doubt that these committees are more sensitive to Iraqi criticism and blackmail than were London and Washington when they ran the show.
l According to 1409, only certain items will be rejected if they are suspected of having dual use potential; the actual contract that included such items would not. All other items listed in such contracts would be shipped to Iraq while the suspicious ones are considered.
l The original smart sanctions idea envisioned the cooperation of Iraq’s neighbors with the UN in monitoring border crossings in order to deter smuggling. Resolution 1409, however, dispenses with this provision, leaving matters much as they are now.
Syria, for example, still considers Iraqi oil supplies it receives to be for “technical analysis” purposes only! To get the Russians to agree to 1409, contracts to the value of $700 million they had signed with the Iraqis were approved.
But will the Iraqi people feel a positive difference in their living standards with the implementation of 1409?
Highly unlikely. The Iraqi regime simply does not have enough income to cover the requirements of the most recent phase of the oil-for-food program that ends on May 30. Baghdad’s rash decision to stop oil exports for 30 days “in solidarity with the Palestinian intifada” lost the country in the region of $1.2 billion in revenues, thus increasing the deficit in the oil-for-food program to about $4 billion.
Resolution 1409 was an American admission of the failure of sanctions in isolating ­ much less overthrowing ­ the Iraqi regime. In other words, the US policy of containing Saddam Hussein’s regime has failed. In fact, US President George W. Bush went even further when he said that a containment policy against Iraq would never work so long
as Baghdad was intent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).
But Resolution 1409 would nevertheless be of some use to Washington, if only to deflect the humanitarian concerns associated with economic sanctions. It also enhanced unity within the Security Council, making it easier for the UN body to speak with one voice on the issue of Iraqi disarmament. The price for Washington’s soft line on 1409 will be a much harder position on the issue of weapons inspectors.
The State Department is in no position to make concessions on this issue, especially after Sept. 11 and particularly as there are other circles (such as Congress and the Pentagon) that do not happen to believe that the return of weapons inspectors would be enough to neutralize the Iraqi threat.
Moreover, the Bush administration has designated the threat of WMDs as one of its top foreign policy priorities in the “war on terror.” In addition, the recent rapprochement between Washington and Moscow  does not give the Russians much room for maneuver in its efforts to help Iraq.
That is why the next confrontation with Iraq will revolve around a new resolution dealing with WMDs and the return of the inspectors.
Baghdad will only agree to cooperate if it was reassured that by doing so the US would try to overthrow the regime, and that sanctions would be lifted totally once the inspectors certify that the country is free of WMDs. Washington, on the other hand, is unprepared to give the Iraqis such assurances.
This being the case, Baghdad will view the return of the inspectors as a reconnaissance mission to prepare for a US invasion. Indeed, in the May 17 issue of the New York Times, James Dao wrote that one of Washington’s most worrying concerns ­ and one of the main reasons for delaying military action against Iraq ­ is the fear of Iraq using chemical weapons against US troops.
It is not strange, therefore, for Baghdad to view the UN’s mission as being intended to dispel these doubts. The Iraqis believe that far from making an invasion less likely, Washington’s certainty that they do not have WMDs will actually encourage the US to invade.
On the other hand, it is surely not in Baghdad’s interests to reveal that it does possess WMDs, since these weapons are the regime’s ultimate deterrent against an American invasion and/or a popular uprising.
Russia and France have been trying to convince the Iraqis that by letting the
inspectors back in, they would avoid a US military strike. So far, however, the Iraqis are unconvinced.
They believe that the
inspectors, once back in Iraq, can instigate a crisis at any time and thus give Washington the pretext it needs to invade.
Conversely, by refusing to allow the UN team back in, the Iraqis would also give the US a pretext to strike, especially since Washington has so far failed to find a link between Saddam Hussein’s regime and al-Qaeda.
Baghdad, in short, is in a Catch-22 situation.

Ghassan al-Atiyyah is the Iraqi editor of the London-based Iraqi File (iraqifile@aol.com). He wrote this commentary for The Daily Star

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