DUBAI: For the first time in nine years, the UAE’s minister of state for foreign affairs has visited Tehran this week. On May 26-27 Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed al-Nahayan was in Tehran to convey a message from UAE President Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahayan to Iranian President Mohammad Khatami on bilateral relations and what Sheikh Hamdan called “efforts to strengthen security and stability in this sensitive part of the world.”
The message also featured an invitation for Khatami to visit the UAE, which he accepted and promised to honor at the earliest possible time.
The most recent meeting between the two countries at the foreign-minister level was held on May 25, 1993, when then- Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati visited Abu Dhabi and met with Sheikh Zayed. Sheikh Hamdan subsequently made arrangements for a visit to Tehran in September of that year, but the visit was canceled at the last minute because of the UAE’s contention that the Iranian side lacked “any intention of allowing the visit to succeed,” according to a statement issued by the Emirati Foreign Ministry at the time.
Iran was critical of the trip’s  cancelation, and has since demanded that a UAE official pay a return visit. Nonetheless, it still took nine years such a visit to occur.
So what are the main points of disagreement between the two Muslim neighbors? And what were the circumstances surrounding Sheikh Hamdan’s visit this week to Tehran?
The major point of disagreement between the two countries ­  which have coasts on the Gulf and are economically, culturally and socially linked ­ centers on the three islands of Abu Moussa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, which are strategically located at the entrance of the Gulf. The route taken by tankers carrying Arab and Iranian oil exports runs close to them.
As the date for the withdrawal of British forces from the Gulf region in early December 1971 drew closer and Iran’s attempts to claim ownership of Bahrain failed, the shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, revived old imperial Iranian demands and attempts dating back to the early 20th century to claim ownership of the three islands.
But the UAE refused to give them up as it had exercised sovereignty over them for at least 225 years. The shah landed his troops on the Greater and Lesser Tunbs on Nov. 30, 1971, and occupied them. Then, through threats and pressure from both Britain and Iran, he was able to conclude a memorandum of understanding with the ruler of Sharjah to share control of Abu Moussa. Iranian troops landed in the northern part of the island, but the issue of sovereignty remained unresolved.
Since then, the UAE has been demanding sovereignty over the three islands and a peaceful resolution to the dispute. The UAE has pitched its position at international forums and through official statements. But Iran did not budge, either during the imperial era or during the subsequent Islamic revolution. Tehran claims that the original ownership of the islands has been restored, and maintains that the whole issue is a misunderstanding rather than a dispute. Iran’s position is supported by the military and demographic imbalance in its favor, as well as its control of the islands since 1971.
The dispute ­ particularly over Abu Moussa, the largest of the three islands ­ simmered at a low level until August 1992, when Iran violated its memorandum of understanding with Sharjah by preventing a number of UAE citizens from disembarking on the island and sending them back to Sharjah after they spent three nights at sea.
Iran subsequently violated its pledges and legal commitments in an attempt to impose full sovereignty over the island. The UAE objected to Iran’s actions, raising the matter with the UN and the Arab League and asking them to intervene after bilateral negotiations in 1992 and 1995 failed to resolve the dispute.
The UAE insists that the fate of the three islands be discussed together, whether through bilateral talks or regional or international mediation. Iran says the issue of Abu Moussa must be discussed separately, solely through bilateral negotiations. Each side has stuck to its position.
So what happened to prompt such an important visit by the UAE’s foreign minister?
Without doubt, several elements paved the way for his visit, and the international and regional contexts lent urgency to the need for paying it.
The events of Sept. 11 and their subsequent fallout focused US military attention on Iran. The extent of this became clear in statements made by US President George W. Bush during his trip to Moscow, as well as remarks by US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and Israeli agitation against Iran that included accusing it of being a sponsor of terror that sought to acquire weapons of mass destruction.
The visit also took place at a time of heightened tensions raised by the threat of a regional war between India and Pakistan ­ both of which are nuclear powers. These tensions have jeopardized the stability of the entire region, especially since large expatriate communities from both countries are present in the Gulf.
Moreover, the UAE foreign minister’s visit to Tehran came on the heels of a visit by the UAE’s chief of staff to Washington, during which he met with Bush, Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice.
The atmosphere created by such statements and threats of a regional war could push the region toward a military conflict, of which the issue of the three islands could be one of the causes.
The UAE is one the most politically and economically stable members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. It has not experienced attempts to undermine its security, such as a foreign invasion or a coup d’etat; it has not suffered financial crises; and it has not incurred large debts. It is therefore not in the country’s interest to be a party to any conflict between the US and Iran.
Perhaps this visit is part of an effort to overhaul bilateral relations and defuse tensions to deprive the right-wing hawks in the Bush administration of an opportunity to escalate tensions with Iran to the point of launching limited military strikes on the Silkworm missiles that Iran has installed on Abu Moussa and at the entrance to the Straights of Hormuz.
The UAE and Iran would both be losers if such an escalation were to occur. Last year’s resolution through the World Court of the dispute between Qatar and Bahrain over the Hawar islands, along with the end of tensions that had characterized relations between the two neighboring states months after the verdict, provides a practical example for a conciliatory and peaceful resolution of the legal dispute between the UAE and Iran over the three islands. It could be a precedent that can be resorted to in order to preserve the stability of both countries and the region in general.
Will Iran respond to the UAE’s gesture? Will it grant the upper hand to reason and wisdom and accept innovative solutions that promote links and joint interests instead of resentment and enmity?

Mohammed Abdullah Al Roken is an Emirati academic and analyst who teaches Public Law at UAE University

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