While in the workings, the deal Israel recently struck with Hezbollah to exchange prisoners who were in its custody for the hostages the Lebanese militia seized two years ago, sparked an intense public debate over whether the price extorted from Israel would equal the remuneration. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's declaration that the captives Hezbollah was holding were deceased only further intensified the debate, both over whether the ransom demanded by Hezbollah was reasonable and over the deal's impact on Israel's future security. It was obvious that the discussion constituted a preamble to the one that would arise over the next exchange deal with Hamas, whose price will almost certainly exceed that of its immediate predecessor.

Israel's sensitivity to and sense of responsibility for the fates of those of its citizens imprisoned by the nation's enemies, a sensitivity that is anchored in Jewish tradition, has been consistent over the years. As such, every deal Israel has struck in the past for the return of Israeli hostages has raised the question of whether this national quality is a welcome outgrowth of Israel's moral strength and a mutual guarantee in which all Israelis can take comfort, or whether it constitutes an Achilles heel that can be easily exploited by the country's enemies to extract unacceptable concessions.

The public debate on these issues always hinges on the questions of price and recompense, which are inextricably woven into negotiations of this kind. Israeli hardliners seek to legislate stern, uncompromising policies and principles that will restrict future governments' room to maneuver, in the hopes of staving off future blackmail attempts. This tendency reflects entirely understandable public impulses, but it treats blackmail attempts as a monolithic phenomenon, completely ignoring the differences between them, which stem from each case's timing and political, and even geopolitical, context.

It's worth noting that in the past, Israel has seized any viable chance to free its hostages by means of military action, rather than through the release of imprisoned terrorists. When such a possibility was not feasible, however, Israel paid the price the circumstances demanded. Due to the disproportion between the number of Israeli citizens and soldiers seized and the prisoners held in Israeli custody, the ransom Israel had to pay up was always higher than the return it received, in terms of prisoners released vs. hostages returned.

The two hostage exchange deals in question - the recently completed exchange with Hezbollah, and the ongoing negotiations with Hamas for the release of Gilad Shalit - differ in both scope and significance. Each should be examined separately.

Despite being emotionally taxing, the price Hezbollah extorted from Israel ended up being relatively low. The deal roiled Israeli stomachs because it granted Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah and the path and ideology he embodies a token victory and necessitated the release of Samir Kuntar, a symbol to Israelis of the war being waged upon them by their neighbors. Yet it seemed as though Kuntar's continued imprisonment would not have afforded Israel any new information on Ron Arad's fate and his release wouldn't hinder Israel's future efforts to resolve the riddle of his disappearance. Given, then, that freeing Kuntar would secure the return of the two Israeli soldiers captured by Hezbollah and remove the shadow of uncertainty that had hung over the lives of both men's families, the release of the murderous Lebanese Druze was perceived by many in Israel as an unavoidable necessity.

We may assume that the price of the deal with Hamas to return captured soldier Gilad Shalit - who, in contrast to the hostages snatched by Hezbollah, is assuredly alive - will be higher and much more difficult to stomach. It is clear that the Egyptian-mediated negotiations are designed only to minimize, not eliminate, this cost.

Those who currently demand that Israel take a hard line in all blackmail situations should take into account the realities of contemporary Israel, the history of previous prisoner swaps and, most important, should examine their demand's repercussions through the prism of the fundamental values Israel wishes to preserve. There is no doubt that this is a severe dilemma, one that pits equally valid and diametrically opposed principles and values against each other, and that any decision will have to measure up to future threats, serve as the basis for attempts to prevent a future repetition of similar dilemmas, and induce Israel to inspect each future case in its own right.

After the deal with Hamas is actually carried out, then, it would be best to conduct an intensive public debate in Israel on the clash that often occurs between fundamental principles and values and the political and security exigencies imposed upon the country by the conduct of its enemies. Among other topics for discussion, it would be wise to inspect Israel's policy regarding the release of prisoners currently in its custody, along with various possibilities of incorporating them into future attempts to resolve political conflicts between Israel and its adversaries.

Yoram Schweitzer is a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) at Tel Aviv University.